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Abstract 
 
This thesis is composed of three chapters. The first one investigates the impact of 
distance, market and supply access and agglomeration externalities on FDI 
locations. Chapter 2 studies the change in trade costs on FDI locations. Chapter 3 
examines the relative effect of trade costs on horizontal and vertical FDI locations. 
         Chapter 1 provides empirical evidence of the effect of agglomeration with 
firms from the same country on other location determinants. I use data for the 
Taiwanese FDI projects in Chinese provinces from 1991 to 1996. In order to 
estimate the relative change in coefficient magnitude over time, I exploit 
Taiwan’s FDI policy shock in 1991. I find negative effects of the bilateral 
distance between the home and host country on FDI locations. Sectoral 
agglomeration with firms from the same country also has significant and positive 
impact on FDI locations.  
          Chapter 2 investigates the impact of the change in trade costs on FDI 
locations. I study the effect on the FDI growth rate and the number of new FDI 
projects. Taiwan’s cross-strait direct flights policy in 2008 provides a 
quasi/natural experiment on the change in trade costs, arising from the 
implementation of direct flights between Taiwan and China. I use difference-in-
difference estimator with Taiwanese firm-level data for the period 2002 to 2011 
to identify the casual effect of the change in trade costs on FDI locations. 
Furthermore, I decompose the effect of trade costs by identifying the transaction 
and transport costs channels. Contract and unit value intensity are created to 
measure the relative effect of trade costs through two channels. I find that the 
dispersion of Taiwanese FDI after the policy shock in 2008.  
          Chapter 3 investigates the impact of trade costs on horizontal and vertical 
FDI locations. I study the relative effects of trade costs on the number of new 
horizontal and vertical FDI affiliates across industries.  I use Taiwanese firm level 
data during the period 2001 to 2011 in combination with the input-output links 
between the parent firm and affiliates to identify horizontal and vertical FDI as 
well as inter-and intra-industry vertical FDI. My findings indicate trade costs 
have additional negative impact on vertical FDI relative to horizontal FDI. In 
addition, as an increase in trade costs occurs, vertical FDI affiliates are affected 
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relatively more than horizontal FDI through both transaction and transport costs 
channels.  
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Introduction 
 
1. Overview of Research methodology 
 
This thesis is divided in three parts. The first part, chapter 1, studies the effect of 
distance, market and supply access and agglomeration externalities on FDI 
location choices by investigating Taiwanese FDI in Chinese provinces during the 
period between 1991 and 1996. The second part, chapter 2, studies the impact of 
the change in trade costs on FDI location choices by using a unique quasi-natural 
experiment of Taiwan’s cross-strait direct flights policy in 2008. Finally, the third 
part, chapter 3, studies the relative effect of trade costs on the patterns of FDI by 
using Taiwanese firm-level data during the period 2001 to 2011. In this thesis, I 
employ applied econometric methodology to identify the causal effects that are 
derived from the research questions in each chapter. The applied econometric 
methodology is conducted through this thesis to address original research 
questions. The aim of this approach is to identify the casual relationship between 
the variable of outcome and the variables of interest which is theoretical and 
empirically relevant. This methodology contain three main components: 
 
A. Literature review 
 
By thoroughly reviewing the relevant literature, I identify the gaps between the 
theoretical predictions and empirical evidence or gaps among the existing 
empirical studies. This allows me to formulate the research questions on the basis 
of the considerations on the theoretical relevance as well as empirical feasibility. 
Hence, a set of theoretical predictions is defined on the expected effects of the 
variables of interest on outcomes.  
 
B. Data 
 
To carry out the empirical exercises several datasets are used, both for Taiwan 
and China. An effort is made to employ the best available data for the research 
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questions investigated. For example, in the first part of the thesis, to be able to 
assess the effects of distance, market and supply access and agglomeration 
externalities on FDI locations, I collect Taiwanese FDI data from two data 
sources. One is the total registered FDI projects, and the other is the public listed 
firms’ FDI affiliates. Both of them are used to better control for measurement 
errors. With the aim of appropriately capturing the effects of agglomeration 
externalities, I collect Chinese provincial data on both industrial outputs and the 
number of firms, because both output and the number of firms are relevant 
sources to measure sectoral agglomerations. 
           In Chapter 2, in the case of the assessment of the change in trade costs 
after the direct flight policy shock on FDI locations, to provide alternative 
measure of this change I construct the passengers’ air travel time across year and 
province. Since the travel time is considered as a kind of trade costs, passengers’ 
air travel time captures this change in flight time as well as flight connection time 
if flight transfer needed.  
           In addition, in Chapter 3, I classify each Taiwanese affiliate’s industry 
code using the information of its primary products to construct the parent-affiliate 
industry pair. Also, to distinguish the type of each FDI affiliate by using the 
input-output linkage between the parent and affiliate, several concordance tables 
are used make compatible different industrial codes, such as ISIC Rev. 4 to 2002 
NAICS.  
 
C. Econometric strategies 
 
The empirical approach in this thesis is based on the estimation of reduced-form 
empirical specifications. Thus, clear theoretical predictions are essential for the 
formation of the empirical equations and for the interpretation of the magnitude 
and sign of the estimated coefficients. For instance, section 3 of chapter 2 
discusses the transaction and transport costs channels through which the trade 
costs might have cross-industry impacts on FDI location.  
             This thesis employs regression analysis to estimate the casual effects 
from the empirical specification. To be able to interpret the estimated coefficients 
as causal effects, particular attention is paid to estimating of unbiased coefficients. 
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Omitted variable bias, reverse causation, simultaneity bias, spurious correlation, 
unobserved effects, measurement errors or poor proxies are those affecting the 
validity of the estimates on variable of interests. To validate the coefficients on 
variables of interest, this thesis mainly uses three identification strategies to 
eliminate the potential biases.  
          First of all, I carefully include control variables in the estimated 
specifications to further control for omitted variable biases. Secondly, since it is 
extremely difficult to conduct randomized experiments on the effect of trade costs 
on firms’ location choices, the quasi/natural experiments can provide a “as if” 
experimental identification strategy to estimate the causal effects. In Chapter 2, I 
identify the cross-strait direct policy in 2008 as a quasi/natural experiment, which 
I argue it provides a “good variation” in the trade costs.  
     Finally, I use panel data, both at the aggregate level (panel of provinces and 
industries) and at the individual level (panel of firms). It allows me to control for 
unobservable and time invariant characteristics of the observation units. These 
unobserved variations might be correlated with both the variables of interest and 
the outcome variable. For example, various fixed effect estimators are used in 
Chapter 3 to address unobservable industry selection bias or omitted province-
industry specific comparative advantage. Also, by using time dummies, I control 
for common yearly shocks. Furthermore, I employ difference-in-difference 
estimation to exploit the exogenous variation before and after the policy shock.  
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2. Overview of thesis 
 
This thesis contains three main research studies, presented in Chapters 1 to 3. 
 
Chapter 1: Distance effect, Market and Supply Access, and Agglomerations: 
Evidence from Taiwanese FDI in China between 1991 and 1996 
 
Chapter 1 investigates the effect of distance, market and supply access and 
agglomeration externalities on FDI location choices by investigating Taiwanese 
FDI in Chinese provinces during the period between 1991 and 1996. The study of 
the impact of the country or regional characteristics on multinational firms’ FDI 
location choices has produced a large body of empirical literature in recent 
decades. However, investigations of the change in the distance effect and 
agglomeration externalities on the location decisions across time are scarcer. I 
exploit a FDI policy shock that occurred between Taiwan and China in 1991 as a 
unique quasi-natural experiment to test the theoretical predictions on these 
variables of interest. Due to the political conflicts across the Taiwan Strait, direct 
economic activities were banned between Taiwan and China since 1949. Direct 
trade was opened in 1987, following the removal of restrictions on Taiwanese 
individuals and firms’ FDI in China in 1991. Hence, I use the policy shock to 
construct two investing periods, 1991 to 1993 as the first period and 1994 to 1996 
as the second one in the Taiwanese FDI data. To estimate the relative change in 
magnitude of the variables of interest on firms' location choices, I run a similar 
specification as Mayer et al. (2010) by using conditional logit estimation. The 
variable of outcome is Taiwanese FDI projects across 24 Chinese provinces and 
16 manufacturing industries.  
          To better identify the effects of different agglomeration externalities, I 
construct two sets of province-industry specific agglomeration variables: market 
and supply access and sectoral agglomeration. First, market and supply access 
variables are included to measure the effects of forward the backward linkages 
across industries and provinces. They are constructed on the basis of Amiti and 
Javorcik’s (2008) approach, using input-output table to define the industrial 
upstream and downstream relationships. Secondly, I create two sectoral 
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agglomeration variables; one is to measure the agglomeration of all 
manufacturing firms, and the other is the agglomeration of Taiwanese firms only.  
            The estimated specification includes provincial control variables in order 
to reduce omitted variables bias. I find that distance and sectoral agglomerations 
have consistently significant impacts on firms’ location decisions in both periods. 
The estimates of geographic distance between Taiwan and Chinese provinces, the 
proxy for trade costs, have consistently and significantly negative signs over two 
investing periods. As the distance increases, firms are less likely to invest in 
locations that are further away from the home country. Also, given the provincial 
factors costs, firms are more likely to invest in the locations where there exist 
clusters from the same industry in which they can gain extra benefits from 
agglomeration externalities such as labour pooling or knowledge spillover. Most 
import of all, after introducing the sectoral agglomeration of Taiwanese firms in 
the second investing period (1994-1996), the magnitude of estimates on both the 
distance and sectoral agglomeration declines. At the same time, the estimate of 
Taiwanese sectoral agglomeration is significant with the expected positive sign. 
This is because Taiwanese firms gain positive externalities from clustering with 
other Taiwanese firms from the same industries, such as insightful investing 
information. On the other hand, the estimates of the market access and supply 
access variables are not consistently significant with the expected positive sign 
over two investing periods. Since the domestic market and industrial 
infrastructures were still under development in China in the early 1990s, upstream 
or downstream linkages may not have the same impact as strong as other 
provincial characteristics on firms’ location decisions. 
            These findings in Chapter 1 contribute to the current literature on FDI 
location in three ways. First of all, given agglomeration externalities and other 
provincial characteristics, I clearly identify the statistically significant and 
negative effect of geographic distance, as a proxy for trade costs, on FDI location 
choices. Secondly, with the Taiwanese FDI firm-level data, the findings present 
the consistently and significantly positive effect of cross-industry Taiwanese 
agglomeration on attracting new FDI projects. Finally, by exploiting the 
Taiwanese FDI policy shock, two investing periods are constructed to examine 
the relative change in the estimated magnitude of variables of interest across time.  
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Chapter 2: Does the Distance Matter? The effect of Change in Trade Costs 
on FDI Locations 
 
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of the change in trade costs on FDI location. I 
study the effect of change in trade costs on the FDI growth rate and the number of 
new FDI projects. There are two major empirical obstacles. First, in multi-
regional models, without factor price equilibrium across space, there are no clear 
theoretical predictions of the effect of changes in trade costs on the firms’ 
locations. Secondly, the distance variable, as a major part of trade costs, can be 
correlated with other unobserved geographical characteristics, such as culture, 
language or the quality of institutions.  
            In this chapter, I address these identification issues by employing a unique 
quasi-natural experiment of Taiwan’s cross-strait direct flights policy in 2008. 
The change in trade costs arises from the implementation of a new transportation 
mode, and I argue that this change in trade costs is exogenous to Taiwanese FDI 
activities. Hence, in combination with panel data on Taiwanese FDI projects, I 
can use difference-in-difference estimation to investigate the casual effect of the 
change in trade costs on FDI locations. By exploiting the variation of the distance 
effect before and after this exogenous policy shock across provinces and time, the 
potential omitted variable biases resulting from unobservable provincial 
characteristics can be eliminated. 
            Furthermore, I decompose the effect of trade costs on firms’ location 
choices by identifying the transaction and transport costs channels. Based on the 
trade literature (Nunn, 2007; Horrigan, 2010; Cristea, 2011), I create contract and 
unit value intensity to measure the relative effect of trade costs through the 
transaction and transport costs channels across industry. As for the transaction 
costs channel, if an industry requires more relationship-specific investments, it 
will face higher face-to-face communication, information, or matching costs. This 
causes the industry to pay relatively higher transaction costs than others as the 
distance between home and host FDI destination increases. As for transport costs, 
based on the fact that air transportation is fast and expensive, air shipments are 
used only when timely delivery is valuable enough. This means the air shipments 
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occur when the value of traded goods is high enough to pay for the premium air 
shipping costs. For sufficiently high value-weight ratio products, the ad-valorem 
airfreight premium becomes relatively smaller than low ratio ones. Thus, goods 
imported from more distant locations are more likely to have higher value-weight 
ratio. In other words, the industry with higher unit value (value-weight ratio) will 
pay relatively less transport costs than others as the distance between home and 
host FDI destination increases.  
             I use the firm-level data of Taiwanese public listed firms’ foreign 
affiliates from Taiwanese Economic Journal (TEJ) during the period between 
2002 and 2011. The dataset provides information on affiliates’ business name, 
ownership, locations and primary products. The data is then aggregated to 23 
two-digit ISIC Rev. 4 manufacturing industries for 30 Chinese provinces. The 
variables of outcome are the FDI growth rate and the number of the new FDI 
affiliates. I attempt to examine the effect of policy shock on the flow level of FDI, 
instead of FDI stock level, which may not reflect the relative change in FDI 
projects over time. The main variable of interest is the bilateral distance, as the 
proxy for trade costs. Also, I use air travel time to approximate trade costs as a 
robustness check. The results from both measures are qualitatively consistent. 
            The main estimation strategy follows the same logic as a standard 
differences-in-differences (DD) specification. I compare the relative change in 
FDI growth rate and the number of new FDI projects in the post-shock period to 
the pre-shock period between provinces that are closer to or further away from 
Taiwan. The difference from standard DD strategy is that I use a continuous 
measure of the intensity of treatment (i.e. distance between Taiwan and Chinese 
provinces) and thereby capture more variation in the data. Since the year of 
openness to direct flights in each province depends on bilateral negotiation 
progress, I use the first openness year, i.e. 2008, for all provinces to have a single 
post-shock indicator. I argued that it is feasible that the timely implementation of 
direct flights and more options for connecting flights change trade costs for all 
provinces after 2008. Since the trade costs between Taiwan and China change for 
all provinces right after the policy announcement, I use the initial opening year, 
2008, as the cut-off period and define the periods prior to 2008 as the pre-shock 
periods, and the periods after 2008 (i.e. 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011) as the post-
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shock periods. Several sensitiveness and robustness checks are employed at the 
end. 
          The empirical results show that after the policy shock, the coefficient of 
interaction term of the post shock dummy and the distance between Taiwan and 
Chinese provinces has a consistently and significantly positive sign, i.e., the 
dispersion of Taiwanese FDI after the policy shock emerges. According to the 
estimates, the increase in the distance between Taiwan and China provinces by 10 
percentage points leads to a 0.32 percent change in the FDI growth rate and a 
0.52 percent change in the number of new FDI affiliates in the period 2008-2011. 
In other words, the remote provinces attract relatively more FDI projects after 
2008.  
           As for the transaction costs channel, the estimate of the interaction term of 
contract intensity and distance is statistically significant with the expected 
negative sign. Quantitatively, if the difference in contract intensity between two 
industries is 10 percentage points, as the distance increase by 10 percentage 
points, the number of new FDI affiliates in the relatively contract intensive 
industry will reduce average 0.24 percentage points more than the industry with 
the relatively low contract intensity. As for the transport costs channel, the 
magnitude of the estimate is weaker but still statistically significant. If the 
difference in unit value intensity between two industries is 10 percentage points, 
as a 10 percent increase in distance, the number of new FDI affiliates in the 
relatively unit value intensive industry will increase average 0.0049 percentage 
points more than the industry with the relatively low unit value intensity. 
Furthermore, after the direct flight shock, there is no clear impact through the 
transaction costs channel, while firms in the relatively high unit value intensive 
industries will choose to invest in relative closer locations than relative low 
intensive ones. 
 
Chapter 3: The Impact of Trade Costs on Horizontal and Vertical FDI—
Evidence from Taiwanese FDI in China 
 
Chapter 3 further investigates the impact of trade costs on horizontal and vertical 
FDI location. I study the relative effects of trade costs on horizontal and vertical 
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FDI affiliates across industries. Horizontal FDI is understood as occasions when 
the parent firm establishes foreign production facilities to serve the market 
locally. By producing the final products in the foreign country, the parent firm 
can avoid trade costs resulting from exporting goods to the foreign market. 
Vertical FDI represents that the parent firm divides the production chains to take 
advantage of cross-country factor cost differentials. The study of the impact of 
determinants on the patterns of FDI has produced an abundant empirical literature 
since 1990, especially on the impact of the market access and factor costs 
differentials. However, there are fewer empirical investigations on the relative 
impact of trade costs on the distribution of horizontal and vertical FDI activities. 
Hence, based on horizontal and vertical FDI theoretical models, I test three 
hypotheses to shed light on the role of trade costs on the patterns of FDI:  
 
1) Trade costs – approximated by bilateral distance - have a negative 
impact on the formation of new vertical FDI affiliates in comparison to 
the horizontal FDI;  
2) With the same transaction or transport costs intensities, vertical FDI 
affiliates will be affected relatively more than horizontal FDI as the trade 
costs increase;  
3) The negative impact of trade costs on intra-industry vertical FDI 
affiliates is smaller than inter-industry vertical FDI.  
 
            I use data on Taiwanese FDI affiliates during the period 2001 to 2011 to 
test my hypotheses. The Taiwanese firm-level dataset provided by Taiwan 
Economics Journal (TEJ) is on the basis of Taiwanese public listed firms’ direct 
investments in China. The TEJ dataset includes information on location, 
ownership, primary products and the parent firm’s information for each affiliates. 
By employing this information, I identify 3,023 new multinational affiliates in 87 
four-digit ISIC Rev. 4 manufacturing industries and 29 provinces. Observations 
are included only when their parent firms are from manufacturing sector as well 
in order to be compatible with the existing literature (ex. Brainard, 1997; Yeaple, 
2003). Following Alfaro and Charlton’s (2009) and Fajgelbaum et al.’ (2013) 
methods, I use a combination of four-digit International Standard Industrial 
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Classification Rev. 4 (ISIC Rev.4) industry-level information and U.S. Bureau 
Economic Analysis (BEA) 2002 Benchmark Input-Output Tables to distinguish 
horizontal and vertical FDI affiliates. Furthermore, I break down vertical FDI into 
inter-and intra-industry vertical FDI to assess the impact of trade costs within 
vertical FDI. Inter-industry vertical FDI is defined when the parent firm and 
affiliate have different two-digit ISIC Rev. 4 code, while intra-industry vertical 
FDI pairs share the same two-digit but different three or four-digit codes. 
            The variable of outcome is the logarithm of total number of each parent-
affiliate industry pair in the four-digit ISIC Rev.4 level in each Chinese province. 
Initially, I assess the effect of distance variable on the number of new FDI 
affiliates in horizontal and vertical sub-sample respectively. The estimated 
specifications include controls as well as industry and time fixed effects to reduce 
omitted variable biases. To identify the relative impact of trade costs on 
horizontal and vertical FDI, I introduce a set of interaction terms of independent 
variables and vertical FDI indicator in the full sample. The vertical FDI indicator 
equals one if the observation is classified as vertical FDI, and zero for horizontal 
FDI. Hence, the estimate of the distance interaction term catches the additional 
effect of trade costs on vertical FDI in comparison to horizontal one. The similar 
strategy is applied to examine the relative effect of trade costs on inter-and intra-
industry vertical FDI. In addition, I also decomposed the trade costs into 
transaction and transport costs channels on the basis of the methods created in 
Chapter 2. I estimate the relative trade costs effect through these two channels on 
the patterns of FDI.  
             My findings indicate that the increase in distance between Taiwan and 
province j by 10 percentage points reduces the number of new vertical FDI 
affiliates by 2.48 percentage points in comparison to horizontal FDI. In addition, 
if both vertical and horizontal FDI affiliates are in the same industry, as the 10 
percent increase in distance, the number of the vertical FDI affiliates reduces 
average additional 4.43 percentage points than horizontal FDI through the 
transaction costs channel, while the number increases by 0.15 percentage points 
through the transport costs channel. Finally, trade costs seem having no different 
impact on inter-and intra- industry vertical FDI location decisions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
DISTANCE EFFECT, MARKET AND 
SUPPLY ACCESS, AND 
AGGLOMERATION—EVIDENCE FROM 
TAIWANESE FDI IN CHINA BETWEEN 
1991 AND 1996 
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1. Introduction 
For the past two decades, it has been well recognized that FDI by multinational 
firms has grown significantly in both developed and developing countries. The 
World Bank (1993) summarized the benefits that FDI brings: technology transfer, 
management know-how and export marketing access. There is abundant literature 
documenting those positive spillovers of FDI on host countries theoretically and 
empirically. For example, Markusen and Venables (1999) provided a theoretical 
justification of spillovers through backward linkages. Haskel et al. (2007) and 
Keller and Yeaple (2009) show FDI leads to significant productivity gains for 
domestic firms, by using firm level data from the United Kingdom and the United 
States respectively. Also, Javorcik (2004) employed firm level data from 
Lithuania to provide evidence consistent with positive productivity spillovers 
from FDI taking place through the vertical spillover channel, i.e. the contacts 
between foreign firms and their local suppliers in upstream sectors. Hence, FDI-
oriented policies such as discriminated corporate tax or subsidized industrial 
infrastructure become popular in developing and transitional countries, expecting 
the increase in inward FDI will bring in much-needed capital, new technologies, 
or advanced management skills. 
Aware of the FDI inflow competition among China’s regions, there are 
plenty of empirical studies investigating determinants of FDI location choices in 
China for example, Amiti and Javorcik (2008), Debaere et al. (2010), and Chang 
et al. (2011). The findings demonstrate that local agglomerations and FDI-
oriented policies have positive effects on foreign affiliates’ locations, while the 
distance between home country and China, as the proxy for trade costs, has an 
adverse impact. However, thorough studies on the impacts of distance, market 
and supply access and agglomeration externalities on regional FDI location 
decisions are scarcer. Besides, abundant empirical results have documented the 
separate effect of these location determinants, but to the author’s knowledge, the 
empirical evidence on change in impact of the distance and market and supply 
access over time is scarce. Furthermore, the empirical findings for FDI locations 
where both host and home country are developing countries at the early 
development stage are rare because of the data limitation. In this study, I employ 
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a unique data of Taiwanese FDI in China in the early 1990’s to investigate the 
relative importance of location factors on FDI inflows in the developing country. 
I identify the openness of direct cross-strait FDI in 1991 after forty years’ 
ban on bilateral commerce as an exogenous policy shock. The innovation in this 
chapter is to investigate the relative impact of distance, market and supply access, 
and agglomeration externalities on firms’ location choices by constructing two 
investing periods for the very first Taiwanese FDI projects in China during the 
period from 1991 to 1996. The first period is 1991-1993, when no proceeding 
FDI projects from other Taiwanese firms are observed. I start from a basic profit 
driven location model, which is based on Mayor et al. (2010), to analyse the first 
movers’ location choices since 1991. The second is 1994-1996. For the following 
investors, since the new agglomeration externalities such as Taiwanese sectoral 
agglomeration formed in the later investing period, I can investigate the deviation 
of the magnitude of the distance and other existing agglomerations effects.  
In summary, these findings in Chapter 1 contribute to the current literature 
on FDI location in three ways. First of all, given agglomeration externalities and 
other provincial characteristics, I clearly identify the statistically significant and 
negative effect of geographic distance, as a proxy for trade costs, on FDI location 
choices. Secondly, with the Taiwanese FDI firm-level data, the findings present 
the consistently and significantly positive effect of cross-industry Taiwanese 
agglomeration on attracting new FDI projects. Finally, by exploiting the 
Taiwanese FDI policy shock, two investing periods are constructed to examine 
the relative change in the estimated magnitude of variables of interest across time. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical review 
on relevant FDI location literature and a discussion of the historical background 
of cross-strait direct FDI policy, while Section 3 outlines the theoretical model. 
Section 4 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical 
strategy and baseline results. Section 6 reports additional robustness checks. 
Section 7 offers concluding remarks. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Related Literature on FDI Location Choices 
The sources of uneven distribution of economic activities across space have been 
popular research interests for a long time. According to Marshall (1920), who 
first introduced the concept of agglomeration economies, the agglomeration of 
economic activities is likely to be generated through three potential mechanisms: 
specialized labour market pooling, input sharing and knowledge spillovers. There 
have been plenty of empirical results showing that firms from the same industry 
tend to cluster in the same region (such as those of Head et al., 1995; Head & 
Mayer, 2004; Amiti & Javorcik, 2008). 
  In the new economic geography (NEG) literature, which emerged 
following the work of Krugman in 1991, location choices are viewed as 
determined by a tension between agglomeration forces and dispersion forces. The 
two agglomeration forces are the “home market effect” and the “price index 
effect;” the two dispersion forces are the “market crowding effect” and an 
immobile factor, “agricultural labour.” According to Redding (2009), 
agglomeration forces arise from pecuniary externalities due to a combination of 
love of variety, increasing returns to scale and transport costs. The dispersion 
forces arise from product market competition and geographically immobile 
factors of production or amenities. The “home market effect” implies that, due to 
the increasing returns to scale and transport costs, firms tend to concentrate 
production near to large markets. The “price index effect” implies that, because 
of consumers’ love of variety and transport costs, there is a lower cost of living 
near to large markets. As for the first dispersion force, the “market crowding 
effect”, transport costs imply that firms close to large markets face a larger 
number of lower-priced competitors than in the smaller one. The second 
dispersion factor implies that immobile factor agricultural labour in combination 
with transport costs provides an incentive for dispersed production across regions. 
  In the ensuing related research, Krugman and Venables (1995) and 
Venables (1996) were concerned with the idea that, since national boundaries 
constrain labour mobility, intermediate inputs can be a source of cumulative 
causation. In a manner analogous to that of classic agglomeration forces, 
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manufacturing firms agglomerate through forward (costs) and backward 
(markets) linkages. A location with a relatively large share of manufacturing 
intermediates has costs advantages for final goods production. Conversely, a 
location with a larger share of the final goods sector provides a larger local 
market for producers of intermediates. Amiti and Javorcik (2008) were among the 
first to introduce a supplier access variable to take into account the inter-industry 
linkages in empirical FDI location analysis at the multiregional level.  
          The empirical literature on the FDI locations provides evidence that the 
positive agglomeration externality for multinational firms can result from locating 
FDI projects in destinations with existing agglomerations from the same country. 
These externalities include greater availability of specialized inputs and labour as 
well as technology spillover. Head et al. (1995) discovered that inter-firm 
linkages within Japanese business groups force members to choose overseas 
affiliates close to one another. In addition, many researchers have pointed out that 
all major FDI investors in China, i.e. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and America, 
are inclined to choose locations favoured by their fellow pioneers because of 
strong business connections, shared language and culture (He, 2002; Belderbos, 
2002; Du et al., 2008; Debaere et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2013). Although China 
opened its market two decades ago, unreliable local political, social and business 
environments and less transparent institutions have made China one of the 
remaining risky investment countries for foreign firms. Even sharing the same 
language and cultures, investors from Taiwan and Hong Kong still tend to 
agglomerate in China.  
   Furthermore, the distance effect is one of the persistent determinants of 
FDI location choices (Balderbos, 2002; Mayer et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2013). 
FDI is an international economic activity and setting up a foreign plant requires 
higher fixed costs than a domestic plant. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2001) assume 
the plant set-up costs, similarly to trade costs, are of the iceberg type in their 
empirical study, i.e. an increase in distance leads to an increase in the set-up 
costs.1 Also, distance is an important determinant of the transport costs of goods 
                                                
1 They assume set-up costγ=γ0+ρ*δ, whereδis the distance, 0≦ρ≦∞. As the distance increases, the costs increase because 
of the differences in the cultural, political or economic environments, etc. 
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shipments (Hummels, 2007). Mayer et al. (2010) 2  considered the distance 
between home and host countries as part of the marginal transaction costs. In the 
empirical FDI location literature, the distance effect can be taken as a part of 
marginal production costs instead of as a fixed cost of setting up a foreign 
affiliate.  
   In the regional FDI locations empirical literature, few empirical studies 
provide evidence on both the impact of the distance between the home and host 
country and the regional agglomeration externalities on FDI location decisions. 
Chang et al. (2013) find that distance to home has significantly negative effect on 
both Taiwanese and Japanese multinational firms’ locations in Chinese provinces. 
At the same time, both sectoral agglomeration and same nationality 
agglomeration have positive and significant impacts on FDI locations. However, 
they do not consider the regional market and supply access across Chinese 
provinces, which have been examined by Amiti and Javorcik (2008) and Debaere 
et al. (2010) by using all FDI projects and South Korean FDI in China 
respectively.  
 
2.2 Historic background to Taiwanese FDI in China 
After 1979, China gradually opened its market to embrace market economies: the 
Open Door Policy. Due to the special historic and political relationship between 
Taiwan and China, the government of Taiwan did not relax restrictions on general 
tourist/ family visits to China until 1987.3 In the same year, indirect international 
trade, i.e. trade transferred via a third country like Hong Kong across the Taiwan 
Strait, started. However, direct investment in China was not allowed. At the same 
time, Taiwanese firms started facing decreasing profit margins resulting from 
wage increases and the reduction in local tax incentives. Hence, establishing a 
new plant in China in order to lower production costs became a popular solution 
to maintaining profit growth. The Taiwan’s government therefore faced 
                                                
2 In the cost function they include various transaction costs - distance, ex-colony dummy and language – in order to 
capture the fact that it is probably easier for a French investor to run a business in a proximate, francophone or ex-colonial 
country. These costs take the form of fixed costs. However, it seems that at least part of their influence on the location 
decision operates through the firm’s marginal cost.  
3 This was only open for one-way visits. People in China were not allowed to visit Taiwan at the same time. This 
restriction was gradually relaxed from 1992. Up to now, the individual travel of Chinese people is still restricted.  
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considerable demand to start legislating the cross-strait trade and investment 
regulations to protect Taiwanese firms and individuals as well as to maintain 
national security after 1988, when Taiwan’s central bank further lifted the control 
on foreign exchange.   
        While Taiwan and China’s governments were negotiating the details of 
regulations on economic activities, tourism, and migration, Taiwanese firms had 
attempted to invest in China indirectly via the third country since 1990. 
Governments from both sides did not finalize the official agreements until 1992 
and 1993. Before then, the cross-strait economic activities were ruled by 
temporary agreements, which started acquiring Taiwanese firms to register their 
FDI in China in 1991. With regard to FDI regulations, Taiwanese individuals and 
firms can invest in China but with a limit on maximum investment amounts.4 In 
addition, FDI projects in specific high technologies were not allowed to invest in 
China. In the case of the semiconductor industry, for instance, the Taiwanese 
government only permitted IC foundry firms to invest in technology below 8-inch 
wafer fabrication. Hence, I employ the open of cross-strait FDI policy as a quasi-
experiment to examine the effects of trade costs and agglomerations on FDI 
location choices in developing countries.  
Even with these restrictions, Taiwanese FDI projects in China started 
growing rapidly. Figure 1 shows that China has become since 1993 the top 
Taiwanese outward FDI destination. In 2008, China accounted for more than 70 
percent of the total amount of Taiwanese outward FDI. Moreover, over 80 
percent of the amount of Taiwanese outward FDI is concentrated in Asia, while 
the share is around 15 percent in America and less than 1 percent in Europe.  
                                                
4 For individuals, the investment can be up to 5 Million New Taiwan Dollars per year. For firms, the investment can be up 
to 60% of a firm’s net capital. 
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3. Theoretical Model 
 
In this paper, the theoretical framework used to analyse Taiwanese FDI location 
decisions in Chinese provinces is derived from Mayer et al.’s (2010) and Amiti 
and Javorcik (2008) models, which study the decision for a firm producing a 
differentiated good to open a new production facility abroad.  
Firms are assumed to compete in a monopolistically competitive 
environment, with each firm producing a differentiated variety. All varieties of 
final goods enter symmetrically into the consumer’s utility function and all 
varieties of intermediate inputs enter symmetrically in the firm’s cost function. 
To create a new plant abroad, a fixed cost occurs, expressed in unit of the 
numeraire good. Also, the fixed cost does not depend on the province chosen: 
Fj=Ffdi, j for all provinces. This assumption is useful when it comes to deriving a 
theoretically consistent equation to estimate the conditional location choice for 
investment abroad. This is feasible because the variation in fixed costs within one 
country should be smaller than across countries.  
    Once the fixed cost is paid, the firm can produce and sell goods through its 
new plant. The marginal cost is conditional on its location strategy. A firm f that 
has invested in province j incurs the following cost: 
 
C j ( f ) = vj ( f )ε j ( f )                                                                         (1)  
 
where vj(f)εj(f) reflects the input costs utilized in production. The component εj(f) 
is unobservable and will be the source of the residual term.  
         In the vj(f) component, four marginal production costs are considered. 
Firstly, factor cost, wj, is equal to the wage level in province j. Secondly, vj(f) also 
depends on the costs of intermediate inputs that the foreign plant uses in 
production. Amiti and Javorcik (2008) hypothesize that firms’ profits are 
positively related to better access to intermediate inputs, which are reflected in a 
lower intermediate input price index, Qj. Assuming a number of varieties of 
intermediate inputs are aggregated by a constant elasticity substitution (CES) 
subutility function into a composite good, the intermediate inputs price index, Qj, 
is defined as: 
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where niu is the number of varieties of intermediate inputs in province i and piu 
denotes the price of intermediate input in province i. σu is the constant elasticity 
of substitution of intermediate inputs and σu >1. The trade cost, τij, of shipping a 
good from province i to j is modeled as Samuelsonian iceberg costs, with τ ≥ 1. 
This means that a proportion of imported inputs, 1− 1/τ, melt in transit. Hence, to 
deliver one unit of any good from one province to another τ unit must be shipped 
as only a fraction 1/τ arrives. If τ = 1, there is free trade, and if τ = ∞, there is no 
trade. In the later empirical specification, I will proxy the intermediate inputs 
price index by two different supplier access variables, SAj.  
         Furthermore, vj(f) also reflects the distance cost to home country, TCj. This 
cost captures the fact that a firm may find it easier to operate in a location that is 
geographically proximate or culturally close. Since Taiwan shares the same 
language and culture as China, the distance cost can be the appropriate proxy for 
trade costs between Taiwan and province j. Finally, there may be some firm-
specific information or technology difference across provinces in vj(f), denoted as 
Aj. A firm chooses to locate in the province where a large number of other firms 
from the same industrial group have already invested to benefit from lower costs 
there, all else being equal.  
         Each firm’s mill price is given by profit maximization, which gives the 
usual marginal revenue equals marginal costs condition. Following Krugman and 
Venables (1996), price is a mark-up over marginal costs, denoted: 
 
pj ( f ) =
σ
σ −1Cj ( f )                                                                                 
 
where firms treat the elasticity of substitution, σ, as if it were the price elasticity 
of demand.  
           Output of firm f in province j is sold to consumers (individuals and firms) 
located within province j and in other provinces within China. Since consumers 
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have constant elasticity of substitution subutility function for each variety, the 
sales in province i by firm f’s affiliate located in province j are given by: 
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where Pi is the delivered prices index from all possible product origins for 
province i. Ei denotes the expenditure in province i from individual consumers (a 
proportion γ of gross domestic product in province i) and downstream firms ( a 
proportion µ of their total revenue, nidpidqid, in province i).  
          Substituting the price with mark-up marginal costs, the quantity that a firm 
f producing in province j would deliver to each destination province i: 
 
qji ( f ) =
σ −1
σGi
(Cj ( f )τ ji )−σ Ei                                                                (3)
Gi = nr (τ ricr )1−σ
r=1
R
∑
 
     
The gross profit earned in each destination province i for a firm f producing in 
province j is 
 
π ji ( f ) = (pj ( f )−Cj ( f ))τ jiqji =
(Cj ( f )τ ji )1−σ
σGi
Ei                                  (4)  
 
          The fraction multiplying Ei depends on the costs of the firm f relative to its 
competitors from all other provinces. In the numerator, the profits are decreasing 
if local (province j) production costs increase. Profits also increase if trade costs, 
τji, to each province i are lower. The denominator contains the corresponding 
characteristics of other competitors from other provinces selling goods in 
province i. The elasticity of substitution, σ, captures the idea that competition is 
fiercer and profits are lower when σ is greater, i.e. varieties are less differentiated 
from each other.  
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         Summing the gross profits earned in each province and subtracting the fixed 
costs Ffdi, the firm f’s aggregate net profit to be earned in province j is given by: 
 
π j ( f ) =
Cj ( f )1−σ
σ
τ ji
1−σEi
Gi
−Ffdi =
Cj ( f )1−σ
σi
∑ MAj −Ffdi                            (5)
MAj =
τ ji
1−σEi
Gii
∑
 
 
where MAj is the market access that firm f can expect from an affiliate located in 
province j. Thus, the probability that firm f will choose among Chinese provinces 
to invest in province j can be written as: 
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where εj(f)≡(1-σ)lnεj(f) is a measure of unobserved cost advantage of province j 
for firm j.  
         When a firm chooses its location, the only relevant information is the 
ordering of the profits. Invariant fixed costs do not affect the profit ordering of 
provinces and can therefore be omitted. The interpretation of equation (6) is that 
on the right-hand side (RHS) of the expression is the observed advantage of 
province j: higher market demand and lower production costs. On the left-hand 
side (LHS) is the unobserved relative attractiveness of province i. If the LHS is 
smaller than the RHS, firms choose province j rather than province i. In this 
model, the choice of a location conditional on the firm conducting FDI is a 
function of the provinces’ relative access to relevant markets in terms of demand 
and their relative production costs.  
  
 
30 
4. Data 
 
4.1 Independent variable: Taiwanese FDI in China 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) in Taiwan, which is in charge of 
Taiwan’s FDI registration, collects data on Taiwanese FDI projects. It provides 
total FDI amounts and number of FDI projects in Chinese provinces since 1991. 
In the early 1990s, although Taiwan was an open economy already, international 
capital inflows and outflows were still controlled or monitored by the government 
in order to maintain economic stability. FDI in China especially is under much 
more strict capital controls because of long-term political conflicts. Hence, I can 
argue that MOEA’s FDI data accounts for in order to represent Taiwanese FDI 
outflows to China. MOEA data covers 27 provinces/regions 5  and 27 ISIC 
manufacturing industries for all FDI projects. Although full firm-level data is not 
available due to business security concerns, MOEA provides a list of Taiwanese 
public listed firms’ affiliates in China, including the local address, investment 
status and products in China from 1991.  
   As mentioned in the previous section, the restriction on Taiwan’s FDI 
policy in China was lifted after 1990, while China opened its market from 1979. 
Since there was no agglomeration of Taiwanese firms in China during the period 
between 1991 and 1993, to examine, without the agglomeration externality from 
home country firms, the impact of distance effect, market access and other 
agglomeration economies on location choices provides a quasi-experiment. 
Naturally, the second investing period (1994-1996) data is designed to investigate 
the relative change in the effects on these variables of interest. This second 
investing period is constructed over a short period in order to reduce the time-
varying effects of technology shocks. There are 8,870 FDI projects in the first 
investing period and 1,526 in the second. It shows that China immediately 
becomes an attractive FDI host country right after the ban was lifted in 1991. Due 
to the unstable political relationship between Taiwan and China from 19956, the 
amount of outward FDI to China dropped dramatically in 1995 and 1996. 
                                                
5 In the MOEA dataset, NW Regions include: Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. 
6  This is 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. China government conducted a series of missile tests in the waters surrounding 
Taiwan from 21st of July, 1995 to 23rd of March, 1996. 
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  Figure 2 illustrates the rapid growth trends in the amount of Taiwanese 
outward FDI in China according to Chinese Statistical Yearbooks. It is worth 
noticing that Taiwanese inward FDI in China in 1990 was not collected at the 
same statistical year, but was reported later in 1992 Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 
This is because the Chinese Statistical Yearbook started including Taiwan as a 
FDI source country in 1992 and also imputed the data of Taiwanese FDI value in 
1990, which had been allocated in the “other countries” in the 1991’s Chinese 
Statistical Yearbook. Also, the amount of 1990’s Taiwanese FDI is quite small 
and is through the third country, which is difficult to distinguish the exact capital 
flow. Moreover, there is no industry and province level of Taiwanese FDI data in 
1990. Given this data limitation from China Statistical Yearbook, since FDI data 
collected by Taiwan’s government started from 1991, it is reasonable to choose 
1991 as the first year of the cross-strait FDI liberalisation.  
In Figure 1, before 1991, other Asian countries and the United States were 
the two major outward FDI destinations. From 1991, when Taiwanese firms were 
allowed to invest in China, China immediately became the leading outward FDI 
destination. In particular there was a dramatic increase in Taiwanese FDI projects 
around 1993, when Taiwan and China officially implemented the cross-strait 
economic activities agreements. At the same time, the Taiwanese government 
created a chance for firms that had already invested in China in 1991 and 1992 
but not reported yet to re-register their FDI status. Hence, this was the first 
justification for the construction of the first-investing period group. Those firms, 
investing before 1993, had not observed any existing Taiwanese firms’ clusters in 
China. Secondly, according to the report of the Chung-Hua Institution for 
Economic Research (2004), the period between 1991 and 1993 was considered 
the first investing period of Taiwanese FDI outflows to China. They concluded 
that there were three major directions in Taiwanese FDI: 1) firms were just 
starting to set up new plants across China, (2) the average investment amount was 
small (below one million dollars), and (3) FDI investors were mainly small-
medium sized firms. Therefore it was reasonable to aggregate the FDI projects 
from 1991 to 1993 as the first-investing period group.  
  On the other hand, after 1991 the importance of Taiwanese FDI in China 
gradually increased. According to the China Foreign Economic Statistical 
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Yearbook, the top five leading investing countries with accumulative stock of 
realized FDI from 1979 to 1999 were Hong Kong (50.32%), USA (8.34%), Japan 
(8.09%), Taiwan (7.76%) and Singapore (4.82%). Figure 2 shows the relative 
importance of inward FDI in China. Hong Kong accounts for more than 50% of 
total FDI in China from 1990-1995, and Taiwan’s FDI was in 2nd place in 1992 
accounting for 10% of total China’s inward FDI. This indicates that since 
Taiwanese’s FDI is an important capital source in the early 1990s, it is worth 
assessing the location determinates of Taiwanese FDI’s for regional FDI policy 
implications. 
          Figures 3 and 4 present the geographic distribution of Taiwanese FDI 
projects in China in 1990-1993 and 1994-1996. These figures indicate that 
Taiwanese FDI projects were highly concentrated in several Chinese provinces. 
Table 1 shows that, for all FDI projects, two major investment provinces, 
Guangdong and Fujian, which together accounted for 50% of FDI projects from 
1991 to 1993. The next two popular locations were Shanghai and Jiangsu. These 
four locations together accounted for over 70% of all FDI projects between 1991 
and 1993. On the other hand, for public listed firms, these four were the top FDI 
destinations, accounting for 72% of total projects, while Guangdong was at the 
top and Fujian in the fourth place. In 1994-1996, those four provinces were still 
the dominant FDI destinations for Taiwanese firms. In this paper, I finally cover 
24 regions. This is because Xinjiang, Ningxia, Qinghai Gansu, and Shaanxi are 
geographically remote provinces and investments there are reported aggregately 
as the North West region. In addition, Tibet is excluded due to its particular 
political status.  
         Table 2 demonstrates the industrial distribution of FDI projects. For all 
project groups over all periods, the distribution of all FDI project is more even 
than the distribution of FDI projects of public listed firms. In the public listed 
firm categories, FDI projects are concentrated in foods, electric equipment, 
electronic equipment and components industries, which account for more than 
50% of total projects. Since industrial characteristics may be correlated with 
market and supplier access and trade costs, in a later section I run regressions for 
separate industrial groups as a robustness check. 
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4.2 Market and supply access 
The measure of market and supply access is the simplified version derived from 
Amiti and Javorcik (2008). Both market and supply accesses are highly 
dependent on trade costs. Both inter- and intra-provincial trade depends on 
internal trade costs such as freight charges and provincial border barriers. Due to 
data constraints, a function of distance is used as a proxy for trade costs. The 
simplest function is the inverse distance rule (Harris, 1954), which assumes that 
the exponent of distance is equal to -1.7 
Supply access is constructed to capture the incentives for a firm in industry s 
to locate in province j: 1) share of province j’s supply of intermediate goods 
relative to the rest of the China, ψjs and 2) industry s use of intermediate inputs, 
αsk. Since industries use more than one intermediate input, these output shares are 
weighted by αsk, the coefficients from the China national input-output tables, 
provided by National Bureau of Statistics in China. The 1990 and 1992 input-
output tables are used in 1991-1993 and 1994-1996 separately. The industrial 
output Yjs is obtained from the annual China Industry Economy Statistical 
Yearbook. Hence, the higher share of intermediate inputs produced in the 
relatively closer regions approximates to the lower intermediate price index. In 
the China input-output tables, there are only 16 manufacturing sectors for both 
1990 and 1992. In order to be compatible with the input-output table, first, I 
mapped Taiwanese FDI industry code into two-digit International Standard 
Industrial Classifications (ISIC) Rev.4 using the concordance table provided by 
Taiwan’s Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive 
Yuan. Second, China’s industrial output data form the China Industry and 
Economic Statistical Yearbook, is mapped with China input-output table. Finally, 
I match China input-output industry code with two-digit ISIC Rev. 4 using the 
industry description provided by National Bureau of Statistics. While there are 27 
manufacturing sectors in the Taiwanese FDI data, the proxy for supply access is 
defined for 16 input-output sectors.8  
                                                
7 I also applied different numbers to this discount parameter and used different distance measurements, such as rail 
distance. With these modifications, the results are consistent in general. 
8 The China INPUT-OUTPUT table codes industries in a broader classification. For example, the INPUT-OUTPUT table 
includes only chemical manufacturing, while the Taiwan FDI data includes chemical products and chemical materials.  
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Finally, the geographic distance between the capital cities of each Chinese 
province is used for Dij. Since the territory of each province varies in China, 
following Mayor et al. (2010) idea, the intra-province distance, Dii, is calculated 
as the radius of the province area. I also construct the supply access with Dii =1, 
which means zero trade costs within province. The two supply access 
measurements in 1990 and 1993 are highly and significantly correlated with 0.67 
and 0.78 respectively9. Hence, considering the huge variation of the size of 
Chinese province (the standard deviation is 239,571.5), the radius intra-province 
distance is better to account for the ease of the access within province by 
controlling the impact of the size of the geographic unit. The detail of supply 
access is as following: 
 
Supply Accesssj = αsk
s=1
S
∑ φ js
j=1
J
∑ ×Dij−1                                                        
φ js =
Yjs
YChina,s
  and Dii = Areaj /π                  
 
 
Furthermore, I construct the supply access from Taiwanese firms for the 
second investing period. This is derived from Dabaere et al. (2010). Since the 
share of output of Taiwanese firms is unavailable, the number of accumulated 
FDI projects up to 1993, FDIjs, is used to approximate the number of active 
Taiwanese firms in industry s and in province j. This is further justified by the 
status of Taiwanese public listed firm’ affiliates in China. In 1994, all affiliates 
established before 1993 were still operating.  
 
 
Supply Access_TWNsj = αsk
s=1
S
∑ θ js
j=1
J
∑ ×Dij−1                                                
θ js =
FDI js
FDIChina,s
               
 
        
                                                
9 I construct market access with Dii =1 and the correlations between two measurements in 1990 and 1993 are 0.57 and 0.53 
respectively. 
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         The measure of market access is analogous to that of supply access, in order 
to reflect the fact that firms can supply other firms and households on an intra- 
and inter-provincial basis. The market access is measured as following: 
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  The share of industry s’s output produced in province j is weighted by βsk, 
the proportion of industry s’s output sold to industry k as the intermediate input, 
and βc is the proportion of final production sold for household consumption. βsk 
and βc are also calculated from the China input-output tables for 1990 and 1992. 
Thus, this measure is a proxy for the degree to which firms’ revenue benefited 
from expenditure from the local and all other provinces. However, being close to 
a large market also leads to a competition effect, i.e., the lower the prices of 
substitute goods, the lower the demand for the firm’s output. In this paper I 
assume that price competition is stable. In the early 1990s, China was just 
beginning to develop and a large portion of the market price was still controlled 
by the Chinese government.  
 
4.3 Agglomeration externalities 
Mayer et al. (2010) point out that investors tend to follow other foreign investors 
in the same industry. They provide two explanations for these agglomeration 
externalities: 1) there are spillovers across firms from the same industry, and 2) 
agglomeration may also be due to the fragmentation of production such that firms 
producing different parts of the same product will tend to locate in the same area 
in order to save transportation costs. Hence, for the first investing period (1991-
1993), I measure this agglomeration using the total number of active Chinese 
firms in province j in manufacturing industry s in 1990. This data is from the 
China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, which provides the number of 
firms and amounts of output across industries. For the second investing period 
(1994-1996), besides the total agglomeration of firms, the agglomeration of 
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Taiwanese firms in the same industry s in province j is also included. This is 
approximated by the accumulated Taiwanese FDI projects, since data on existing 
Taiwanese firms in China is unavailable. This can be justified by the same 
reasoning as mentioned in the Taiwanese supply access section.  
 
4.4 Provincial variables 
Following the existing FDI location literature, the geographic distance is used to 
measure the distance effect between home and host destination. The distance 
between Taiwan and Chinese province j is calculated by using Google Earth. The 
variables in production costs at the provincial level include average worker and 
staff wages and share of electricity production, as a proxy for the electricity price, 
which are obtained from the annual China Statistical Yearbook. If a province has 
higher share of electricity production, the electricity supply in this province is 
better than others. To control for the impact of infrastructures on trade costs, I 
include the density of road and rail networks, as obtained from the China 
Statistical Yearbook. The high school attainment rate for ages over 7 is used to 
control for human qualities. Government policy incentive is also an important 
control variable in the literature. Here, I use the total number of special economic 
zones, open coastal cities and different kinds of national economic and 
development zone 10  in each province to approximate this policy effect. 
Furthermore, I include the number of state-owned firms as a proxy for the local 
market mechanism, i.e. the more state-owned firms, the higher the market 
rigidity. It is because most Chinese state-owned firms are not operating as profit-
driven nor following market oriented entities. Empirical literature (DeCoster & 
Strange, 1993, and Amiti & Javorcik, 2008) also suggests that other foreign FDI 
projects in the same province could signal the location’s attractiveness. 
Therefore, the total accumulated foreign stock is included in order to control for 
the investment environment. Finally, the dummy variable of coastal province is 
used to control for remaining unobserved geographical characteristics.  
To eliminate simultaneity, the dependent variables used in the first 
investing period (1991-1993) are created from the 1990 data and 1993 data for 
the second investing period (1994-1996). The explanations for all variables can 
                                                
10 It includes: economic and technological development zones, high technology industry development zones, and others. 
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be found in Table 3. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for major variables of 
interest in 1990 and 1993 respectively. Also, the correlation matrix of all 
variables is included in the Appendix. 
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5. Empirical Specifications and Results 
 
Conditional logit is used to estimate the effects of location determinants based on 
the equation (6). As demonstrated by McFadden (1973), assuming that εj(f) is a 
Type-1 Extreme Value random error, the probability that the firm f will choose to 
invest in province j is equal to: 
 
(7)                                                 
)ln)(lnexp(
)ln)(lnexp(
Pj ∑ +
+
=
j jj
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  Expressing the frequency of the province j being selected by Taiwanese 
firm as Wj (j=1…J), the probability of observing such FDI pattern is obtained as 
equation (8): 
 
(8)                                                                               WPΠL jj1j==  
 
  The parameters α and β indicate the characteristics of potential host 
provinces to Taiwanese FDI are estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation 
method, which maximizes the likelihood function. 
 
5.1 Baseline Results 
Table 5 presents the main results from equation (7), which is derived from firm’s 
profit function. In column (1), I replicate the specification from Amiti & Javorcik 
(2008) for the first investing period, focusing on the market and supply access 
without the distance variable. The results are generally in line with their findings: 
the estimates of both market and supply access variables are with the expected 
positive signs, while only the market access variable is statistically significant. 
Also, the sectoral agglomeration is positive and significant. The findings indicate 
that Taiwanese FDI tend to locate in the province with larger market and supply 
access as well as agglomeration from the same sector.  
  In columns (2) to (5), I run specifications based on equation (7) for the first 
investing period, 1991-1993. In column (2), I run the regression with the distance 
variable only. The estimate is statistically significant with the expected negative 
  
 
39 
sign. This indicates that Taiwanese firms tend to choose locations closer to 
Taiwan to save the transaction, transport, and fixed-setup costs as the literature 
suggests (see Egger & Pfaffermayr, 2001, Mayer et al. 2010; etc.) 
  In column (3), market and supply access and sectoral agglomeration are 
included as well as the distance variable. All provincial control variables are 
included to eliminate the potential omitted variable biases. The results show that 
distance, market access and sectoral agglomeration are statistically significant 
with the expected signs. The decreasing magnitude of the distance variable is as 
expected. Since the bilateral distance between Taiwan and Chinese provinces 
might be correlated with the unobserved provincial characteristics such as the 
coastal provinces or the provinces with special economic zones, it might cause 
omitted variables bias on Taiwanese FDI location choices.  
It is worth noting that the effect of supply access is negative and significant. 
Amiti and Javorcik (2008) also find if both market and supply access variables 
are included, in some specifications, estimates of one of them become 
insignificant. They suggest that these two variables might be highly correlated 
due to the way they are constructed. In this study, the correlation between the 
market and supply access is 0.66 with the significance at 1% level. Hence, 
following Amiti and Javorcik (2008), in columns (4) and (5), the specifications 
include either market or supply access variable. The estimate of market access 
remains significant with the positive sign in column (4), while the estimate of 
supply access is still negative but not significant in column (5). In the robustness 
check, I used the other market and supply access measurement with the zero trade 
costs (Dii=1) intra-province distance. The estimated results are qualitatively 
consistent with signs and significance as the other measurement of market and 
supply access.  
The estimated coefficients of sectoral agglomeration are consistently 
significant with the positive sign as indicated in the literature, such as Mayor and 
Head (2004) or Mayor et al. (2010). These results indicate that Taiwanese FDI 
tend to choose the location where the market is larger and has more firms from 
the same sector. 
  It is worth noting that supply access becomes negative in columns (3) and 
(5) after the distance variable is included. Mayor et al. (2010) argue that part of 
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the distance effect correlated with the impact of supply access from the home 
country on FDI locations. In addition, Surveys: Taiwanese Firms in China (1993 
and 1994), as reported by Taiwan’s Chung-Hua Institution for Economic 
Research, provides extra supporting evidence. Taiwanese firms investing in 
China in 1993 or before relied on parent firms or other firms in Taiwan to provide 
equipment (70%), components (75%) and personnel (2.06%). Since the supply 
access does not include output share from Taiwan in this paper, the supply access 
of intermediate inputs from Taiwan can be captured by the distance variable.  
  According to Mayer et al. (2010), with variables of interest in natural log 
terms, as well as a large number of location choices, the estimated coefficients are 
close to the elasticity of the probability of average investors choosing a 
destination. However, there are only 24 locations in this study that this simple 
quantitative analysis cannot be applied here. Alternatively, based on Schmidheiny 
and Brülhart (2011)11, I calculate the own-region elasticity, the percentage change 
in the expected number of firms in province j with respect to the percentage 
change in the variables of interest k, for each province.  Since the predicted 
probability of Pj varies by provinces, I select two extreme provinces for the 
computation of elasticities: Guangdong, the largest province in terms of predicted 
probability of Pj, and Inner Mongolia, the smallest province in terms of the 
predicted probability with non-zero FDI projects.  
Ccolumn (3) of Table 5 is used as the base specification and the elasticity of 
distance variable for Guangdong and Inner Mongolia province is calculated 
respectively. As for Guangdong province, a 10% decrease in the distance, proxy 
for the trade costs, increases the probability of attracting Taiwanese FDI projects 
by around 5.9%. On the other hand, as for Inner Mongolia, a 10% decrease in the 
distance increase the probability of Taiwanese FDI projects by 9.4%, which is 
close to the estimated coefficient of distance variable. Hence, this exercise 
indicates that in the conditional logit model with limited number of locations, the 
elasticity of variable of interest can be analysed as the range value across 
locations.   
  Columns (1) to (5) in Table 6 show the results in the second investing 
period, 1994-1996, when Taiwanese sectoral agglomeration and supply access 
                                                
11 Schmidheiny and Brülhart (2011) estimate the own region semi-elasticity: εjj=(1-Pj)βk, where Pj is derived from equation 
(7) 
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exist for the first time. Specifications in column (1) and (2) are the replications of 
the specifications in column (2) and (3) of Table 5. The coefficients of distance 
variable in column (1) and (2) are close to those in the first period. Then, in 
column (3), I include the Taiwanese sectoral agglomeration variable to analyse its 
influence on other variables of interest. The estimate of Taiwanese sectoral 
agglomeration is statistically significant with the positive sign. This suggests that 
firms can gain extra nationality-specific benefits from being closer to the 
agglomeration of firms from the same country. Since Taiwanese firms faced 
different business regulations from other foreign countries during 1990s, such as 
those relating to a firm’s registration or to license applications, the national-
specific information spillovers can be gained from clustering with other 
Taiwanese firms.  
  Note the inclusion of Taiwanese sectoral agglomeration reduce the 
magnitude of all other variable of interests as shown in column (3). The estimates 
of distance and sectoral agglomeration variable are still significant with the 
expected signs. However, both market and supply access variables are not 
significant. This may indicate that the declining magnitude of these variables 
reflects the incremental impact of the sectoral agglomeration from the same 
country.  
  Furthermore, in columns (4) and (5), the variable of supply access from 
Taiwanese firms is also included. In both specifications, the estimates of supply 
access from Taiwanese firms are with the negative sign but not significant. These 
results, however, are in contrast to other national FDI studies, which suggest 
firms tend to choose the locations that are closer to the suppliers from the same 
countries. For example, Debaere et al. (2010) find that South Korean FDI 
locations in China are positively affected by the supply access from the same 
country in each province. Similar to total supply access, in early 1990s, 
Taiwanese affiliates in China still rely on the imports of intermediate inputs from 
Taiwan. 
  Quantitatively, I use the specification in column (3) in Table 6 as the base 
specification to calculate the elasticity of distance variable for the largest and 
smallest provinces in the second investing period: Guangdong and Guizhou. As 
for Guangdong province, the 10% decrease in the distance therefore increases the 
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probability of attracting FDI projects by 6.3%, while by 7.8% for Guizhou. 
Hence, the range of elasticity value of distance variable is smaller than the first 
investing period after the inclusion of the Taiwanese sectoral agglomeration in 
the second period. It indicates that the influence of trade costs is decreasing once 
the new agglomeration effect kick in.  
With regard to other production costs, the coefficients are significant only 
in the first investing period. In Table 5, the coefficients on electricity variable 
show the expected positive signs, while the positive and significant effect of 
wages is against the model expectation. Considering the positive and significant 
education variable, this may suggest that firms tend to locate in the provinces 
with better quality of labour force, i.e. higher wages. The coefficient of total 
foreign investments is positive and significant for both investing periods. This 
indicates that other foreign firms’ locations could be the signals of where the 
good FDI locations in the early 1990s when China’s market was still 
undeveloped. Moreover, the positive and significant estimates of coastal province 
dummy suggest that Taiwanese FDI tend to locate along the Chinese coast to 
either have better transportation accesses or be closer to Taiwan. 
 
5.2 Taiwanese public listed firms’ FDI 
Since we cannot distinguish investors from individuals or firms in the total 
projects, this may cause worry about a sampling bias for firms’ location choices. 
In practice, these individuals may be members of a firm’s board or senior 
managers attempting to avoid the complicated registration process for a firm. 
These investments are highly related to firms’ profits. Although we assume that 
FDI projects in the first investing period are green field investment, it is not 
known from the data whether FDI projects in the second investing period are 
green field or repeating investments. Location strategies may vary across green 
and brown field investments. In order to eliminate these concerns, the sub-sample 
constructed from the data on public listed firms’ FDI projects is used for a 
sensitivity check. There are 130 and 143 green field FDI projects in the first and 
the second investing periods respectively.  
Table 7 presents the results of variables of interest. Columns (1) to (3) report 
the results for the first investing period and columns (4) to (6) for the second 
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period. First, the findings in columns (1) to (3) show that the estimates of the 
distance variable remain statistically significant with the expected negative sign. 
Also, the magnitude of coefficients is similar to the estimates in the first investing 
period in Table 5. The estimates of market and supply access variables are with 
the expected positive signs but not significant in column (2) and (3) respectively. 
The estimated coefficients of sectoral agglomeration are not significant but with 
the expected positive signs.  
  In columns (4) to (6), the results show that the magnitude of all variables of 
interest decreases in the second investing period. In comparison to Table 6, the 
magnitude of distance variable decreases more from -1.013 (column (1)) to –
0.632 (column (4)). Moreover, the estimates of sectoral agglomeration from the 
Taiwanese firms are statistically significant and positive. In short, the results in 
Table 7 suggest that two datasets are in general consistent. 
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6. Robustness Check  
 
6.1 Coastal provinces  
As found in Table 5 and 6, the coastal province dummy is significant and positive 
in both investing periods. It is worth considering whether firms’ location 
decisions are driven by unobserved geographical effects from coastal provinces. 
The empirical literature suggests that FDI projects in the coastal provinces tend to 
benefit from the better access to the international market. Thus, I restrict the data 
to the coastal provinces only. The main idea is to check that within this choice set, 
which controls for the geographical fixed effect, the variables of interest are still 
significant with the expected signs.  
   Table 8 presents the results for all FDI project and public listed firms’ FDI 
project in two investing periods. Columns (1) to (6) report the results for the first 
investing period and columns (7) to (12) for the second period. The coefficients 
of the distance variable and the sectoral agglomeration from Taiwanese firms are 
significant with the expected signs for both periods. Also, the change in the 
magnitude of the distance effect between two investing periods demonstrates the 
same trend as shown in Table 5 and 6. The coefficient of the regular sectoral 
agglomeration becomes insignificant but with the expected positive signs. It also 
shows the same trend in estimates’ magnitude in Table 5 and 6. However, the 
coefficients on the market access and supply access variables are not consistent 
with the expected positive signs and in general not significant in both investing 
periods. This further implies that the distance might be correlated with the 
unobserved market and supply access from Taiwan that might have lowered the 
importance of provincial market and supply access even after control the coastal 
geographical characteristic. 
 
6.2 Industrial specification 
Since industrial characteristics may affect firms’ location decisions, I allow for 
heterogeneity across industries by estimating variables of interest by industry in 
both investing periods. Table 9 shows the coefficients of these variables of 
interest for seven industry groups: Food and beverages, Textiles and clothing，	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woods and furniture, Chemicals, rubber and plastics, Mineral and metal products, 
Machinery and transport equipment, and Electric machinery and electronics.  
  The coefficients of the distance variable are in general negative and 
significant across industry groups for two periods. However, the magnitude of the 
effect varies across the groups. For example, it has no effect on Woods and 
Furniture industries in both investing periods, while the distance effect is greater 
and significant on Machinery and Transport Equipment or Electric Machinery 
and Electronics manufacturing locations. Besides, for agglomeration externalities 
variables, on the one hand, there also exist heterogeneous effects across industry 
groups for the sectoral agglomeration. The estimate for Mineral and Metal 
products is negative and significant in the first period. Also, the estimate for 
Textiles and clothing is significantly negative in the second period. On the other 
hand, for the agglomeration from Taiwanese firms, the estimated effects are in 
general positive and significant for most industry groups. However, the estimated 
effects become negative in the Food and Beverages and the Wood and Furniture 
groups but are not statistically significant. Finally, we observe the greater 
variation across industry groups on the estimates of market and supply access 
variables. It is even much more difficult to have consistent empirical predictions 
on both market and supply access effects. It is likely that the remaining 
unobserved industrial characteristics have impacts on FDI locations that are not 
controlled for in this study. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the factors determining FDI location decisions by using 
Taiwanese FDI projects at Chinese provincial level during the period between 
1991 and 1996. The theoretical model and empirical econometric specification 
are derived from the works of Mayer et al. (2010) and Amiti and Javorcik (2008), 
which are based on the new economic geographic model. The analyses focus on 
the effects of variables of interest not only on the market and on supply access or 
agglomeration externalities, but also on the distance effect. Most importantly, the 
innovation in this paper is its investigation of the relative magnitudes of change in 
the variables of interest in two FDI investing periods.  
         The findings indicate that the distance effect and the sectoral agglomeration 
along the national line have consistently significant impacts. Firms will choose to 
invest in foreign locations, which are closer to the home country and to a large 
agglomeration of firms from the same country. An average 10 percent decrease in 
the distance between Taiwan and a Chinese province will increase the probability 
of investment by around 9 percentage points. Also, a 10 percent increase in the 
sectoral agglomeration from Taiwanese firms increases the probability by about 3 
percentage points. After introducing the sectoral agglomeration from Taiwanese 
firms at the second investing period, the declining magnitude in coefficients of 
other variables of interest is as expected. Since the Taiwanese FDI data relates to 
the period when China’s market was at the early stage of development, firms may 
not have had good access to the final market or to suppliers of intermediate inputs. 
Hence, the distance effect and agglomeration externalities may be more dominant 
factors than market and supply access for the firms’ FDI location decisions in 
China at this early stage.  
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Source: MOEA, 2009 
Figure 1 Share of Taiwanese Outward FDI in Major Countries/Regions, 1988-
2004 
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Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1991-1996 
Figure 2 Percentage of Inward FDI in China from Major Countries/Regions, 
1990-1995 
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                             Source: MOEA, 2009 
Figure 3 Taiwan’s FDI projects in China, 1991-1993 
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                         Source: MOEA, 2009 
Figure 4 Taiwan’s FDI projects in China, 1994-1996 
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Table 1 Taiwanese FDI in China by province: 1991-1993, 1994-1996 
 
All FDI cases 
 FDI of public listed firms 
Province 1991-
93 
1994-96 % of total 
cases 1991-
1996 
 Province 1991-93 1994-96 % of total 
cases 1991-
1996 
Guangdong 3245 425 35.30%  Guangdong 38 41 28.94% 
Fujian 1495 202 16.32%  Jiangsu 35 31 24.18% 
Jiangsu 933 234 11.23%  Shanghai 13 27 14.65% 
Shanghai 934 222 11.12%  Fujian 12 11 8.42% 
Zhejiang 454 96 5.29%  Zhejiang 4 11 5.49% 
Beijing 306 55 3.47%  Beijing 6 5 4.03% 
Shandong 256 41 2.86%  Tianjin 4 7 4.03% 
Tianjin 180 38 2.10%  Liaoning 2 3 1.83% 
Liaoning 154 30 1.77%  Shandong 4 1 1.83% 
Hebei 122 22 1.39%  Hubei 2 1 1.10% 
Henan 121 18 1.34%  Sichuan 2 1 1.10% 
Sichuan 116 19 1.30%  Hainan 1 1 0.73% 
Hunan 78 38 1.12%  Hebei 1 1 0.73% 
Hubei 81 23 1.00%  Jiangxi 1 1 0.73% 
Hainan 81 4 0.82%  Anhui 1 0 0.37% 
Jiangxi 74 11 0.82%  Guangxi 1 0 0.37% 
Anhui 59 10 0.66%  Hunan 1 0 0.37% 
Guangxi 53 7 0.58%  Inner Mongolia 1 0 0.37% 
Heilongjiang 38 10 0.46%  Jilin 0 1 0.37% 
Guizhou 30 6 0.35%  Yunnan 1 0 0.37% 
Jilin 22 5 0.26%  Guizhou 0 0 0.00% 
Yunnan 18 6 0.23%  Heilongjiang 0 0 0.00% 
Inner 
Mongolia 10 3 0.13% 
 
Henan 0 0 0.00% 
Shanxi 10 1 0.11%  Shanxi 0 0 0.00% 
Total 8870 1526 100%  Total 130 143  
Source: MOEA, 2010 
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Table 2 Taiwanese FDI in China by industry: 1991-1993, 1994-1996 
All FDI cases  FDI of public listed firms 
Province 1991-
93 
1994
-96 
% of total 
cases 
1991-96 
 Province 1991
-93 
1994-
96 
% of total 
cases 1991-
1996 
Manufacturing Not Classified 
Elsewhere 
1047 98 11.01%  Electrical Equipment  18 20 13.92% 
Food  716 110 7.95%  Computers, Electronic and 
Optical Products  
19 18 13.55% 
Electrical Equipment  654 143 7.67%  Food  22 14 13.19% 
Leather, Fur and Allied 
Products  
743 49 7.62%  Electronic Parts and 
Components 
15 13 10.26% 
Fabricated Metal Products  643 128 7.42%  Machinery and Equipment  3 11 5.13% 
Plastic Products  652 113 7.36%  Basic Metal  5 6 4.03% 
Apparel and Clothing 
Accessories  
624 58 6.56%  Manufacturing Not Classified 
Elsewhere 
6 5 4.03% 
Computers, Electronic and 
Optical Products  
493 106 5.76%  Plastic Products  3 8 4.03% 
Non-metallic Mineral Products  431 67 4.79%  Other Transport Equipment  2 8 3.66% 
Chemical Products  384 67 4.34%  Fabricated Metal Products  4 5 3.30% 
Textile Mills 344 73 4.01%  Apparel and Clothing 
Accessories  
5 3 2.93% 
Machinery and Equipment  312 101 3.97%  Non-metallic Mineral 
Products  
1 6 2.56% 
Electronic Parts and 
Components 
295 75 3.56%  Beverages  1 5 2.20% 
Wood and Bamboo Products  285 29 3.02%  Textile Mills 6 0 2.20% 
Other Transport Equipment  199 61 2.50%  Pulp, Paper and Paper 
Products  
4 2 2.20% 
Chemical Materials  162 60 2.14%  Chemical Products  0 6 2.20% 
Pulp, Paper and Paper 
Products  
183 35 2.10%  Rubber Products  5 1 2.20% 
Basic Metal Manufacturing 142 33 1.68%  Medical Goods  2 3 1.83% 
Rubber Products 108 26 1.29%  Leather, Fur and Allied 
Products  
3 1 1.47% 
Beverages  108 21 1.24%  Petroleum and Coal Products  2 2 1.47% 
Motor Vehicles and Parts  98 31 1.24%  Motor Vehicles and Parts  0 4 1.47% 
Furniture  88 18 1.02%  Chemical Materials  3 1 1.47% 
Printing and Reproduction of 
Recorded Media 
79 12 0.88%  Printing and Reproduction of 
Recorded Media 
1 0 0.37% 
Medical Goods  50 12 0.60%  Furniture  0 1 0.37% 
Petroleum and Coal Products  30 0 0.29%  Wood and Bamboo Products  0 0 0.00% 
Total 8870 1526 100%  Total 130 143  
Source: MOEA, 2010 
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Table 3: Explanation of Variables 
Variables Explanation Note 
Independent variable   
FDI Choice Firm location choice of industry i in 
province j  
Choice=1 if province j is chosen, 
choice=0 otherwise 
Variables of interest   
Ln distance ln of distance between Taiwan and 
province j 
Transaction cost of setting up foreign 
affiliate 
Ln market access 
 
Market access of industry i in province 
j  
For 1991-1993 dataset, market access is 
measured by 1990 data; for 1994-1996 
dataset, 1993 data is used 
Ln supply access 
 
Supply access of industry i in province 
j  
For 1991-1993 dataset, market access is 
measured by 1990 data; for 1994-1996 
dataset, 1993 data is used 
Ln supply 
access_TWN 
Supply access from Taiwan FDI in 
industry i in province j 
Estimated by accumulated Taiwan FDI 
projects from 1991 to 1993 
Ln sectoral 
agglomeration 
# of firms from all countries in industry 
i in province j 
Agglomeration externality 
Ln sectoral 
agglomeration_TWN 
Accumulated Taiwan FDI projects 
from 1991 to 1993 in industry i in 
province j 
Agglomeration externality from same 
country 
Ln wage Average annual wage of staff and 
workers in province j 
Proxy for marginal production costs 
Ln electricity  
 
Share of provincial electricity supply 
over all China 
Proxy for marginal production costs 
Provincial control variable 
Ln # stateowned firms Number of state-owned industrial firms in 
province j 
Control for local endowment 
Ln road density Density of road network in province j Control for infrastructure issue 
Ln rail density Density of rail network in province j Control for infrastructure issue 
Special economic 
zones 
number of special economic zones, open 
coastal cities or economic development 
zones in province j  
Control for policy issues 
Coastal province Dummy for coastal provinces Control for regional effects, D=1 if 
coastal province, D=0 otherwise 
Ln total FDI amount 
 
Stock of Direct Foreign Investment in 
province j 
Proxy for local investment 
environment 
Ln high school ratio High school attainment ratio in province j Control for quality of human capital 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Main Variables 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln Distance 7.18632 0.517042 5.545021 8.019968 
Year=1990     
Ln market access -6.629141 .3948747 -7.867387 -5.491856 
Ln supply access -7.345473 .5868373 -9.557065 -5.929672 
Ln sectoral agglomeration 5.734242 1.413269 0 8.607947 
Ln wages 7.635417 .1304795 7.46 7.98 
Ln electricity  -3.366815 .7310057 -6.010649 -2.545697 
Year=1993     
Ln market access -6.615524 .376703 -7.314721 -5.559536 
Ln supply access -7.48668 9402439 -9.699134 -5.27539 
Ln sectoral agglomeration  5.989487 1.166451 0 8.516593 
Ln supply access_TWN -7.50194 .9554263 -9.917586 5.172994 
Ln sectoral 
agglomeration_TWN 
1.920397 1.506287 0 6.196444 
Ln wages 8.052083 .1944457 7.78 8.58 
Ln electricity  -3.35517 .6908996 -5.741936 -2.533417 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, 1991-1997  
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Table 5 Conditional logit: All Taiwanese FDI projects in China, 1991-1993 
 Dependent variable: FDI choice 
 1991-1993 1991-1993 1991-1993 1991-1993 1991-1993 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln distance  -1.309*** -0.939*** -0.907*** -0.949*** 
  (.0126) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Ln market access 0.673***  1.081*** 0.184*  
 (0.233)  (0.225) (0.096)  
Ln supply access 0.144  -0.946***  -0.049 
 (0.217)  (0.210)  (0.093) 
Ln sectoral 0.423***  0.468*** 0.467*** 0.484*** 
agglomeration (0.024)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Ln wages 0.994***  2.24*** 2.359*** 2.255*** 
 (0.261)  (0.227) (0.225) (0.225) 
Ln electricity -1.086***  0.503*** 0.431*** 0.572*** 
 (0.119)  (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) 
Ln road density 1.302***  0.716*** 0.641*** 0.822*** 
 (0.190)  (0.142) (0.140) (0.141) 
Ln fixed-line density -0.329***  -0.646*** -0.642*** -0.674*** 
 (0.065)  (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) 
Special economic zones -0.101  -0.125 -0.175 -0.097 
 (0.126)  (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) 
Coastal provinces 0.221*  0.422*** 0.379*** 0.439*** 
 (0.124)  (0.121) (0.120) (0.123) 
Ln total FDI amount 0.623***  0.235*** 0.277*** 0.2*** 
 (0.066)  (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
Ln # state-owned firms 1.363***  -0.711*** -0.671*** -0.772*** 
 (0.150)  (0.151) (0.153) (0.151) 
Ln high school ratio -0.773***  0.459*** 0.355*** 0.542*** 
 (0.126)  (0.131) (0.126) (0.132) 
FDI case* provinces 212880 212880 212880 212880 212880 
FDI case 8870 8870 8870 8870 8870 
Pseudo R2 0.3103 0.1062 0.323 0.3227 0.3227 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All independent variables used in 1991-1993 are from 1990; variables used in 1994-1996 are from 1993 
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Table 6 Conditional logit: All Taiwanese FDI projects in China, 1994-1996 
  Dependent variable: FDI choice 
  1994-1996 1994-1996 1994-1996 1994-1996 1994-1996 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln distance  -1.234*** -0.968*** -0.783*** -0.815*** -0.826*** 
  (0.0292) (0.114) (0.118) (0.134) (0.135) 
Ln market access   -0.741 -0.799 -0.782 -0.092 
   (0.711) (0.725) (0.725) (0.263) 
Ln supply access   0.452 0.651 0.741  
   (0.697) (0.712) (0.733)  
Ln sectoral   0.441*** 0.303*** 0.295*** 0.312*** 
agglomeration   (0.0633) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) 
Ln sectoral    0.312*** 0.317*** 0.313*** 
agglomeration_TWN    (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Ln supply access_TWN     -0.135 -0.073 
     (0.248) (0.240) 
Ln wages   0.616* 0.278 0.345 0.344 
   (0.341) (0.383) (0.414) (0.416) 
Ln electricity   0.519** 0.12 0.118 0.129 
   (0.202) (0.218) (0.217) (0.216) 
Ln road density   0.614*** 0.249 0.267 0.266 
   (0.215) (0.212) (0.211) (0.211) 
Ln fixed-line density   -0.358** -0.205 -0.216 -0.211 
   (0.147) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) 
Special economic zones   -0.297 -0.2 -0.207 -0.212 
   (0.183) (0.179) (0.179) (0.180) 
Coastal provinces   0.323 0.432** 0.424** 0.449** 
   (0.197) (0.201) (0.202) (0.201) 
Ln total FDI amount   0.433*** 0.262** 0.259* 0.253* 
   (0.128) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) 
Ln # state-owned firms   -0.2 0.398 0.407 0.39 
   (0.316) (0.348) (0.347) (0.347) 
Ln high school ratio   0.995*** 0.867*** 0.857*** 0.886*** 
   (0.293) (0.303) (0.306) (0.305) 
FDI case* provinces  36624 36624 36624 36624 36624 
FDI case  1526 1526 1526 1526 1526 
Pseudo R2  0.0924 0.2721 0.2776 0.2776 0.2775 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All independent variables used in 1991-1993 are from 1990; variables used in 1994-1996 are from 1993 
  
 
60 
Table 7 Conditional logit: Taiwanese public listed firms FDI projects in China, 
1991-1993 and 1994-1996 
 Dependent variable: FDI choice   
 1991-1993 1991-1993 1991-1993 1994-1996 1994-1996 1994-1996 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln distance -1.013*** -1.056*** -0.996*** -0.632* -0.693* -0.657* 
 (0.325) (0.319) (0.323) (0.357) (0.380) (0.382) 
Ln market access -1.907 0.699  2.707 2.792 1.077 
 (2.402) (0.930)  (3.044) (3.040) (0.930) 
Ln supply access 2.575  0.966 -1.854 -1.731  
 (2.150)  (0.768) (2.921) (2.966)  
Ln sectoral  0.385 0.41 0.374 0.149 0.133 0.098 
agglomeration (0.254) (0.251) (0.250) (0.200) (0.217) (0.205) 
Ln sectoral     0.373*** 0.383*** 0.388*** 
agglomeration_TWN    (0.136) (0.139) (0.140) 
Ln supply access_TWN     -0.257 -0.326 
     (0.800) (0.789) 
Provincial control 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FDI case*provinces 3120 3120 3120 3432 3432 3432 
FDI case  130 130 130 143 143 143 
Pseudo R2 0.3188 0.3169 0.3179 0.3498 0.3499 0.3494 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All independent variables used in 1991-1993 are from 1990; variables used in 1994-1996 are from 1993 
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Table 8 Taiwanese FDI: within Chinese Coastal Provinces 
Dependent variable: FDI choice 
1991-1993 All   Public listed   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln distance -1.381*** -1.222*** -1.416*** -2.048*** -2.104*** -1.681*** 
 (0.064) (0.060) (0.061) (0.613) (0.603) (0.572) 
Ln market access 0.429* -0.752***  -4.348 -2.532  
 (0.254) (0.198)  (3.046) (1.808)  
Ln supply access -1.69***  -1.44*** 1.887  -0.674 
 (0.227)  (0.176) (2.374)  (1.445) 
Ln sectoral  0.547*** 0.529*** 0.563*** 0.679** 0.687** 0.496* 
agglomeration (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.319) (0.313) (0.288) 
Other provincial 
control variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8213 8213 8213 121 121 121 
1994-1996 All   Public listed   
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Ln distance -1.066*** -1.043*** -1.06*** -1.963*** -1.915*** -1.661** 
 (0.199) (0.199) (0.197) (0.676) (0.667) (0.656) 
Ln market access -1.072 -1.101 -0.806** 4.642 4.485 -0.483 
 (0.811) (0.812) (0.363) (3.157) (3.172) (1.120) 
Ln supply access 0.563 0.338  -4.91* -5.167*  
 (0.791) (0.830)  (2.978) (3.059)  
Ln sectoral  0.12 0.131 0.137* -0.003 0.019 -0.069 
agglomeration (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.259) (0.262) (0.248) 
Ln sectoral  0.48*** 0.467*** 0.464*** 0.383** 0.362** 0.378** 
agglomeration_TWN (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.159) (0.165) (0.169) 
Ln supply   0.27 0.305  0.45 0.226 
access_TWN  (0.296) (0.282)  (0.826) (0.812) 
Other provincial 
control variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1376 1376 1376 138 138 138 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All independent variables used in 1991-1993 are from 1990; variables used in 1994-1996 are from 1993 
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 Table 9 Taiwanese FDI in China by industry 
Dependent variable: Chinese province chosen 
1991-1993 Food and 
beverages 
Textiles 
and 
clothing 
Wood and 
furniture 
Chemicals, 
rubber and 
plastics 
Mineral 
and metal 
products 
Machinery 
and 
transport 
equipment 
Electric 
machinery 
and 
electronics 
Ln distance -0.844*** -1.41*** -0.271 -1.083*** -1.07*** -0.892*** -0.838*** 
 (0.116) (0.134) (0.168) (0.110) (0.112) (0.171) (0.118) 
Ln sectoral  0.682*** 0.741*** 0.396*** 0.398*** -0.207** 0.406** 0.674*** 
agglomeration (0.193) (0.138) (0.148) (0.088) (0.092) (0.183) (0.087) 
Ln market access -2.66 -3.16*** -14.47*** -0.174 -1.601 10.116*** 6.753*** 
 (2.408) (0.929) (3.949) (6.837) (1.108) (3.321) (1.539) 
Ln supply access 2.422 2.738*** 12.328*** 1.054 1.69 -9.536*** -5.723*** 
 (2.255) (0.744) (3.797) (7.072) (1.148) (3.275) (1.501) 
N 824 968 373 1306 1216 609 1442 
1994-1996 Food and 
beverages 
Textiles 
and 
clothing 
Wood and 
furniture 
Chemicals, 
rubber and 
plastics 
Mineral 
and metal 
products 
Machinery 
and 
transport 
equipment 
Electric 
machinery 
and 
electronics 
Ln distance -0.865** 0.04 -2.036 -0.851*** -0.932** -2.057*** -0.904*** 
 (0.408) (0.474) (1.618) (0.122) (0.367) (0.766) (0.323) 
Ln sectoral  -0.136 0.776*** -0.196 0.324*** 0.35** 0.196** 0.346*** 
agglomeration_TWN (0.204) (0.245) (0.306) (0.040) (0.153) (0.096) (0.123) 
Ln sectoral  0.849** -0.671* 0.52 0.276*** 0.072 1.841*** 0.387*** 
agglomeration (0.398) (0.366) (0.631) (0.068) (0.145) (0.502) (0.149) 
Ln market access -11.679** -1.313 -15.015 -0.82 -10.7** 6.856* -4.452 
 (5.498) (2.145) (15.012) (0.737) (4.586) (3.663) (4.628) 
Ln supply access 9.122* 2.632 14.298 0.589 11.464** -8.156** 3.511 
 (4.779) (2.005) (14.276) (0.730) (4.694) (3.793) (4.101) 
N 131 131 47 1451 228 193 324 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
 
All independent variables used in 1991-1993 are from 1990; variables used in 1994-1996 are from 1993 
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Appendix 1-1 Correlation of variables, 1991-1993 
 
 Ln 
distance 
Ln 
market 
access 
Ln supply 
access 
Ln 
sectoral 
agglomer
ation 
Ln wages Ln 
electricity 
Ln road 
density 
Ln fixed-
line 
density 
Special 
economic 
zones 
D_coastal 
provinces 
Ln total 
FDI 
amount 
Ln # 
state-
owned 
firms 
Ln high 
school 
ratio 
Ln distance 1             
Ln market access -0.4286 1            
Ln supply access -0.2407 0.5466 1           
Ln sectoral 
agglomeration 
-0.2114 0.3375 -0.1221 1          
Ln wages -0.1512 0.2588 0.1493 0.0975 1         
Ln electricity -0.023 0.3128 0.1792 0.5462 0.0865 1        
Ln road density -0.4222 0.4974 0.2787 0.0925 0.5646 -0.1079 1       
Ln fixed-line density 0.1512 0.5357 0.3094 0.0398 0.3424 0.0765 0.5387 1      
Special economic 
zones 
-0.4638 0.2429 0.1374 0.24 0.5612 0.1072 0.3865 -0.1089 1     
D_coastal provinces -0.3105 0.3492 0.1997 0.1086 0.6227 -0.0747 0.5766 0.2965 0.8307 1    
Ln total FDI amount -0.3573 0.2945 0.1683 0.2258 0.6724 0.0947 0.7697 0.3309 0.7335 0.7852 1   
Ln # state-owned 
firms 
-0.1701 0.1803 0.102 0.5474 -0.1063 0.8914 -0.1792 -0.1949 0.0715 -0.2169 0.0138 1  
Ln high school ratio 0.1489 0.3426 0.2017 -0.0144 0.4831 -0.0566 0.3278 0.7021 0.1198 0.4053 0.3994 -0.3038 1 
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Appendix 1-2 Correlation of variables, 1994-1996 
 
 
 
Ln 
distance 
Ln market 
access 
Ln supply 
access 
Ln 
sectoral 
agglomera
tion 
Ln 
sectoral 
agglomera
tion_TWN 
Ln supply 
access_T
WN 
Ln wages Ln 
electricity 
Ln road 
density 
Ln fixed-
line 
density 
Special 
economic 
zones 
D_coastal 
provinces 
Ln total 
FDI 
amount 
Ln # state-
owned 
firms 
Ln high 
school 
ratio 
Ln distance 1               
Ln market access -0.5158 1              
Ln supply access -0.2274 0.429 1             
Ln sectoral 
agglomeration 
-0.2121 0.3781 -0.0318 1            
Ln sectoral 
agglomeration_TWN 
-0.5157 0.4498 0.1679 0.3454 1           
Ln supply access_TWN -0.3392 0.4159 0.9795 -0.0704 0.2307 1          
Ln wages -0.2132 0.3399 0.1573 0.0829 0.5036 0.2716 1         
Ln electricity -0.0008 0.2568 0.1023 0.537 0.2732 0.0408 -0.0534 1        
Ln road density -0.4189 0.5355 0.2356 0.1177 0.5236 0.2797 0.6257 -0.0964 1       
Ln fixed-line density -0.1516 0.0046 0.1979 0.0575 0.0867 0.1058 0.2626 -0.009 0.5484 1      
Special economic zones -0.4816 0.1894 0.0916 0.3375 0.652 0.1538 0.4384 0.2949 0.3788 -0.1393 1     
D_coastal provinces -0.3105 0.3725 0.1724 0.1396 0.5213 0.2132 0.6879 -0.0636 0.5956 0.2999 0.6329 1    
Ln total FDI amount -0.5407 0.392 0.1794 0.3328 0.7145 0.2479 0.6217 0.198 0.5873 0.0598 0.8757 0.7635 1   
Ln # state-owned firms -0.091 0.2608 0.1061 0.5718 0.3094 0.0654 -0.0141 0.8707 0.0043 -0.0397 0.2982 -0.0327 0.3357 1  
Ln high school ratio 0.128 0.2824 0.1286 -0.0025 0.1951 0.0859 0.4759 -0.1072 0.3025 0.6387 0.1223 0.3815 0.3164 -0.0876 1 
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CHAPTER 2 
DOES THE DISTANCE MATTER? THE 
EFFECT OF CHANGE IN TRADE COSTS 
ON FDI LOCATIONS 
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1. Introduction 
Trade costs play an essential role in the new economy geography (NEG) models. 
Without these costs, there is no role for geography. Take Puga’s (1999) NEG 
model for example; he pointed out that trade costs should be interpreted as a 
package, including not only physical transport costs but also informational, sales 
and support complications involved in doing business at a distance. Though this 
simplified model provides analytical insights, its uni-dimensional geography 
structure is far from real world. First of all, regions are related to each other by a 
more complicated geographical structure. Bosker et al. (2010) point out that while 
current NEG empirical studies in multi-countries or multi-regions settings have 
applied bilateral distances between regions or controlled tariff or border effects in 
trade costs, their attempts to answer questions like “where on the bell (tomahawk) 
are we?” still rely on the uni-dimensional NEG model. This might create 
misleading interpretations of estimated parameters. Since the development of an 
analytically solvable version of an NEG model with a multi-dimensional 
geographical structure faces mathematical difficulties (Bosker et al. 2010), in this 
chapter, I aim at providing solid empirical evidence on the impact of the change 
in trade costs in the multi-regional framework. 
          I use a quasi-experiment to circumvent these modelling difficulties on 
empirical studies: the implementation of Taiwan’s cross-strait direct flight policy 
in 2008. Up to this point, owing to historical political conflicts between Taiwan 
and China, there were neither direct air nor ocean transportation for passengers 
and shipments across the Taiwan Strait since 1949. The very first commercial 
cross-strait direct flight routes between Taiwan and five Chinese provinces started 
in 2008. This breakthrough negotiation on cross-strait transportation policy 
happened after the pro-China party candidate won the presidential election in 
early 2008. Very soon, there were direct flights to and from Taiwan and twenty-
five of China’s thirty-one provinces in 2011. Hence, direct air transportation 
between Taiwan and China provides an exogenous and immediate reduction in 
travelling and shipping costs. The average passenger’s air travel time is reduced 
by around 160 minutes. It takes only one and a half hours from Taipei to 
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Shanghai with a direct flight, while an indirect one (usually via Hong Kong) can 
take at least five hours. 
          I use the geographical distance between Taiwan and Chinese provinces as 
the treatment in a difference-in-difference identification strategy. This is to 
investigate the impact of relative change in trade costs across provinces on 
Taiwanese public listed firms’ FDI locations between 2002 and 2011. The change 
in trade costs arises from the implementation of a new transportation mode, and I 
argue that this change in trade costs is an exogenous shock on Taiwanese FDI 
activities. Hence, in combination with panel data on Taiwanese FDI projects, I 
can use difference-in-difference estimation to investigate the casual effect of the 
change in trade costs on FDI locations. By exploiting the variation of the distance 
effect before and after this exogenous policy shock across provinces and time, the 
potential omitted variables bias resulting from the unobservable provincial 
characteristics can be eliminated 12. Also, non-tariff barriers such as language or 
culture are minimized because Taiwanese firms share the same Chinese origin. 
The econometric specifications further control for observable time varying 
provincial and industrial characteristics and the unobservable provincial and 
industry-time fixed effects. The results indicate that after the shock, firms choose 
to establish Chinese affiliates further away from Taiwan. Hence, the direct 
empirical evidence on the dispersion of Taiwanese FDI locations is generally 
consistent with the NEG prediction in the inter-region labour framework with 
limited local labour mobility13. 
          Even though trade costs are of theoretical importance, the empirical 
specification of trade costs either in trade or NEG literature is far from being 
direct and quantifiable. Bilateral distance is commonly used as a proxy for trade 
costs. The inverse distance is employed as a discount factor to measure region or 
country market access (Redding and Veneables, 2004; Amiti and Javorcik, 2008). 
Distance is also an important determinant of transport costs of goods shipments 
(Hummels, 2007). Moreover, in Mayer et.al (2010), transaction costs, which are 
approximated by bilateral distances, languages and law origins, can be taken as 
                                                
12 I have to assume that there are no specific and exogenous shocks on trade costs among each province pairs. If the 
unobserved variation in these trade costs is with a time trend or industrial specific, they can be controlled by including 
industry-year fixed effects. I also include the time variant provincial variable of transportation infrastructure to control the 
regional trade costs. In the robustness check, I will estimate the within region variation to justify this assumption. 
13 Since China’s “HuKou” (resident registration) system remains in force to prevent rural labour from immigrating to cities, 
there is still no full labour mobility across Chinese provinces. 
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one of the determinants of firms’ choice of location. Fujita and Mori (2005) 
summarized that it is important to distinguish the two different types of 
impediment to trade in space, i.e. transport costs for goods, and communication 
costs for doing business over space. 
         This chapter is to my knowledge the first in trade and NEG literature to 
disentangle the distance effect on FDI locations by identifying the transport and 
transaction cost channels. I create two intensity indices on the base of the trade 
literature to investigate the relative effect of these two channels across industries: 
contract intensity and unit value intensity. As for the transaction costs channel, if 
an industry with more relationship-specific investments (high contract intensity) 
experiences higher face-to-face communication costs (Cristea, 2011), it will pay 
relatively higher transaction costs than others as the distance between home and 
host FDI destination increases. As for the transport costs channel, if an industry 
has a higher value-weight ratio (high unit value) on shipments, the share of 
premium ad-valorem air shipping costs will be lower than the ones with lower 
unit value. (Hummels and Schaur, 2013). Hence, the industries with higher unit 
value can afford to ship more goods to further distant regions/countries than those 
with lower unit values. My findings indicate that for new FDI projects, firms in a 
high contract intensive (more relationship-specific investment) industry will tend 
to invest closer to the home country to save transaction costs. On the other hand, 
firms in a high unit value intensive industry will invest relatively more in the 
distant locations than ones in the low unit value industry because of the relative 
advantage on transport costs. 
         Furthermore, I examine the impact of flight liberation on FDI locations 
through the transaction and transport costs channel. After the direct flight shock, 
as the trade costs decrease, the dispersion of FDI locations is expected to occur 
through the transaction costs channel. Firms with higher contract intensity will 
tend to locate in the more distant destinations than those with lower contract 
intensity. On the other hand, as the trade costs decrease, the reduction in the share 
of premium ad-valorem air shipping costs is higher in the relative low unit value 
industry than high ones. Hence, the firm with lower unit value will marginally 
benefit more than the one with higher unit value and will tend to invest relative 
more in the distant destinations after the reduction in trade costs. The findings 
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show that the estimates of interaction term variables in transaction costs channel 
are with the predicted positive signs but not significant. As for the transport costs 
channel, the results are statistically significant with expected negative signs. It 
indicates that firms in the relatively high unit value intensive industries will 
choose to invest in relative closer locations than relative low intensive ones 
because of the reduction in the share of premium ad-valorem air shipping costs. 
         What are the implications of this paper for today’s FDI location decisions, 
when air transportation is common and becoming cheaper and cheaper? The 
flight liberalisation across the Taiwan Strait provides a quasi-experiment to 
investigate how the multinational firms have responded to the change in trade 
costs on their FDI location choices. My findings can provide policy implications 
for local governments to boost the FDI inflow. For instance, the improvements in 
the transportation network and custom service will further reduce trade costs. 
         The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion of the 
importance of air transportation and the historical background of cross-strait 
direct flight policy, while Section 3 outlines the conceptual framework. Section 4 
describes the data used in the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy 
and baseline results. Section 6 reports additional robustness checks. Section 7 
offers concluding remarks. 
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2. Background 
2.1 The importance of air transportation 
Given Taiwan’s geographic condition, air and ocean transportations are the only 
methods for people and firms to travel or export/import goods globally. 
Historically, from a passenger perspective, because of the constraints of Taiwan’s 
harbours and the weather conditions, air transportation is dominant for 
international passenger travelling to and from Taiwan. Figure 1 shows that the 
number of international air passengers is far higher than ocean passenger 
numbers. Besides, the rough wave condition across the Taiwan Strait limits the 
development of passengers’ sea transportation. Figure 1 demonstrates the fact that 
air transportation remains the dominant mode for the cross-strait transportation.  
         For goods shipments, air and ocean transportations are equivalently 
important for Taiwan’s exporting and importing industries, and in general they 
share similar growth trends as shown in Figure 2. After the restrictions of direct 
shipments to and from China are lifted in 2008, the air shipments not only 
enjoyed a higher growth rate than ocean shipments, but also gradually had a 
higher share of total shipments (see Figure 2).  
         I provide the summarized data on exports and imports as well as the air 
shipments data in 2007 to draw a broad picture about the potential impact of air 
transportation on the cross-strait economic activities. The 2006 industry census, 
conducted by Taiwan’s Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
shows that the top two industries in total revenue and gross outputs are electronic 
parts (23%, 9%) and computer, electronic and optical equipment (24%, 23.7%). 
Taiwan’s manufacturing sector is highly concentrated on industries producing 
electronic, electricity and optical equipment and parts. According to Taiwan’s 
Mainland Affairs Council14 monthly economic reports, the electrical equipment 
and parts are the top export and import products from China in 2007. The share of 
these products in total exports and imports between Taiwan and China is 39 
percent and 34 percent respectively. The second main export goods are optical, 
photographic instruments and parts (15.7%) and import goods are mechanical 
                                                
14 It is the official ministry in Taiwan in charge of the economic, social and culture affairs related to China, 
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appliance and parts (14.9%). Hence, the top two products count for around 50 
percent of total exports and imports between Taiwan and China.  
          The data on air shipments provided by Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation 
and Communication, shows that these products are also the main products using 
air transportation in Taiwan. In 2007, on the one hand, electrical equipment and 
parts account for 40 percent of total weights of exports in air shipments and 20 
percent of imports in air shipments. Optical and photographic products account 
for 9 percent for exports and imports in air shipments respectively. The share of 
Mechanical appliance and parts in total exports and imports in air shipments is 12 
percent and 14 percent. On the other hand, none of them are among the top 10 
main products in exports or imports in sea shipments. Since the values of these air 
and sea shipments are not available, I cannot calculate the share of each product 
in different transportation modes to total trade value. However, these stylized 
facts suggest that air transportation is more likely to have greater impact on the 
bilateral economic activities between Taiwan and China based on Taiwan’s 
industrial structure and trade patterns.  
         In short, since the air transportation is the dominant mode for Taiwanese 
people and firms, this paper will focus on the impact of the change in air 
transportation on Taiwan’s firm location choices in China. In Section 5, we show 
that the estimates of this direct flight shock are robust in controlling for time-
varied provincial and industrial characteristics as well as province, industry and 
time fixed effects. 
 
2.2 The progress of cross-strait direct flights  
Taiwan has resumed its economic links with China by opening bilateral trade and 
allowing Taiwan firms’ direct investment, though with certain limitations, since 
1991. However, even with these closer mutual economic ties, there were neither 
direct passenger transportation nor goods shipments through ocean or air 
transportation between China and Taiwan before 2008. This restriction in 
transportation is due to Taiwan’s national security concerns and other political 
disagreements between Taiwan and China. Therefore, Hong Kong has become an 
important transferring port for Taiwanese firms because of its geographic 
proximity to Taiwan and good international transportation facilities. 
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During the past decades, the Taiwanese government had attempted to 
negotiate direct transportation with the Chinese government, but limited progress 
was achieved. Even though China has become the most important trade partner 
and attracted the most Taiwanese FDI since 2001, the strong economic demands 
are still not able to lift this restriction. After winning the president election in the 
spring of 2008, President Ma Ying-Jeou, who has closer political relations with 
China, started a new round of cross-strait direct flights negotiations in the May of 
that year. 
To identify this policy as an exogenous shock, I will argue that Mr Ma’s 
winning factors do not come from this cross-strait economic demand but from 
local political and economic ones. First of all, the scandal of incumbent president 
Mr Chen Shui-Bian’s wife and son-in-law in 2006 had damaged the public 
support of Mr Chen’s party, Democratic Progress Party (DPP). Thus, DPP’s 
president candidate, Mr Hsieh Chang-Ting, was in a disadvantaged campaigning 
position in 2008. Besides, global economic downturn from 2007 had affected 
Taiwan’s exports that resulted in an increasing unemployment rate. Finally, 
according to existing voting regulations in Taiwan, voters have to vote personally 
in the registered ballots. This restrains Taiwanese workers in China from 
participating, who are more likely to vote for the pro-China candidate than voters 
reside in Taiwan15. In short, we can say that the further economic openness 
between Taiwan and China is expected if Mr Ma is elected, but for cross-strait 
direct flights, it is difficult for people to estimate how fast and to what extent this 
policy will be implemented after the election. 
Also, I will argue that this policy shock is applied to all Taiwan’s firms and 
the effects of this policy reach to Chinese provinces. In the first stage, there are 
only chartered passenger flights to 17 Chinese provinces at the end of 200816. By 
31st August 2009, there were regular passenger flights between Taiwan and 21 
Chinese provinces. In 2009, the average number of weekly direct flights is around 
140. In 2010, there are direct flights for 25 provinces with around 500 weekly 
flights. In 2011, no new provinces are added but the number of weekly flights 
                                                
15 There are no official records of the number of Taiwanese voters who reside in China or their voting rate. According to 
media and parties’ estimates, those voters might count for 3 to 5 percent of total votes, which can affect the result in a 
close election.  
16 These 17 provinces are: Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, Sichuan, Tianjin, Yunnan and Zhejiang. 
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increases to 780. However, the progress in air shipments is slower than passenger 
flights. The direct air shipment flights opened in 2 provinces only (Shanghai and 
Guangdong) in 2008 and 5 provinces (Chongqing, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, 
and Shanghai) in 201117. Hence, it is expected that these five provinces might 
work as shipping hubs and enjoy better transportation advantages. Owning to this 
extra cost advantage, as shown in Section 5, the dummy variable for provinces 
with the direct air shipments will be used to further control this regional costs 
impact on Taiwan FDI locations. On the other hand, direct ocean passenger 
cruises and shipments started from 15 December 2008 for the most important 
ports in Taiwan and China. In short, at the end of 2011, Taiwan has generally 
enjoyed the same access to China as Hong Kong in direct passenger flights. 
Figure 3-1 and 3-2 present the simplified flight routes between Taiwan and 
China before and after direct flight policy. Before 2008, the air transportation to 
and from China had to bypass a third country. In this simple demonstration, I use 
Hong Kong as the major transferring hub based on its geographic location and 
relative advantages in air transportation capacity to and from China. In Figure 1-
2, we can observe that due to the constraint of a no-fly zone in the middle of the 
Taiwan Strait, direct flights to southern China will fly via the Hong Kong Air 
Control Zone, while flights to northern China can choose to fly via either 
Shanghai or the Beijing Air Control zones. 
                                                
17 Direct passenger flights are also allowed to carry goods. Depending on the type of carriers, however, the shipping 
capacity is far lower in passenger flights than pure air shipment flights. 
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3. Conceptual framework 
This paper firstly analyses the general effect of the time and cost shocks from the 
introduction of cross-strait direct flights on Taiwan FDI locations in China. In 
comparing the pre and post-direct flight periods, the question of whether firms 
tend to agglomerate or disperse across the space after the transportation shock is 
not trivial. The empirical findings can shed light on the theoretical multi-region 
models. Secondly, how the increase in transport accessibility can affect the firm 
location choices is straightforward: an increase in transportation efficiency (more 
transportation options) decreases firms’ shipping or communication costs, 
causing operational profit increase, both of which resulted in the distribution 
change of FDI locations18. Hence, I focus on two specific costs channels: 
transaction costs and transport costs. 
 
3.1 Transaction costs 
First of all, this paper wants to identify how heterogeneous transaction costs 
occur across industries through a specific channel. Industries that require 
relationship-specific investments might incur higher transaction costs than lower 
ones. For example, the senior managers will need more face-to-face meetings to 
precede the relationship-specific investment, and with this the communication 
and coordination costs increase. Cristea (2011) argues that exports of 
sophisticated manufacturers, which require strategic inputs of unverifiable 
quality, and whose sales involve intensive searching and matching, are the type of 
goods that are most dependent on face-to-face interactions that incur higher 
transaction costs. Besides, according to Mayer et al. (2010), the bilateral distance 
between home and host countries has a significantly negative effect on firm 
location decisions. Hence, I try to investigate the relative impact of transportation 
shocks on firm in an industry requiring higher relationship-specific investments 
than others, i.e. investment in further away locations will decrease for industry 
with relationship-specific investments. 
                                                
18 Be aware that the effect of direct flights on FDI locations might occur through a number of different channels. However, 
in this paper, I will focus only on the impacts of transaction and transport costs. 
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To measure the level of relationship-specific investments for final goods, 
Nunn (2007) constructed a contract intensity index by: 1) using the 1997 USA I-
O Use Table to identify which intermediate inputs are used, and in what 
proportions, in the production of each final good, and 2) using data from Rauch 
(1999) to identify which inputs require relationship-specific investments. Rauch 
(1999) allocated goods into three categories depending on the thickness of 
exchange markets: a) sold on an organised exchange, b) reference priced in a 
trade publication, or c) neither. Inputs in b and c categories can be thought of as 
having an intermediate to high level of relationship-specificity. For each final 
good, Nunn (2007) established two contract intensity measures of the proportion 
of its intermediate inputs that are relationship-specific. The detail of contract 
intensity is described below: 
 
 
 
where uij denotes the value of input j used in industry i, and ui denotes the total 
value of all inputs used in industry i. Rjneither is the proportion of input j that is 
neither sold on an organized exchange nor reference priced; and Rjneither is the 
proportion of input j that is not sold on an organized exchange but is reference 
priced 
Following Nunn (2007), this paper uses the contract intensity 1, the more 
restrict measure, to emphasize the effect of transportation shock on the 
transaction costs through this particular channel19. Nunn (2007) also provides 
contract intensity for 29 3-digit ISIC Rev.2 manufacturing industries20. To be 
compatible with Taiwan’s FDI industry classification, I use UN correspondence 
tables to match ISIC Rev.2 with ISIC Rev. 4 and construct contract intensity 
value for 23 2-digit industries. The author recognises that the usage of United 
States Input-output table in 1997 might not disclose the true cross industry 
                                                
19 I also use the second measure to estimate the specification. The results are qualitatively consistent. 
20 Data is available on Nunn’s website: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/nunn  
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contract intensity due to following reasons. First, the production processes in 
United States and China might exist huge difference in terms of labour costs or 
productivities. Second, the input-output table used is out of date. Given the rapid 
development in technology in recent decades, the input-output ratio in 1997 might 
largely deviate from the current one. However, due to the lack of up-to-date 
relationship-specific investment data and the concordance tables among China 
and United States’ Input-output industry codes, I still employ Nunn’s (2007) data 
to construct approximation of the index to measure the cross-industry contract 
intensity in China.   
By applying Nunn’s (2007) measurement of contract intensity (CI) for 
relationship-specific investments across industries, I argue that the higher the 
contract intensity (the higher requirement for relationship-specific investments), 
the higher the transaction costs. Hence, firms with higher contract intensity might 
tend to establish the foreign affiliate in a closer location. Thus, a negative 
coefficient of the interaction variable of the contract intensity and distance 
between Taiwan and Chinese province indicates that provinces, where they are 
further away from Taiwan, will have relatively fewer FDI projects in industries 
for which relationship-specific investments are more important (i.e. high contract 
intensity industries). 
 
3.2 Transport costs 
Harrigan (2010) demonstrates how relative distance affects comparative 
advantage. In his theoretical model, the relevant country characteristics are 
geographical location, and the product characteristics are timeliness-adjusted 
transport costs. Based on the fact that air transportation are fast and expensive, air 
shipments are used only when timely delivery is valuable enough. This means the 
air shipments occur when the value of traded goods is high enough to pay for the 
premium air shipping costs. For example, in the case that two watches are with 
similar weight (100g) but different values (one is $100 and the other is $10), the 
unit value is 1($/g) and 0.1 ($/g) respectively. Since the air freight is measured 
mainly based on products’ weight, both watches have the same air freight (e.g. 
$10). Hence, the share of the air freight in the high price watch’s unit value is 10, 
while the share in the low price watch is 100. Therefore, the high price watch is 
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more likely to be shipped by air than the low price watch due to the relative low 
share of the air freight in the unit value.  
         Since airplanes have an advantage on speed over land and sea-based modes 
of transport, they are used disproportionately for goods with high unit value that 
are produced far from where they are sold. In the previous example, the 
production plant of high value watches seems more likely to be located further 
away from the markets and use timely air delivery. By using the trade data on 
U.S. imported goods with detailed shipping costs, one of his major empirical 
findings is that goods imported from more distant locations will have higher unit 
vales. Equation (1) shows the econometric specification used in Harrigan (2010): 
 
 
 
where vic is the logarithm unit value of imports of product i from country c. Unit 
value is defined as the f.o.b. dollar value of imports per physical unit, so it does 
not include the transport charges. αi is the fixed effect for 10-digit HS product 
code i; and dc is the distance of c from U.S.  
Harrigan (2010) uses a within-product estimator to control for which goods 
a country exports as well as for differences in physical characteristics of products. 
Harrigan’s (2010) findings show that the estimated coefficient β is statistically 
significant with the expected positive sign. The unit value is higher when they 
come from more distant locations. Hummels and Schaur’s (2013) also point that 
for sufficiently high value products, the ad-valorem air freight premium becomes 
relatively small compared to low value ones.  
The next question is if distance is a feasible proxy for the transport costs. 
Hummels (2007) investigated the main components of transport costs (freight-
custom value ratio) for international trade flows either via air or ocean shipping 
by using panel data of USA imported products from 1975 to 2004. In his model, 
the distance variable is one of the factors affecting the ad valorem transport costs 
of USA imported products. The further the distance between USA and the import 
country, the more the cost increases. Besides, Alfaro and Charlton (2009) point 
out that distance, a proxy for transport costs, has a consistently negative effect on 
vic =αi +βdc +other controls+εic                                                (1)
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vertical FDI locations. As the bilateral distance increases, the multinational 
activities decrease.  
Based on Harrigan (2010), I establish a product fixed effects estimation 
using a product-country-year panel data, which is of USA imported products on 
five-digit SITC Rev. 2 code during the period 1990 to 2004 provided by 
Hummels (2007)21. The product fixed effects estimated specification is shown in 
equation (2): 
 
 
 
where vict is the unit value of product i in air shipments (f.o.b value-weight ratio) 
imported from country c in year t. Two time varying country or country-product 
characteristics are included as Harrigon (2010) suggests: gdpct and tariffict. 
Besides, I also include country and time dummies to control for the unobservable 
time and country characteristics, which might cause the omitted variable bias on 
the estimate of unit value. And then, the unit value intensity of a two-digit ISIC 
Rev.4 industry j is measured as an average value of the estimated individual-
specific error of product i in equation (2), where product i is categorised into 
aggregated industry j. The detail formulation of this intensity is as following:  
 
 
 
Hence, this intensity measure will just reflect the industrial characteristic in the 
unit value across country and year. 
According to Harrigan’s (2010) predictions, with higher unit value 
intensity, this industry will tend to invest in the locations further away from the 
home country than lower ones. Given the same air transport costs, industries with 
higher intensity will pay relatively lower ad valorem air freight costs. Hence, the 
positive coefficient of the interaction variable of unit value intensity and the 
                                                
21 This dataset also includes the GDP and tariff data. The detail please see David Hummel’s website: 
http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/hummelsd/datasets.asp 
vict =α0 +α1tariffict +α2gdpct + vc + vt + vi +εipt                          (2) 
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distance indicates that provinces, which are relatively far away from Taiwan, will 
have relatively more FDI projects from industries with higher unit value intensity. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Contract and Unit Value Intensity 
Contract intensity is not highly correlated with unit value intensity. The 
correlation is -0.152. A list of the contract and unit value intensive industries is 
provided in Table 1. The ranking of industries appears to be sensible. For contract 
intensity, the lesser industries tend to have primary inputs such as basic metals or 
food products, while the most contract intensive ones seem to use more inputs 
requiring relationship-specific investment, such as motor vehicles, computers, 
and electronic and optical products. For unit value intensity, the least intensive 
industries seem to be heavier than the most intensive ones. For example, the final 
goods in furniture and wood products industries are much heavier than 
Pharmaceutical products. 
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4. Data 
4.1 Data sources 
The data of Taiwan public listed firms’ FDI in China is from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal (TEJ). TEJ not only provides the addresses and product 
information of firms’ FDI in China, but also other firm level data such as 
employment, net profit per employee, etc. Based on this information, I can 
classify each FDI into the 2-digit ISIC Rev.4 system. Also, for China’s other 
industrial and provincial data, these are taken from the Chinese Statistical 
Yearbook and China Yearly Industry data. Finally, the cross-strait direct flights 
data is collected from Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA). 
The FDI data used is from 2002 to 2011 to avoid other major trade or 
economic policies implemented in the same period to eliminate identification 
issues. For instance, both China and Taiwan joined the WTO in 2001, which in 
turn caused further economic integration across the Taiwan Strait. The tobacco 
industry is not included because of 1) none of Taiwan’s public listed firms have 
invested in this industry in China; 2) tobacco is considered as an exclusive state-
owned industry in China. Tibet is not included in the data due to its highly 
political concerned status. Thus, there are 30 province/municipal/autonomous 
areas. Figure 4 illustrates the total of Taiwan’s public-listed firms’ FDI in China 
in 2002 and 2011. In 2011, coastal provinces are still the most attractive locations 
for Taiwan’s firms, but there is higher firm density in the middle of China 
compared to 2002. 
Based on TEJ data, the growth rate of Taiwanese FDI projects and the 
number of new FDI projects from 2002 to 2011 in each province are established. 
By using these two dependent variables, I attempt to catch the effect of policy 
shock on the flow level of FDI, instead of FDI stock level, that it may not reflect 
the relative change in FDI projects.  
The major variables of interest are the trade costs between Taiwan and 
China. Due to data constraints on calculating precise cost measures, I employ the 
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distance between Taiwan and Chinese provincial capital as the proxy for these 
costs22. The distance is calculated by using Google Earth. 
4.2. Estimated passenger air travel time 
It has been considered that transportation time can be taken as a type of cost. 
Longer passenger travelling times equate to them bearing higher costs. To 
provide an alternative to approximate cross-strait transporting/transaction costs, I 
estimate total average passenger journey times by using flight booking systems at 
airline and travelling websites23. The travelling time of each direct flight after 
2008 is referred to in airline companies’ timetables. The major issue of estimating 
the total travelling time of indirect flights is to establish reasonable flight transfer 
time. The number of daily connecting flights to and from the transferring hub, for 
example Hong Kong, will affect the reliability of the measurement of transfer 
time. For indirect flights between Taiwan and China, passengers can arrive in all 
provincial capitals within 2 stops. Based on this transferring condition, I assume 
Hong Kong is the first stop because of its frequent flights and route coverage to 
and from China24. Also, there are frequent daily flights between Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, which is one of the busiest international flight routes. In 2011, there were 
414 flights weekly. 
From 2002 to 2011, Hong Kong had regular direct flights to 25 Chinese 
provinces25. To reach those provinces without direct flight connections, we need 
another stop in China, such as Beijing, Shanghai or Xian where Chinese domestic 
flight hubs are located. Hence, the transfer time can be assumed: 1) if the first 
stop is via Hong Kong, it will take 90 minutes and the second stop via China’s 
domestic airports will need 150 minutes; 2) after 2008, if the first stop is via 
China’s domestic airports, it will take 150 minutes. Transferring flights in 
China’s airports on average takes a longer amount of time than in Hong Kong, 
since there are less connecting flights and less efficient transferring services. 
Although the fixed flight transferring time across airports is not realistic, this 
simplified measure attempts to catch the general air travel patterns between 
                                                
22 Distance is commonly used as the proxy for trade costs in NEG or trade literature. Disdier and Head (2008) provide a 
thorough evaluation of the distance effect on trades. 
23 For examples, I use booking website such as Skyscanner (www.skyscanner.net) and airline companies’ website: China 
Airline, Eva Airways, etc. 
24 Other alternative first stops include Macau, Cheju Island or Seoul.  
25 According to Hong Kong International Airport Annual Report (2002-2011), 6 provinces without direct flight connection 
are: Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Besides, In 2011, Taiwan also has compatible direct 
flights to those 25 provinces with an average of 3300 fights per month.  
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Taiwan and China. Take Shanghai for example, before 2008, it took 95 minutes 
to travel from Taiwan to Hong Kong and then another 135 minutes from Hong 
Kong to Shanghai. Factoring in transfer time, a passenger needs 320 minutes to 
reach the destination. After 2008, it takes only 105 minutes from Taipei to 
Shanghai with a direct flight. 
Figure 5 demonstrates the estimated travelling time in 2006 and 2011 and 
the travelling time save ratio too. We can see that remote provinces save more 
minutes after cross-strait direct flights open, while provinces closer to Taiwan 
save more on a relative level. However, we shall bear in mind that this measure 
simplifies the complexity of flight transfers by giving fixed flight connecting 
times for all destinations. 
  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 6-1 demonstrates that the relationship between the growth of Taiwan’s 
public-listed firms’ FDI and the distance between Taiwan and Chinese provinces 
has changed from downward sloping to upward sloping in 2011. Figure 6-2 
shows that the relationship between new FDI projects and distance remains 
downward sloping while the magnitude decreases gradually. Table 1-2 presents 
the descriptive statistics of main variables. 
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5. Empirical strategies and results 
5.1 Empirical strategy 
The main estimation strategy follows the same logic as a standard differences-in-
differences (DD) specification. I will compare the relative change in FDI growth 
rate and new FDI projects in the post-shock period relative to the pre-shock 
period between provinces that are closer to or further away from Taiwan. The 
difference from standard DD strategy is that I use a continuous measure of the 
intensity of treatment (i.e. distance between Taiwan and Chinese provinces) and 
thereby capture more variation in the data. Because the date of openness to direct 
flights in each province depends on bilateral negotiation progress, I use the same 
date of initial openness for all provinces. The development of cross-strait flights 
suggests that after agreements have been signed, it takes less than two months to 
operate. Besides, it also allows passengers of direct flights to connect to other 
domestic local flights. Even for provinces without direct flights, the total 
travelling time will change as well. Therefore, in this paper, I use the initial 
opening year, 2008, as the cut-off period and define the periods prior to 2008 as 
the pre-shock periods, and the periods after 2008 (i.e. 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011) 
as the post-shock periods. In the following sections, I will employ a number of 
procedures to check that this chosen cut-off is consistent with the data. 
The main estimating equation assumes that the growth rate of an industry’s 
FDI in a Chinese province is proportional to the change of the distance between 
Taiwan and a Chinese province. This is written as equation (3):  
 
 
 
where i indexes industries, p indexes provinces and t indexes time periods, which 
are from 2002 to 2011. The variable Distancep is the logarithm of the distance 
between Taipei, Taiwan and a Chinese province p capital, defined in the previous 
section, and Itpost is an indicator variable that equals one for the periods after 2007 
(i.e. 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011). The outcome of interest, denoted nipt is either 
the growth rate of Taiwanese public-listed firms’ foreign affiliates or the 
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logarithm of total number of Taiwan public-listed firms’ new FDI projects. The 
equation also includes province and industry-year fixed effects (vp and vit), time 
variant industry-provinces and province characteristics (Xipt-1 and Ypt-1), which 
include a set of geographic and industrial agglomeration variables.  
         The coefficient of interest in equation (3) is β1, and the estimated coefficient 
of β1 measures the additional growth in FDI growth rate experienced by 
provinces with relative distance to Taiwan after cross-strait direct flights started 
in 2008 (relative to before). A positive coefficient indicates that after open direct 
flights, provinces further away from Taiwan benefited from a greater increase in 
the FDI growth rate than those closer to Taiwan after 2008, relative to before 
2008. 
           This is the balanced panel data from year 2002 to 2011 with many zero 
value FDI observations. To deal this zero-value issue, Tobit or Poisson estimators 
for the level or count data of dependent variable are econometric solutions 
suggested in FDI empirical literature. These two non-linger specifications can 
account for the province-industry observations where no FDI is observed, the 
existence of zeros in the dependent variable data (Alfaro & Charlton, 2009; 
Paniagua, 2011). In this study, based on difference-in-difference estimation 
strategy, I employ OLS with fixed effects instead of count number estimators to 
control for zero value issue to obtain consistent coefficient estimates for two 
reasons. First, since the Tobit model cannot estimate fixed effects in the panel 
data, it is unable to control for unobserved time invariant provincial or industrial 
characteristics. On the other hand, I run the baseline specifications using the 
Poisson with fixed effects as the sensitivity check. The coefficients of the β1 in 
equation (3) is with expected positive sign but not significant. Second, FDI 
growth rate, one of the dependent variables, cannot be applied in the count 
models.  
           Since Taiwanese FDI is a province-industry panel dataset, I can use the 
fixed effect estimations to deal with the zero value problems. The advantage of 
using a fixed effect estimator is that it controls for which FDI project in industry i 
invests in which province: if a province does not receive a FDI project in industry 
i from Taiwan, then that province’s distance to Taiwan is (appropriately) 
irrelevant to the effect of distance on the FDI growth or the number of new FDI 
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projects within industry i. Also, the fixed effects model allows to recognize how 
the relevant variables evolve through time and to identify the specific time, 
industry or province effects. 
 
5.2 Baseline Estimates 
The results of main estimating equation (3) are shown in Table 2. In Table 2, four 
specifications for each outcome of interest are reported. The first three 
specifications are reported in column (1)-(3) and (5)-(7) for FDI growth rate and 
new FDI projects separately. The first specification, reported in column (1) and 
(5), includes year, province and industry-year fixed effects only, without 
additional controls. In column (2) and (6), two agglomeration variables are 
included. Taiwan Firmipt-1, the logarithm of total Taiwan public listed firms FDI 
in industry i in province p, controls for Taiwanese agglomeration. Total Firmipt-1 
is the logarithm of total numbers of firms in industry i in province p and is used to 
allow for industrial agglomeration. This is done to ensure that the effect of 
opening direct flights is not confounded by other changes in local industrial 
agglomerations.  
The third specification, in columns (3) and (7), report the estimates for our 
baseline specification. In addition to the control for local industrial 
agglomerations, I also include wage and market access variables in the estimated 
specification because firms’ location decisions might be driven by labour costs 
and market accessibility. Wagept-1 is the logarithm of average salaries of workers 
and staff in province p at year t-1. This is used to proxy the factor price 
differentials between Taiwan and Chinese provinces.  Market Accesspt-1 is the 
logarithm of measure of local market size in province p at year t-1. The market 
access of province p is the summation of: 1) distance discounted final 
consumption of all other provinces q, q ≠ p, and 2) province p’s final 
consumption discounted by the radius of area. 
The estimated coefficient of the distance interaction term, Distancep×Itpost, 
reveals the average increase in the outcomes of interest arising from direct cross-
strait flights from 2008.26 According to the estimate in column (3), increasing the 
distance between Taiwan and province p of 1 percent increases the FDI growth 
                                                
26 I report standard errors clustered at the province- isic2 industry level. There are total 690 province-industry clusters. 
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rate by 0.032 percent on average. The estimated coefficient for new FDI projects 
from column (7) indicates that a 1 percent increase in distance increases the 
number of new FDI projects by 0.052 percentage points. 
Column (4) and (8) of Table 2 report the robustness of results by adding 
other provincial variables to control for other geographical factors that have an 
impact on Taiwan firms’ location decisions. It is well documented that firms tend 
to invest more in regions with better infrastructures as well as better local 
government support. Therefore, I use the natural log of density of rail length and 
natural log of the number of national level special economic zones in each 
province to control these determinants of location choices. These estimates are 
positive and significant while the magnitude becomes smaller than baseline 
specifications. 
 
5.3 Sensitivity to Variable Definitions 
The first sensitivity check tests the robustness of estimates to the use of 
alternative post-shock dates. Estimates of equation (4) using alternative cut-off 
dates are reported in Table 3, columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9). Each cell reports the 
coefficient of interest (i.e., β1) from the regression. Each row reports results using 
an alternative definition of the post-shock period. The first row uses the baseline 
definition of the post-shock period, which is 2008 and later. The second row uses 
2009 and later as a similar but alternative definition. The estimates show that the 
results remain robust to the choice of slightly different adoption dates. 
The second sensitivity test is also reported in Table 3 by using an 
alternative trade costs measure that is more close to reality. As discussed in 
section 4.2, the passenger air travelling time is constructed by two components: 
actual flight time and estimated transfer time together. Thus, the remaining 
columns of Table 3 report results from equation (4). 
 
 
 
The results in columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) show that the estimates 
generally remain positive and are consistently significant. Even though the 
nipt = β0 +β1traveltimept +β2traveltimept × Itpost                          (4)
        +ΦXipt-1 +ΘYpt-1 + vp + vit +εipt                          
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transfer time in this simple measure is fixed for all destinations, it reflects the 
variation of connection capacity in each airport. The passenger, however, will 
have to wait a longer time for the connecting flight to a more remote destination 
than a popular one. Hence, by using this alternative measure, this direct flight 
policy shock does affect firms’ costs structure and their FDI location choices. 
 
5.4 The impact of transaction costs and transport costs on location choices 
In this section, we further examine the impact of transaction and transport costs 
on locations of new FDI projects. Following equation (3), the estimated 
coefficient of the distance interaction terms, Distancep×CIi or Distancep×UVIi, 
reveal the relative effects of distance on the location choices through transaction 
and transport cost channels across industries. In Table 4, the results present 
different specifications, which test the impact of individual channel and the joint 
impacts.   Columns (1) and (2) show that as the bilateral distance increases, the 
contract intensive industries will invest less than less intensive ones. 
Quantitatively, if the difference in contract intensity between two industries is 10 
percentage points, as the distance increase by 10 percent, the number of new FDI 
affiliates in the relatively contract intensive industry will reduce on average 0.24 
percent more than the industry with the relatively low contract intensity. The 
findings in Columns (3) and (4) indicate that industries with higher unit value 
intensity will tend to invest at locations relatively further away than less intensive 
ones. If the difference in unit value intensity between two industries is 10 
percentage points, as the distance increases by 10 percent, the number of new FDI 
affiliates in the relatively unit value intensive industry will increase on average 
0.0043 percent more than the industry with the relatively low unit value intensity. 
Columns (5) and (6) present the joint impacts of two channels. The transaction 
costs channel remains statistically significant with the expected negative sign, 
while the estimates of transport channel are with the expected positive sign but 
not significant. 
In the next step I examine whether direct flight shock will lead to further change 
in the firm’s location choices through these two channels. The estimated 
coefficients of post shock interaction term, Distancep×CIi×Post or 
Distancep×UVIi×Post, reveal the average effects of direct flights through each 
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specific channel.  
          After the direct flight shock, as the trade costs decrease, the dispersion of 
FDI locations is expected to occur through the transaction costs channel. Firms 
with higher contract intensity will tend to locate in the more distant destinations 
than those with lower contract intensity. Column (1) and (3) of Table 5 show that 
the estimated coefficients of inverter term variable is with predicted positive sign 
but not significant. 
           On the other hand, as the trade costs reduce, the change in the share of 
premium ad-valorem air shipping costs is higher in the low unit value industry 
than high ones. Hence, the firm with lower unit value will marginally benefit 
more than the one with higher unit value and will tend to invest relative more in 
the distant destinations after the reduction in trade costs. The results in column (2) 
and (4) are statistically significant with expected negative signs. This indicates 
that firms in the relatively high unit value intensive industries will choose to 
invest in relative closer locations than relative low intensive ones because of the 
higher reduction in the share of premium ad-valorem air shipping costs. Finally, 
the general post-distance variable is included in column (5) and (6) to further 
control other unobservable effects through the distance variable. The results are 
similar for the transport costs channel, while the signs of interaction term in the 
transaction costs channel become negative but not significant.  
           In short, the results provide solid support that the two intensity measures 
can disentangle the composition effects of trade costs through transaction and 
transport costs channels with nontrivial economic magnitudes. 
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6. Robustness checks 
6.1 Flexible estimates 
Estimation in equation (3) requires that a fixed post-shock date is chosen. 
However, since the openness of these direct air flights starts gradually from 2008, 
reasonable cut-off dates range between 2008 and 2009. To further investigate the 
robustness of this cut-off, I use a number of different strategies to examine 
whether the patterns in the data are consistent with the year 2008 as a fixed post-
shock date. The first strategy is to estimate a fully flexible estimating equation 
written as follows 
 
 
 
where all variables are defined as in equation (3). The only difference is that, in 
equation (5), the distance measure interacts with each of the time-period fixed 
effects and year 2002 is as the base year. The estimated vectors of βj’s reveal the 
correlation between distance and the outcomes of interest in each time-period. 
In this estimation, it is expected the estimated βj’s are to be constant over 
time for the years before the policy shock. Also, I expect coefficients to be 
positive and larger in magnitude for the years after policy shock because of the 
gradual openness of direct flights. Estimates of equation (5) are reported in Table 
6. Column (1) and (2) report estimates for FDI growth rate and columns (3) and 
(4) report estimates for new FDI projects with control variables. The first 
specification includes province, time and industry fixed effects only; the second 
includes the additional controls for industrial agglomerations on firm’s location 
choices27. 
The results illustrate several important facts. First, there are no clear trends 
of the estimated interaction effects during the time periods immediately prior to 
the policy implemented. I will confirm this impression with a more formal 
                                                
27 I also regress with full control variable sets but the results are not clear to demonstrate this trend. This can be caused by 
the noise of correlation among these control variables and interaction terms. 
nipt = β0 + β jDistancept × Itj
j=2002
2011
∑                                                 (5)
        +ΦXipt-1 +ΘYpt-1 + vp + vt + vi +εipt                          
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analysis in the next section. The second insight is that after 2008, the magnitude 
of the distance variable increases with positive sign in some specifications, such 
as column 4. This indicates that provinces, which are further away from Taiwan, 
benefit more from this transportation shock than those closer to Taiwan. This 
implies the cross-strait flight policy affects firms’ cost structure in terms of trade 
costs so that firms are more willing to invest in a further location than before.  
 
6.2 Rolling estimates 
The second strategy to check for the chosen cut-off data is similar to the structural 
break test. This method is proposed by Nunn and Qian (2011) to check the 
structural break when there are a small number of time periods in the sample. The 
idea of this approach is attempt to work as close as possible to the standard 
statistical tests for detecting structural breaks.  
I examine four-year time segments of the full panel. For each window, I 
estimate the baseline specification from equation (3), defining the latter two years 
as the post-shock period. The estimated coefficient for the interaction between 
distance and the post-shock indicator variable shows the average increase in FDI 
growth rate and numbers of new FDI projects between the pre and post periods 
for further away provinces relative to closer provinces. Those estimates are 
expected to be close to zero until the cut-off begins to coincide with the date that 
agreements are signed.28 Prior to the policy shock, there is no reason to anticipate 
that further away provinces have a higher FDI growth rate or an increase in new 
FDI projects.  
The estimates are reported in Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
estimated coefficients for FDI growth rate and number of new FDI projects using 
a sample that includes four year periods, ranging from 2002 to 2005. For these 
regressions, the post indicator variable Itpost takes on the value of zero in 2002 and 
2003 and the value of one in 2004 and 2005. Since the direct cross-strait flights 
did not start until 2008, the results from this specification can be interpreted as a 
placebo experiment. It is the same in columns (3)-(6). Columns (3) and (4) 
examine the 2003-2006 periods and use a post indicator variable that equals one 
in 2005 and 2006, while columns (5) and (6) examines 2004-2007 and use an 
                                                
28 The results are robust to the choice of different window lengths, such as 5 or 6 years 
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indicator variable that equals one in 2006 and 2007. The estimated coefficients of 
interest in these three placebo experiments are close to zero and insignificant. 
There is no evidence of a differential relationship between the distance and the 
FDI growth rate or the number of new FDI projects in these early pre-shock time 
periods. 
Columns (7) and (8) show estimates for time periods ranging from 2005-
2008 with a post indicator variable equaling one in 2007 and 2008. In this 
specification, one of the two years in the post period coincides with the post-
shock period. Thus, it is expected that the estimates capture some of the effects of 
the operation of direct cross-strait flights. The results demonstrate that the 
magnitude of coefficients is increasing and even become positive and significant. 
Columns (9) and (10) report estimates for 2006-2009, with a post indicator 
variable that equals one in 2008 and 2009. Here these two post years coincide 
with the post-shock period. I expect the coefficients to capture more fully the 
introduction of direct flights. The results show larger positive significant 
estimated coefficients. 
Columns (11) and (12), as a final check, report estimates for 2007-2010, 
with a post indicator variable equal to one in 2009 and 2010. Since 2008 is 
included in the pre-shock time period, the results are expected to be insignificant. 
Taken together, the results confirm the findings from the previous flexible 
estimate: the impact of policy shock on the relationship between the distance and 
the change of FDI growth rate and the number of new FDI projects starts after 
2008. 
 
6.3 Examining within Region Variation 
It is a concern that the results of the impact of the policy shock might be simply 
capturing the fact that Chinese coastal regions are, on average, more attractive for 
foreign investors compared to inland regions.  Hence, the increase of FDI growth 
rates or new FDI projects in coastal provinces can be different from the rest of 
provinces for reasons other than the openness of direct cross-strait flights. Here I 
employ an alternative strategy and estimate the effect of this transportation shock 
within region variations only. I add regional fixed effects that interact with time-
period fixed effects to the baseline specification, equation (3). With the region-
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year fixed effects, the coefficient of interest, β1, is identified from within-region 
variation only. An additional benefit of the region-year fixed effects is that they 
capture any historical region-wide shocks that affected provinces within a region 
similarly.29  
Columns (1) and (3) in Table 8 report baseline estimates for comparison, 
while the remaining columns of the table report estimates with the region-year 
fixed effects, with and without the set of baseline control variables. The estimates 
show that the point estimates are reduced, but remain positive and significant. 
The smaller point estimates might reflect a loss of precision arising from the fact 
that there are relatively few provinces within each region. 
 
6.4 Lagged Dependent Variable 
In the baseline specification, I have controlled for unobserved omitted variables 
by adding provincial fixed effects. However, there might be other time-variant 
omitted variables that exist that can cause the upward or downward bias of the 
estimates. One of the potential omitted variables can be the lagged dependent 
variable. As far as FDI is concerned, the investment in the previous year at 
province p can be an indicator for future investors. This might lead to an upward 
bias of the estimate. To better control this potential bias, I add a one-year lagged 
dependent variable in the baseline regression. Table 9 reports these estimates. In 
column (5) and (8), the estimated specifications include the interaction term of 
lagged dependent variable and the post shock indicator. Columns (1)-(4) show 
that the lagged dependent variable does not affect estimates different from the 
baseline specification for the FDI growth rate, while columns (5)-(8) report that 
the estimates of coefficients are smaller and even become not significant in 
column (8). It indicates that some new FDI projects can be the continuing 
investment from the previous year. Hence, in controlling for the lagged dependent 
variable, this can absorb the variation that should not be explained by the direct 
flight policy shock. 
                                                
29 Coastal region includes 13 provinces: Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, 
Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper, I examine the impact of implementing a new transportation mode 
on firms’ location choices by using a unique quasi-natural experiment of 
Taiwan’s cross-strait direct flights policy. As an island and exporting oriented 
country, air transportation has taken an important position in Taiwan’s 
international economy in recent decades. More than 90% of international 
passengers to and from Taiwan are via air transportation. Also, air shipments 
have kept growing since 2000. 
Owing to historical political conflicts between Taiwan and China, there 
have not been any direct air or ocean transportation for passengers and shipments 
across Taiwan Strait since 1949. The very first commercial cross-strait direct 
flight routes between Taiwan and five of Chinese provinces started in 2008. The 
breakthrough in the negotiation progress in cross-strait transportation policy 
happened after the pro-China party candidate won the presidential election in 
early 2008. Very soon, there were direct flights to and from Taiwan and twenty-
five out of thirty-one of Chinese provinces in 2011. This policy shock 
dramatically changed existing air transportation patterns. For example, the 
average passenger’s air travelling time has been reduced by around 160 minutes. 
It takes only one and a half hours from Taipei to Shanghai with a direct flight, 
while an indirect one (usually via Hong Kong) can take at least five hours. Based 
on the direct flight policy shock between Taiwan and China, I employ a 
differences-in-differences strategy to estimate the general causal effect of the 
trade costs on Taiwanese public listed firms’ FDI location choices in twenty-three 
ISIC two-digit manufacturing industries in thirty Chinese provinces during the 
period 2002-2011. 
The findings shed light on the theoretical concept of the effect of trade costs 
on the distribution of firm locations in the new economy geography (NEG) multi-
regions model. In theory, the mathematic difficulties in modelling trade costs 
with multi-dimensional geography structure make the prediction of agglomeration 
or dispersion process inconclusive. In this paper, given the existing Chinese 
regional transportation networks, I aim at introducing the exogenous direct flight 
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shock between Taiwan and China in order to investigate the impact of change of 
trade costs on firm locations. 
Furthermore, I attempt to investigate the composition of trade costs by 
identifying how transaction and transport costs affect firms’ location choices 
through the distance channel. To measure these effects, I construct the transaction 
intensity and transport intensity to investigate the relative impacts of these costs 
among industries when the transportation shock occurs. As for transaction costs, 
if an industry requires more relationship-specific investments, it will face higher 
face-to-face communication costs. Hence, it will pay relatively higher transaction 
costs than others as the distance between home and host FDI destination increases. 
As for transport costs, based on the fact that airplanes are fast and expensive, they 
will be used for shipping only when timely delivery is valuable enough of the 
traded good to pay for the premium shipment costs. For sufficiently high value 
products, the ad-valorem airfreight premium becomes relatively small compared 
to low value ones. Thus, goods imported from more distant locations will have 
higher unit vales. The industry with higher air shipments’ value-weight ratio will 
pay relatively less transport costs than others as the distance between home and 
host FDI destination increases. 
The empirical results indicate that after the policy shock, the interaction 
term of the post shock dummy and the distance between Taiwan and a Chinese 
province (as a proxy for trade costs) has consistent and significantly positive 
effects on FDI location choices. According to the estimates, the increase of the 
distance by 10 percent will lead to an average 0.31 percent change for the FDI 
growth rate and 0.51 percent change for the number of new FDI projects during 
the period 2008-2011. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of both transaction 
and transport costs channel are statistically significant with expected signs. With 
a 10 percentage points higher in the transaction intensity, an increase in distance 
by 10 percent will result in average 0.24 percent decrease for the number of new 
FDI projects in the industry with relatively higher transaction costs. For the 
transport costs channel, the result is weaker. With 10 percentage points higher in 
the unit value intensity, an increase in distance by 10 percent will result in a 
relative higher number of new FDI projects by 0.0049 percent. After the direct 
flight shock, there is no clear impact through the transaction costs channel, while 
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firms in the more unit value intensive industries will choose to invest in relative 
closer locations than less intensive ones. 
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                 Source: Ministry of Transportation and Communication, Taiwan, 2012 
Figure 1  
Number and Growth Rate of Taiwan Air and Ocean Passengers 
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               Source: Ministry of Transportation and Communication, Taiwan, 2012 
Figure 2  
Growth Rate and Share of Taiwan Air and Ocean Shipments 
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                       Source: CAA, 2011 
Figure 3-1  
Taiwan-China Air Transportations, via Hong Kong, before 2008 
  
  
 
101 
 
                       Source: CAA, 2011 
Figure 3-2  
Taiwan-China Air Transportations, Direct Flights After 2008 
  
Before 2008, via Hong Kong 
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                      Source: TEJ, 2012 
Figure 4-1 
Number of Taiwanese Public Listed Firms in China, 2002 
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                            Source: TEJ, 2012 
Figure 4-2 
Number of Taiwanese Public Listed Firms in China, 2011 
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Source: author estimations 
Figure 5  
Estimated Air Travelling Time Between Taiwan and Chinese Provinces, 2006 & 
2011 
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Figure 6-1  
Growth of Taiwan’s FDI and Distance between Taiwan and Chinese Provinces, 
2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 
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Figure 6-2  
New Taiwan’s FDI and Distance Between Taiwan and Chinese Provinces, 2005, 
2007, 2009 and 2011 
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Table 1-1 
Descriptive Statistics of Contract and Unit Value Intensity 
 
Contract Intensity   Unit Value Intensity 
  Industry description     Industry description 
0.859 Moto vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
 15.279 Pharmaceutical products 
0.855 Other transport equipment  5.825 Basic metals 
0.785 Computer, electronic and optical 
products 
 3.245 Other manufactured products 
0.764 Machinery and equipment  3.245 Repair and installation of machinery 
and equipment 
0.745 Wearing apparel  2.768 Chemicals and chemical products 
0.740 Electrical equipment  -0.275 Moto vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
0.713 Beverages  -0.275 Other transport equipment 
0.713 Printing and publishing  -0.369 Computer, electronic and optical 
products 
0.611 Leather and related products  -0.724 Electrical equipment 
0.568 Furniture  -0.857 Printing and publishing 
0.547 Other manufactured products  -1.676 Coke and petroleum refineries 
0.547 Repair and installation of machinery 
and equipment 
 -1.698 Other non-metallic mineral products 
0.516 Wood products, except furniture  -1.743 Machinery and equipment 
0.490 Pharmaceutical products  -1.944 Textiles 
0.435 Fabricated metal products  -2.006 Fabricated metal products 
0.421 Other non-metallic mineral products  -2.074 Paper and products 
0.408 Rubber and plastic products  -2.105 Wearing apparel 
0.376 Textiles  -2.279 Food products 
0.365 Chemicals and chemical products  -2.479 Leather and related products 
0.348 Paper and products  -2.520 Tobacco 
0.317 Tobacco  -2.555 Rubber and plastic products 
0.305 Food products  -2.654 Wood products, except furniture 
0.226 Coke and petroleum refineries  -2.837 Beverages 
0.201 Basic metals   -3.089 Furniture 
The tow intensities measures reported are rounded from 7 digits to 3 digits. 
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Table 1-2 
Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Distance 7.21849 0.510864 5.517734 8.215991 
No. of Taiwan FDI 0.4516016 0.8705551 0 6.240276 
No. of Total Firms 4.802671 1.732966 0 9.400217 
Wage 9.85519 0.4690574 8.97563 11.18269 
Market Access 4.517039 0.5629486 2.710821 5.947222 
Contract Intensity 0.5451921 0.194357 0.201311 0.8587404 
Unit Value Intensity -0.0556142 3.985771 -3.089045 15.27882 
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Table 2 
The Impact of The Direct Flight Policy Shock: Baseline Estimates 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Taiwanese FDI growth rate  Taiwanese new FDI projects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Distancep x Post 0.0511*** 0.0435*** 0.0315*** 0.0276***  0.00871 0.0755*** 0.0521*** 0.0439** 
 (0.01000) (0.00965) (0.0094) (0.00979)  (0.0145) (0.0188) (0.0176) (0.0178) 
Baseline Controls          
# of Taiwan FDIipt-1 N Y Y Y  N Y Y Y 
# of Total Firmsipt-1 N Y Y Y  N Y Y Y 
Wage pt-1 N N Y Y  N N Y Y 
Market Accesspt-1 N N Y Y  N N Y Y 
Other Controls          
Rail Densitypt-1 N N N Y  N N N Y 
# of SEZpt-1 N N N Y  N N N Y 
D_Air Freightpt-1 N N N Y  N N N Y 
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6900 6900 6900 6900  6900 6900 6900 6900 
R_squared 0.177 0.192 0.194 0.196  0.423 0.573 0.575 0.575 
Note: Observations are at industry-province level. All regressions use a baseline sample of 30 provinces and 23 ISIC Rev.4 2-digit industries. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is either 
Taiwanese FDI growth rate or natural log of Taiwanese new FDI projects. Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and 
transport costs. The Post indicator variable equals zero for the periods 2002-2007 and one for the periods 2008-2011. All regressions include province and industry-year fixed effects. Each control variable listed is 
either provincial or industrial time variant. A Y indicates the inclusion of a control variable; N indicates that the control is not included in the specification. Coefficients are reported with standard errors, clustered at the 
province-industry level, in parentheses.   
* Indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 3 
Alternative Variable of Interest (Flight time) and Post Policy Shock Time Period 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Taiwanese FDI growth rate  Taiwanese new FDI projects 
 Distance between Taiwan and 
Chinese Provinces 
 Traveltime between Taiwan and 
Chinese Provinces 
 Distance between Taiwan and 
Chinese Provinces 
  Traveltime between Taiwan and 
Chinese Provinces 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
Post=2008, 2009, 0.0511*** 0.0435*** 0.0315***  0.0696*** 0.062*** 0.052***  0.00871 0.0755*** 0.0521***  0.0317** 0.0988*** 0.0780*** 
         2010, 2011 (0.010) (0.0096) (0.0094)  (0.0086) (0.0083) (0.0079)  (0.0145) (0.0188) (0.0176)  (0.0130) (0.0167) (0.0148) 
Post=2009, 2010, 2011 0.0597*** 0.0522*** 0.0417***  0.0692*** 0.0621*** 0.0531***  0.00763 0.0718*** 0.0496***  0.0326** 0.0946*** 0.0761*** 
     (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0082)  (0.0149) (0.0189) (0.0175)  (0.0131) (0.0166) (0.0148) 
Baseline Controls                
# of Taiwan FDIipt-1 N Y Y  N Y Y  N Y Y  N Y Y 
# of Total Firms ipt-1 N Y Y  N Y Y  N Y Y  N Y Y 
Wage pt-1 N N Y  N N Y  N N Y  N N Y 
Market Access pt-1 N N Y  N N Y  N N Y  N N Y 
Fixed effects Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Note: Observations are at industry-province level. All regressions use a baseline sample of 30 provinces and 23 ISIC Rev.4 2-digit industries. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is either 
Taiwanese FDI growth rate or natural log of Taiwanese new FDI projects. Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and 
transport costs. The Post indicator variable equals zero for the periods 2002-2007 and one for the periods 2008-2011. All regressions include province and industry-year fixed effects. Each control variable listed is 
either provincial or industrial time variant. A Y indicates the inclusion of a control variable; N indicates that the control is not included in the specification. Coefficients are reported with standard errors, clustered at the 
province-industry level, in parentheses.   
* Indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 4 
Transaction and Transport Costs 
 
 Dependent Variable: Taiwanese 
new FDI projects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distancep×CIi -0.258*** -0.235***   -0.249*** -0.227*** 
     (0.0408) (0.0413)   (0.0412) (0.0417) 
Distancep×UVIi   0.00485** 0.00425** 0.003 0.00268 
        (0.002) (0.00199) (0.00201) (0.00201) 
Control Variables       
# of Total Firms ipt-1 N Y Y N Y Y 
Wage pt-1 N Y Y N Y Y 
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6900 6900 6900 6900 6900 6900 
R_squared 0.303 0.305 0.305 0.299 0.302 0.302 
Note: Observations are at industry-province level. All regressions use a baseline sample of 30 provinces and 23 ISIC Rev.4 
2-digit industries. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is either Taiwanese FDI growth rate or 
natural log of Taiwanese new FDI projects. Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese 
provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and transport costs. The Post indicator variable equals 
zero for the periods 2002-2007 and one for the periods 2008-2011. All regressions include province and industry-year 
fixed effects. Each control variable listed is either provincial or industrial time variant. A Y indicates the inclusion of a 
control variable; N indicates that the control is not included in the specification. Coefficients are reported with standard 
errors, clustered at the province-industry level, in parentheses.   
* Indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance 
at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5 
Transaction and Transport Costs: Direct Flight Policy Shock 
 
 Dependent Variable: Taiwanese new FDI projects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distancep×CIi -0.239***  -0.254*** -0.229*** -0.244*** -0.225*** 
     (0.0427)  (0.0427) (0.0431) (0.0532) (0.0535) 
Distancep×CIi×Post 0.0101  0.0122 0.00628 -0.012 -0.00424 
      (0.0289)  (0.0280) (0.0290) (0.0842) (0.0841) 
Distancep×UVIi  0.00747*** 0.00611** 0.00586** 0.00618** 0.00589** 
  (0.00257) (0.00259) (0.00258) (0.00260) (0.00259) 
Distancep×UVIi×Post  -0.00806** -0.00777* -0.00796** -0.00794* -0.00804** 
  (0.00406) (0.00406) (0.00406) (0.00410) (0.00410) 
Distancep×Post     0.0148 0.0065 
      (0.0486) (0.0488) 
Control Variables       
# of Total Firms ipt-1 N Y N Y N Y 
Wage pt-1 N Y N Y N Y 
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6900 6900 6900 6900 6900 6900 
R_squared 0.303 0.305 0.303 0.305 0.303 0.305 
Note: Observations are at industry-province level. All regressions use a baseline sample of 30 provinces and 23 ISIC Rev.4 
2-digit industries. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is either Taiwanese FDI growth rate or 
natural log of Taiwanese new FDI projects. Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese 
provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and transport costs. The Post indicator variable equals 
zero for the periods 2002-2007 and one for the periods 2008-2011. All regressions include province and industry-year 
fixed effects. Each control variable listed is either provincial or industrial time variant. A Y indicates the inclusion of a 
control variable; N indicates that the control is not included in the specification. Coefficients are reported with standard 
errors, clustered at the province-industry level, in parentheses.   
* Indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance 
at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
  
 
113 
Table 6 
Flexible Estimates: The Relationship between Taiwan-China Distance and 
Taiwan FDI Growth Rate or Taiwan New FDI Plants in China: By Time Period 
 
 Dependent variable    
 Taiwanese FDI growth rate  Taiwanese new FDI plants 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Distancep × 2003 0.0275 0.0244  0.0516** 0.0716** 
 (0.0188) (0.0182)  (0.0250) (0.0286) 
Distancep × 2004 0.0108 0.00649  -0.00828 0.0238 
 (0.0181) (0.0176)  (0.0309) (0.0348) 
Distancep × 2005 0.0315** 0.0238  0.0124 0.0597** 
 (0.0152) (0.0147)  (0.0238) (0.0273) 
Distancep × 2006 0.0103 0.000809  -0.00443 0.0524 
 (0.0205) (0.0199)  (0.0281) (0.0330) 
Distancep × 2007 0.0222 0.00746  0.0213 0.0901** 
 (0.0206) (0.0200)  (0.0325) (0.0370) 
Distancep × 2008 0.0348** 0.0163  0.0205 0.0989*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0148)  (0.0241) (0.0302) 
Distancep × 2009 0.0351** 0.0126  0.0454 0.128*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0164)  (0.0294) (0.0378) 
Distancep × 2010 0.0259 0.00226  -0.031 0.0614* 
 (0.0182) (0.0176)  (0.0340) (0.0371) 
Distancep × 2011 0.177*** 0.152***  0.0483* 0.154*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0323)  (0.0288) (0.0380) 
Control variables N Y  N Y 
Fixed effects Y Y  Y Y 
Observations 6900 6900  6900 6900 
R_squared 0.112 0.131  0.409 0.558 
Note: Observations are at industry-province level. All regressions use a baseline sample of 30 provinces and 23 ISIC Rev.4 
2-digit industries. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is either Taiwanese FDI growth rate or 
natural log of Taiwanese new FDI projects. Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese 
provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and transport costs. All regressions include province, 
industry and year fixed effects. Each control variable listed is either provincial or industrial time variant. A Y indicates the 
inclusion of control variables; N indicates that the controls are not included in the specification. Coefficients are reported 
with standard errors, clustered at the province-industry level, in parentheses.   
Control variables include: # of Taiwan FDIipt-1, # of Total Firms ipt-1, Wage pt-1 
* Indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance 
at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 7 
Impact of Direct Flight Policy Shock with Alternative Cut-offs 
 
 Placebo Treatment Periods         
 2002-2005; 
Post=2004, 2005 
 2003-2006; 
Post=2005, 2006 
 2004-2007;  
Post=2006, 2007 
 2005-2008;  
Post=2007, 2008 
 2006-2009; 
Post=2008, 2009 
 2007-2010;  
Post=2009, 2010 
 Growth 
Rate 
New 
FDI 
 Growth 
Rate 
New 
FDI 
 Growth 
Rate 
New FDI  Growth 
Rate 
New FDI  Growth 
Rate 
New FDI  Growth 
Rate 
New FDI 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Distancep×Post 0.00345 0.00395  -0.00245 0.0144  -0.0161 0.029  0.00305 0.0475**  0.0250** 0.0532**  -0.000291 -0.00067 
 (0.0120) (0.0249)  (0.0121) (0.0232)  (0.0144) (0.0240)  (0.0118) (0.0202)  (0.0109) (0.0237)  (0.0108) (0.0224) 
Baseline controls Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Fixed effects Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Observations 2760 2760  2760 2760  2760 2760  2760 2760  2760 2760  2760 2760 
R_squared 0.156 0.621  0.121 0.605  0.116 0.598  0.11 0.593  0.113 0.571  0.134 0.569 
Note: Observations are at industry-province level. All regressions use a baseline sample of 30 provinces and 23 ISIC Rev.4 2-digit industries. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is either 
Taiwanese FDI growth rate or natural log of Taiwanese new FDI projects. Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and 
transport costs. The Post indicator variable equals zero for the periods 2002-2007 and one for the periods 2008-2011. All regressions include province and industry-year fixed effects. Each control variable listed is 
either provincial or industrial time variant. A Y indicates the inclusion of a control variable; N indicates that the control is not included in the specification. Coefficients are reported with standard errors, clustered at the 
province-industry level, in parentheses.  
Baseline controls include: # of Taiwan FDIipt-1, # of Total Firms ipt-1, Wage pt-1, Market Access pt-1  
* Indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 8 
 Robustness to Using Within-Region Variation Only 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Taiwanese FDI growth rate  Taiwanese new FDI plants 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Distancep×Post 0.0315*** 0.0199* 0.0154  0.0521*** -0.0164 0.0294* 
 (0.0094) (0.0105) (0.0100
) 
 (0.0176) (0.0147
) 
(0.0176) 
Controls variables Y N Y  Y N Y 
Coastal Province Fixed 
Effects 
N Y Y  N Y Y 
Observations 6900 6900 6900  6900 6900 6900 
R_squared 0.194 0.187 0.2  0.575 0.424 0.577 
Note: Observations are at industry-province level. All regressions use a baseline sample of 30 provinces and 23 ISIC Rev.4 
2-digit industries. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is either Taiwanese FDI growth rate or 
natural log of Taiwanese new FDI projects. Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese 
provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and transport costs. The Post indicator variable equals 
zero for the periods 2002-2007 and one for the periods 2008-2011. All regressions include province and industry-year 
fixed effects. Each control variable listed is either provincial or industrial time variant. A Y indicates the inclusion control 
variables; N indicates that the controls are not included in the specification. Coefficients are reported with standard errors, 
clustered at the province-industry level, in parentheses.   
Control variables include: # of Taiwan FDIipt-1, # of Total Firms ipt-1 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance 
at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  116 
Table 9 
 Robustness to Controlling for Lagged Dependent Variable  
 
 Dependent Variable      
 Taiwanese FDI growth rate  Taiwanese new FDI plants 
 Distance between Taiwan and Chinese Province  Distance between Taiwan and Chinese Province 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Distancep×Post 0.0513*** 0.0431*** 0.0314*** 0.0305***  0.0133 0.0454*** 0.0296** 0.00745 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.0093) (0.00866)  (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0142) 
Lagged D.V. -0.0163 0.0016 0.0013 0.0237  0.561*** 0.397*** 0.394*** 0.442*** 
 (0.0174) (0.018) (0.018) (0.0190)  (0.0539) (0.0553) (0.0554) (0.0147) 
Lagged D.V. ×Post    -0.0253     -0.131*** 
    (0.0288)     (0.0178) 
Baseline Controls          
# of Taiwan FDIipt-1 N Y Y Y  N Y Y Y 
# of Total Firmsipt-1 N Y Y Y  N Y Y Y 
Wagept-1 N N Y Y  N N Y Y 
Market Accesspt-1 N N Y Y  N N Y Y 
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6900 6900 6900 6900  6900 6900 6900 6900 
R_squared 0.178 0.192 0.194 0.195  0.604 0.624 0.625 0.628 
Note: Observations are at industry-province level. All regressions use a baseline sample of 30 provinces and 23 ISIC Rev.4 2-digit industries. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is either 
Taiwanese FDI growth rate or natural log of Taiwanese new FDI projects. Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and 
transport costs. The Post indicator variable equals zero for the periods 2002-2007 and one for the periods 2008-2011. All regressions include province and industry-year fixed effects. Each control variable listed is 
either provincial or industrial time variant. A Y indicates the inclusion of a control variable; N indicates that the control is not included in the specification. Coefficients are reported with standard errors, clustered at the 
province-industry level, in parentheses.  
* Indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE IMPACT OF TRADE COSTS ON 
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL FDI—
EVIDENCE FROM TAIWANESE FDI IN 
CHINA 
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1. Introduction 
 
What are the motivations that drive firms to establish their production facilities in 
foreign countries? Is it to save trade costs by serving the foreign market locally, 
or to take advantage of factor-price differentials, or both? The abundant 
theoretical literature studying the patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
identified two main types of FDI: horizontal and vertical FDI. With horizontal 
FDI, firms serve the foreign market by producing the final products locally to 
avoid trade costs, whereas with vertical FDI firms take advantage of cross-
country factor cost differentials. Hence, the patterns of FDI have often been 
predicted on the basis of industry and country characteristics in which the 
affiliates are in operation. However, the main challenge in examining the casual 
relationship between the locations of FDI and the motivations explained by the 
theoretical models is to find an identification strategy that allows one to 
distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI.  
         In this paper, I aim at investigating the relative impact of trade costs on 
horizontal and vertical FDI across industries. Since trade costs are recognized as 
one of the determinants in both horizontal and vertical FDI theoretical models, 
the understanding of their impact on different type of FDI is empirically relevant. 
Although there are abundant empirical studies on the impacts of other 
determinants, such as market access or factor cost differentials, on the patterns of 
FDI since 1990s, there are fewer studies on the relative impact of trade costs on 
the distribution of horizontal and vertical FDI activities. This might be due to 
limitations on data availability and methods to classify horizontal and vertical 
FDI. By exploiting unique firm-level data on Taiwanese public listed firms’ 
affiliate in China during the period 2001 to 2011, I aim at providing solid 
empirical evidence to identify the causal effect of trade costs on the distribution 
of horizontal and vertical FDI across space. 
           Alfaro and Charlton (2009) point out that the challenges are mainly related 
to the need for high quality data. The data should include information on location, 
ownership, and intra-firm trade flows within multinational firms at the plant level. 
Due to data limitation, many empirical studies instead employ information on 
multinational activities at the industry level, such as the share of the affiliates’ 
exports to the parent firm to total affiliates output, or aggregated FDI flows from 
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balance-of–payments statistics as a proxy for foreign affiliate’s activity. 
Empirical findings generally support the market access motive (horizontal FDI) 
while rejecting the low transport and factor costs motives (vertical FDI). For 
example, Brainard (1997) assessed the motivations of horizontal FDI by using 
U.S. trade data and affiliate sales data and found that higher trade costs reduce the 
affiliate’s exports in favour of affiliate sales at the foreign market.  
           As the theoretical literature predicts (see Markusen, 1984; Helpman, 1984; 
Markusen & Venables, 2000; etc.), trade costs have different impacts on 
horizontal and vertical FDI locations. In the horizontal FDI model, given foreign 
market size, as trade costs between the host and home country increase, firms will 
prefer to establish foreign production facilities rather than exporting, with the aim 
of reducing trade costs. Instead, in the vertical FDI model, given the factor cost 
differentials, firms will chose to locate the production affiliates, which is part of 
the production processes, in the closer destinations in order to reduce the trade 
costs resulting from intra-firm trade. However, in the empirical literature, the use 
of bilateral geographical distance as a proxy for trade costs seems to provide 
inconclusive predictions on the patterns of FDI. For instance, Fajgelbaum et al. 
(2013) find that the estimates of trade costs have a significantly negative impact 
on horizontal FDI activities, which goes against the predictions of the horizontal 
FDI model30.  The first contribution of this paper is to shed light on the role of 
trade costs on horizontal and vertical FDI locations by using panel data on 
Taiwanese firm-level FDI in Chinese provinces during the period from 2001 to 
2011. The findings show that as the distance between Taiwan and the Chinese 
provinces increases, vertical FDI affiliates tend to locate relatively closer to the 
home country in comparison to the horizontal ones. These results provide solid 
support for theoretical predictions on the patterns of horizontal and vertical FDI 
locations. 
          Carr et al. (2001) examine the cross-country trade cost effects on the 
patterns of FDI31. Their empirical specification, however, separates the distance 
effect from the overall trade costs. This is because the sign of the distance 
                                                
30 Fajgelbaum et al. (2013) argue that these results could be rationalized in an extended version of the model with 
intermediate inputs. Irarrazabal et al. (2013) show that a negative coefficient on distance is consistent with a model of 
horizontal FDI when allowing for trade in intermediates goods. 
31 They assess the impact of bilateral trade costs between the host and home country on foreign affiliates sales. The trade 
costs effects include three estimates: host country trade costs, home country trade costs and the interaction between the 
host country trade costs and the endowment difference between home and host country.  
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variable is ambiguous due to the fact that distance is an element of both exports 
costs and investment and monitor costs (Carr et al., 2001). Recently, the 
empirical trade literature also suggests that geographical distance has cross-
industry effects and can be at least decomposed into transaction and transport 
costs. For example, Cristea (2010) indicates that an industry with more 
relationship-specific investments tends to incur higher transaction costs than 
industries with few specific-relationship investments. Besides, Horrigan (2010) 
suggests that industries with higher value-weight ratio in air shipments can afford 
to trade goods in distant countries. This implies that the distance effect can be 
further decomposed to exploit the cross-industry variation on the patterns of FDI.  
          Since Taiwan and China share a common culture and the data on 
Taiwanese affiliates provides information at provincial level, I can eliminate 
country-invariant tariff as well as other intangible trade costs such as language or 
institutions, which are commonly considered as distance correlated costs. Hence, 
I can better identify the cross-industry distance effects on horizontal and vertical 
FDI locations. To the best of my knowledge, this has not been fully investigated 
in the literature. Based on the transaction and transport costs channels identified 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the second contribution of this paper is to provide solid 
empirical evidence of heterogeneous trade costs effects on the patterns of FDI 
across industries. The results show that vertical FDI affiliates are more sensitive 
to both transaction and transport costs channels than horizontal FDI.  
          The Taiwanese firm-level dataset provided by Taiwan Economics Journal 
(TEJ) is on the basis of Taiwanese public-listed firms’ direct investments in 
China. It enables me to investigate the effect of trade costs on multinational 
activities comprehensively at a more disaggregated industry level. The TEJ 
dataset includes information on location, ownership, primary products and the 
parent firm’s information for each affiliate. By employing this information, I 
identify more than 3,000 new multinational affiliates in 87 industries and 29 
provinces during the period 2001-2011. This unique panel dataset on new FDI 
affiliates allows me not only to use fixed effects estimators to reduce industrial 
selection biases or control for unobserved provincial characteristics, but also to 
clearly assess the effect of trade costs on the new foreign affiliates. Thus, the 
potential biases resulting from the exit of foreign affiliates in the stock level data 
can be controlled for. In the data section, I also produce a number of checks to 
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ensure that the data is representative of the full sample. 
          A limitation of this dataset is that it does not provide the affiliates’ sales 
and intra-firm trade within multinational firms, which is a common way to 
distinguish horizontal and vertical FDI affiliates in the empirical literature 
(Brainard, 1997; Yeaple, 2003; Carr et al., 2001; etc.). Following Alfaro and 
Charlton (2009) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2013), I use a combination of four-digit 
International Standard Industrial Classification Rev. 4 (ISIC Rev.4) industry-level 
information and U.S. Bureau Economic Analysis (BEA) 2002 Benchmark Input-
Output Tables to distinguish horizontal and vertical FDI affiliates. In this paper I 
further break down vertical FDI into inter-and intra-industry vertical FDI based 
on Alfaro and Charlton’s (2009) method. Inter-industry vertical FDI is defined 
when the parent firm and affiliate have different two-digit ISIC Rev. 4 code, 
while intra-industry vertical FDI pairs share the same two-digit but different three 
or four-digit codes.  
           Although both inter- and intra-industry affiliates are vertical in the sense 
that they are in industries that provide inputs to their parents firm, Alfaro and 
Charlton (2009) indicate that their findings derived from intra-industry FDI are 
not closely consistent with the standard vertical FDI theories, which emphasizes 
the factor cost differentials motive. They find that intra-industry vertical 
affiliates, which are mostly located in rich countries and in industries with 
proximate stage of production process to the parent firm, are less attracted by the 
host country’s comparative advantage. Since trade costs are another important 
motive in the vertical FDI models, it is worth assessing whether trade costs have a 
different impact across inter-and intra-industry vertical FDI affiliates. Hence, the 
third contribution of this paper is to provide the empirical evidence of impact of 
the trade costs on the intra-industry vertical FDI for theoretical considerations.   
         The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion of the 
related theoretical and empirical literature on patterns of FDI. Section 3 describes 
the data and patterns of horizontal and vertical FDI. Section 4 presents the 
horizontal and vertical FDI patterns. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy and 
results. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
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2. Related Literature 
 
A multinational firm is defined as “…an enterprise that controls and manages 
production establishments-plants-located in at least two countries establishes 
business enterprises in two or more countries.” (Caves, 2007) Although the 
corporate structure of a multinational firm might be complex, it is generally 
defined by two types of entities, the parent and the affiliate. According to Antras 
and Yeaple (2013), parent firms are entities located in one country that control 
productive facilities, while affiliates are located in other countries. The control 
between the parent and the affiliate is associated with the ownership resulting 
from foreign direct investments.  
          The pattern of multinational activities has long been recognized to be 
complex, and there was no formal theory about the relationship between 
multinational firms’ activities and host and home country characteristics until the 
1980s. The very first general equilibrium model of FDI locations was built by 
embedding multinational firms’ activities in trade theory. This theoretical 
framework focused on two types of multinationals’ investments: horizontal FDI 
and vertical FDI.  
        According to the horizontal FDI model, multinationals arise because of the 
potential to save on transaction and trade costs, as a substitute for exports. When 
trade costs in the host country are low, a firm can undertake production at home 
and serve the host country market through exports. However, when trade costs 
are high, a firm becomes a multinational to undertake the same production both at 
home and abroad, and serve the foreign market by producing locally instead of 
exporting to it. This type of FDI is called horizontal because the multinational 
replicates a subset of its activities or production processes in another country. 
Hence, the arm’s-length exports and horizontal FDI are two alternative ways to 
serve a foreign market. Firms with headquarters in the home country produce 
final goods in plants located in the home and host country to serve each market 
separately (see Markusen, 1984 and Markusen & Venables, 2000) 
          Firms engage in vertical FDI when they break the value-added chain in 
order to take advantage of international factor-price differentials. Firms engage in 
two activities: headquarter services and plants production. Headquarter activities 
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are physical or human capital intensive, while plant activities are manual labour 
intensive. When there are no factor-price differences across countries, the 
activities of both the headquarters and plants are carried out in the domestic 
market. When factor prices differ across countries, firms become multinationals 
and split the activities of headquarters and plants. Firms locate their headquarters 
in a country that is relatively abundant in skilled labour and production plants in 
countries where unskilled labour is relatively abundant. Hence, intra-firm trade of 
inputs and FDI are complements. Helpman’s (1984) model of multinational firms 
predicts that vertical multinational activities, i.e. maintain their headquarters in 
the home country and establish production plants in other countries, will increase 
as the relative factor endowment differences between the home and host countries 
increase.  
          The empirical evidence on patterns of FDI activity generally gives strong 
support to the predictions of the horizontal model. For example, Brainnard (1997) 
and Carr et al. (2001) show that FDI is high in countries with higher trade costs 
and low plant economies of scale, while the factor abundance has little impact on 
FDI locations. Their results support the horizontal investment model along with 
the market access motive, but reject the vertical FDI, which is motived by low 
trade costs and comparative advantage across countries.  
         In recent empirical investigations of vertical FDI, however, the comparative 
advantages considerations on multinational firms’ location decisions are 
supported by, for example, Yeaple (2003) and Hanson et al. (2005). Alfaro and 
Charlton’s (2009) findings, based on global firm-level data, show that in the more 
aggregated industrial level, vertical FDI will arise in countries where production 
factors are relatively cheap. 
         In the empirical literature on FDI location, it has been well documented that 
bilateral distance, as a proxy for trade costs, has consistent and negative effect on 
FDI location (Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2001; Keller & Yeaple, 2009; Mayer et al., 
2010; etc.). However, there are only few further investigations on the relative 
distance effect on vertical and horizontal FDI. This is because the firm-level FDI 
data with detailed product information, production locations and intra-firm trade 
flows are difficult to acquire. Hence, the identification strategy to define vertical 
and horizontal FDI becomes the crucial empirical challenge. Egger (2008) 
employs US bilateral FDI stocks panel data at industry level to examine the 
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distance-related effects on the distribution of US horizontal and vertical FDI. The 
results provide strong support for horizontal FDI models. However, in the 
empirical specification, the use of total FDI stocks as the outcome of interest 
cannot distinguish the horizontal and vertical FDI. Hence, it is not possible to 
identify the relative distance effect on horizontal and vertical FDI.  
        Alfaro and Charlton (2009) exploited the firm-level dataset provided by Dun 
& Bradstreet on global multinational activities. They establish a method to 
classify the relationship between the parent and the foreign affiliates into 
horizontal and vertical FDI by inferring from their products’ input-output linkage. 
They also further define two sub-categories of the vertical FDI: inter- and intra-
industry vertical FDI. Inter-industry vertical FDI is defined when the parent and 
affiliates are in different two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, 
while intra-industry vertical FDI is defined when the parent and affiliates are in 
the same two-digit SIC codes but have different 3 or 4 digit codes. Their findings 
generally support the trade costs motive on vertical FDI locations, i.e., the 
negative coefficient on the bilateral distance variable. It is worth noticing that 
they present the results that intra-industry vertical affiliates tend to locate in 
richer countries, which contradict to theoretical predictions on factor price 
differentials. The findings indicate that not only the factor costs comparative 
advantage become insignificant, but also the magnitude of the coefficient on trade 
costs decreases. The explanations could be that intra-vertical FDI affiliates, which 
is in the same proximate production stage as the parent firm, are more likely to 
establish in the countries with better governance or better quality of contracting 
institutions32. However, they did not provide further results of the relative effect 
of trade costs on the inter- and intra-industry vertical FDI locations.  
         Even though trade costs are of theoretical importance, the empirical 
specification of trade costs is far from being direct and quantifiable. Bilateral 
distance is commonly used as a proxy for trade costs. The inverse distance is 
employed as a discount factor to measure region or country market access 
(Redding & Veneables, 2004; Amiti & Javorcik, 2008). Distance is also the 
important determinant of transport costs of goods shipments (Hummels, 2007). 
Moreover, in Mayer et al (2010), transaction costs, which are approximated by 
                                                
32 Nunn (2007) shows that countries with a poor contractual environment tend to specialize in industries in which 
relationship-specific investments are not important. The contracting institutions affect the patterns of trade through 
comparative advantage channel.  
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bilateral distances, languages and law origins, can be taken as one of the 
determinants of firms’ choice of location. Fujita and Mori (2005) summarized 
that it is important to distinguish the two different types of impediment to trade in 
space, i.e. transport costs for goods, and communication costs for doing business 
over space. In Chapter 2, based on the literature discussed above, I have 
identified transaction and transport costs channels of the trade costs by employing 
two intensity measures: contract intensity and unit value intensity.  
          It has been argued that trade costs have heterogeneous effects on the 
distribution of economic activities across industries. Cristea (2011) indicates that 
exporting firms in the industry requiring specific-relationship investment, i.e. 
higher contract intensity, will face higher transaction costs. On the other hand, 
Harrigan (2010) claims that exporting firms in the industry with higher value-
weight air shipments ratio, i.e. higher unit value intensity, will bear relative 
smaller ad-valorem transport costs than those in the lower value-weight ratio 
industry. Hence, in Chapter 2, I created the contract intensity and the unit value 
intensity to measure the relative distance effect on FDI locations across 
industries. The empirical findings from Chapter 2 suggest that the higher the 
contract intensity (the higher requirement for relationship-specific investments), 
the higher the transaction costs. The parent firms tend to establish the foreign 
affiliate in the higher contract intensity industry in a closer location. On the other 
hand, the higher the unit value intensity (the higher value-weight ratio of air 
shipments), the lower the ad-valorem cost premium for the transport cost. Thus, 
the parent firms can afford to establish the foreign affiliates in the higher unit 
value intensity industries in the locations further away from the home country 
than lower ones. 
          In sum, the horizontal FDI model predicts that market access and trade 
costs are two major host country characteristics affecting horizontal FDI locations. 
The larger the market access, the stronger incentive the parent firm has to 
establish the foreign affiliate in order to serve the local market. Also, if the trade 
costs become higher, the parent firm will not serve foreign markets through 
exports but through local affiliates. On the other hand, the location characteristics 
conducive for vertical FDI differ from those for horizontal FDI and principally 
concentrate on factor price differentials and low trade costs. As the differences in 
factor prices increase between the home and host country, the parent firm is 
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motivated to divide production into discrete processes and locate individual 
process in the country that provides the most favorable environment. Production 
fragmentation leads to intra-firm trade between headquarters and foreign affiliates. 
Hence, as trade costs decrease, the intra-firm trade flows increase. Therefore, 
based on the theoretical literature, this paper aims at providing empirical evidence 
on the relative importance of trade costs on the pattern of FDI locations by testing 
the following three hypotheses of related trade costs effects:  
 
1) Trade costs – approximated by bilateral distance - have a negative 
impact on the formation of new vertical FDI affiliates in comparison to 
the horizontal FDI;  
2) With the same transaction or transport costs intensities, vertical FDI 
affiliates will be affected relatively more than horizontal FDI as the trade 
costs increase;  
3) The negative impact of trade costs on intra-industry vertical FDI 
affiliates is smaller than inter-industry vertical FDI.  
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3. Data 
 
3.1 Data sources 
In this paper, I use three sources of data. In the first place, I use data on 
Taiwanese public listed firms’ FDI in China, collected from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal (TEJ). TEJ collects the FDI information from firms’ annual 
financial statements as well as FDI registration data from the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (MOEA). The unit of foreign affiliates in TEJ dataset is the 
firm. It provides the business names, addresses, investment types, ownership, 
primary products, and the capital flow of these affiliates in China. Parent’s 
primary industry code is recoded using Taiwanese industrial classification, which 
is based on four-digit ISIC Rev. 4 system. The affiliate’s code is not reported, but 
can be filled in by using the information of affiliate’s primary products. To be 
consistent with the empirical literature, I construct the dataset with both parent 
and affiliate being in the manufacturing sector during the period between 2001 
and 2011. Combining the affiliate’s name and location in China and MOEA’s 
registration date, it is possible to identify the 3,023 new FDI affiliates spanning 
cross 87 four-digit ISIC Rev. 4 industries. This paper will use the number of new 
FDI affiliates as the dependent variable to investigate the impact of the distance at 
the extensive margin, i.e., more firms participate in multinational activities.  
          To validate the representative of TEJ data, I compare the number of new 
TEJ affiliates aggregated by year and province with information on Taiwanese 
FDI projects by the MOEA (see Figure 1-1 and 1-2). According to Taiwan’s FDI 
regulations, both individuals’ and firms’ FDI projects in China have to be 
approved by MOEA, or register in MOEA if the amount of investment is under 
$200,000. Complete firm-level data is not available, but the MOEA provides 
monthly and annual reports on all registered/approved FDI projects in China with 
information covering 25 provinces/regions with two-digit ISIC Rev. 4 codes. 
However, MOEA’s data is based on projects not affiliates. Figure 1 plots total 
number of FDI projects (by year and province) from the MOEA against total new 
affiliates (by year and province) in the TEJ data. The correlation between the two 
datasets is 0.81, suggesting that the cross-province and year distribution of 
Taiwanese multination activity in the TEJ data matches that in the MOEA 
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registered data. Moreover, Figure 1-2 demonstrates that the two datasets are 
highly correlated in the cross year-province-two digit ISIC industry level.  
           In this paper, I include as main control variables, factor prices and 
agglomeration externalities at the Chinese provincial level. Data on wages and 
gross industry output are collected from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook. The 
market access of province j is the summation of: 1) distance discounted final 
consumption of all other provinces i, i ≠ j, and 2) province j’s final consumption 
discounted by the radius of area. I also construct the market access with zero 
trade costs within province, i.e. the inversed intra-province distance equals to 1. 
Two market access measurements are highly correlated (0.71). Hence, 
considering the huge variation in the size of Chinese provinces (the standard 
deviation is 118,630.4), the radius intra-province distance is better to account for 
the ease of the access within each province by controlling the impact of 
geographic unit. ). In the regression analysis, I also use the market access 
measurement with the zero trade costs (Dii=1) intra-province distance as a 
sensitivity check. The estimated results are qualitatively consistent with signs and 
significance as the market access variable with the radius intra-province distance.  
        Finally, the Taiwanese industrial agglomeration data is collected from the 
MOEA’s annual FDI reports. They provide the number of projects and amounts 
of FDI in twenty-five Chinese provinces/regions in twenty-three two-digit ISIC 
Rev.4 industries. I use the cumulated industrial FDI projects as the proxy for 
Taiwanese agglomeration in each province.  
         The major variables of interest are the trade costs between Taiwan and 
China. Due to data constraints on calculating precise cost measures, I employ the 
distance between Taiwan and capital city of each Chinese province as a proxy for 
trade costs33. The distance is calculated by using Google Earth.  
          Based on the methods established in Chapter 2, I reconstruct contract and 
unit value intensities for three-digit ISIC Rev. 4 codes to investigate the relative 
impact of transaction and transport costs on horizontal and vertical FDI locations. 
As for contract intensity, the top five contract intensive industries are: 
Manufacture of motor vehicles (ISIC 291), Manufacture of parts and accessories 
for motor vehicles (ISIC 293), Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor 
                                                
33 Distance is commonly used as a proxy for trade costs in the new economy geography or international trade literature. 
Disdier and Head (2008) provide a thorough evaluation of the distance effect on trades. 
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vehicles, Manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers (ISIC 292), Manufacture of 
measuring, testing, navigating and control equipment, watches and clocks (ISIC 
265) and Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic 
equipment (ISIC 266). The least five intensive industries are: Manufacture of 
refined petroleum products (ISIC 192), Manufacture of basic precious and other 
non-ferrous metals (ISIC 242), Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilizers and 
nitrogen compounds, plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms (ISIC 201), 
Casting of metal (ISIC 243) and Manufacture of other food products (ISIC 107).   
           As for the unit value intensity, the top five unit value intense industries 
are: Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products 
(ISIC 210), Manufacture of other chemical products (ISIC 202), Manufacture of 
basic precious and other non-ferrous metals (ISIC 242), Manufacture of medical 
and dental instruments and supplies (ISIC 325), and Manufacture of man-made 
fibres (ISIC 203). The five least intensive industries are: Manufacture of furniture 
(ISIC 310), Manufacture of beverages (ISIC 110), Manufacture of plastics 
products (ISIC 222), Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting 
materials (ISIC 162), and Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of 
luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness; dressing and dyeing of fur (ISIC 151). 
In short, these two intensity measurements can reflect heterogeneous industrial 
characteristics on transaction and transports costs.   
 
3.2 Horizontal and Vertical FDI 
To investigate the patterns and the determinants of FDI locations, the ideal data 
should be able to distinguish horizontal and vertical FDI. However, it is difficult 
to have a clear-cut distinction.  First of all, not all divisions of production stages 
can be neatly classified as horizontal or vertical. Secondly, the empirical study 
requires firm-level information on the sales and purchases of inputs by foreign 
affiliates. Furthermore, foreign affiliates’ sales have to be categorised according 
to their destination: sales to local market, exports to home country, or exports to 
the third country. And the imported inputs of foreign affiliates need to be 
classified based on whether they are used for further reprocessing or for resale in 
the local market. However, detailed firm-level data with which to analyse the 
activities of multinational firms are not generally available.  
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         Since the Taiwanese dataset does not provide intra-firm trade flows, which 
is used in the trade literature to identify the vertical FDI, Alfaro and Charlton’s 
(2009) method is a feasible identification strategy to distinguish horizontal and 
vertical FDI affiliates by using firm ownership data and an input-output matrix. In 
Alfaro and Charlton’s (2009) data, there was no intra-firm trade information to 
identify vertical and horizontal FDI. They solved this issue by inferring the intra-
firm trade from information about the goods produced in the parent firm and 
foreign affiliates and the aggregate input-output linkage between these goods. As 
their dataset covered many countries and industries, they argued that this method 
should not cause concerns about the value of intra-firm trade being affected by 
transfer pricing. In addition, this method avoids the arbitrariness of classifications 
of products for the “intermediate” inputs or others. Therefore, this input-output 
linkage method is employed for the Taiwanese FDI data, which is disaggregated 
in finer industry level across Chinese provinces and years. Since Taiwanese FDI 
data is a panel dataset, I can even better control for other unobserved and time 
invariant provincial, industrial and province-industry characteristics in this 
empirical study. 
          According to U.S. input-output tables, horizontal FDI is defined when the 
activity of foreign affiliates is in the same industry of their parent, and vertical 
FDI when the activity of foreign affiliates is in the industries upstream from the 
parent industry.  Foreign affiliates are neither vertical nor horizontal if they 
satisfy neither of these criteria, and if they satisfy both, they will be called 
complex FDI34 . In this paper, I characterize the input-output links among 
industries using the direct requirements table from U.S. Bureau Economic 
Analysis (BEA) 2002 Benchmark Input-Output Tables. The observation in the 
table is a commodity-industry pair, and the direct requirements coefficient, dij, 
specifies the value of inputs from industry i needed to produce one dollar of 
output in industry j. The commodities and industries are defined using the BEA 
six-digit industry codes, which I can map into the 2007 NAICS classification. 
And then they are matched to the four-digit ISIC Rev. 4 assigned in the TEJ 
dataset by using the BEA concordances35. There are 130 manufacturing industries 
                                                
34 Please see Alfaro and Charlton (2009) for detailed information. 
35 The BEA provides following concordances tables: 2002 I-O industry code to 2002 NAICS, 2002 NAICS to NAICS 
2007, and ISIC Rev. 4 to NAICS 2007. Based on the industry descriptions, the direct requirement coefficient is allocated 
to ISIC Rev. 4 from 2002 I-O industry code.  
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in the four-digit ISIC Rev. 4 classification. In this paper, as the literature 
suggested (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009 and Ramondo et al., 2012), the threshold of 
dij >0 is selected to determine the strength of the relationship required to assume 
that an affiliate is a supplier to this parent36.  
 
                                                
36 I also use the BEA 2002 Total Requirement Table and choose various thresholds: 0.01, 0.001 and 0.005. Those results 
are qualitatively consistent across different thresholds. 
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4. Patterns of Horizontal and Vertical FDI 
 
By using the direct requirement coefficient matrix with the Taiwanese parent-
affiliate industry pairs, I can describe the most frequent manufacturing parent-
affiliate combinations. Table 1 shows that, out of all the manufacturing FDI 
affiliates in the data, 1,361 are vertical and 1,599 are horizontal at four-digit ISIC 
Rev. 4 level. In Table 2, the most common horizontal pair is Manufacturing 
Computer Components and Boards (ISIC 2610), and the second is Manufacture 
of Computers and Peripheral Equipment (ISIC 2620). On the other hand, Table 3 
demonstrates that the most common vertical industry pair is Manufacturing of 
Computers and Peripheral Equipment (ISIC 2620) affiliates supplied by the 
Manufacturing of Computer Components and Boards (ISIC 2610). The second 
most common pair is Manufacturing of Computer Components and Boards (ISIC 
2610) supplied by Manufacturing of Computers and Peripheral Equipment (ISIC 
2620). The third most common pair is Manufacturing of Computer Components 
and Boards (ISIC 2610) supplied by Plastics Packaging Materials and 
Unlamented Film and Sheet Manufacturing (ISIC 2220). Those observations 
suggest that this approach captures supply chain relationships.  
          The average value of the direct requirements coefficients in the I-O matrix 
is only 0.001, and 70 percent of the industry pairs do not have an input-output 
relationship. The direct requirements I-O table also shows that most industries 
require inputs from similar industries: the entries in the direct requirements 
matrix tend to be the largest on or near the diagonal. In the Taiwanese parent-
affiliate data, the average direct requirements coefficients jump to 0.009 when the 
affiliate is upstream. This suggests that in the Taiwanese parent-affiliate data, the 
parent owns affiliates in similar industries and that these industries are important 
producers of intermediate inputs for each other. 
          A large share of these production chains linkages is unreported when the 
data are aggregated at the two-digit ISIC rather than the four-digit ISIC industry. 
That is, many parent-affiliate pairs operate in industries that share the same two-
digit ISIC industry, but have different three and/or four-digit ISIC industries. 
Table 1 shows that, in two-digit aggregation level, only 780 affiliates are 
allocated as vertical FDI, while in four-digit level, there are 1,361 vertical FDI 
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affiliates. About 40 percent of the vertical FDI observed is not visible at the two-
digit level because only at finer levels of disaggregation it is clear that these 
foreign affiliates are in industries that produce inputs to their parents’ products. 
Alfaro and Charlton (2009) argue that the distinction between vertical 
investments visible at the two- and four-digit level is more than of labeling: there 
are in fact different products, one being an input to the other. Hence, in this paper, 
the main results are made from using 4-digit ISIC Rev. 4 code to reduce the 
measurement bias.  
         Moreover, based on Alfaro and Charlton (2009) definition, I further 
distinguish the vertical FDI into inter-and intra-industry vertical FDI. Inter-
industry vertical FDI is labeled when the parent and affiliate operate across two-
digit ISIC codes, and intra-industry vertical when the parent and affiliate operate 
cross four-digit industry codes. According to the input-output linkages, I argue 
that the inter-industry vertical FDI has different motivations, product 
characteristics, and location determinants from intra-industry vertical FDI. This 
provides the opportunity for further investigations on the relative distance effect 
on inter-industry and intra-industry vertical FDI. For example, Manufacturing of 
Computers and Peripheral Equipment (ISIC 2620) affiliates supplied by the 
Manufacturing of Computer Components and Boards (ISIC 2610) are classified 
as intra-industry vertical FDI, while Manufacturing of Computer Components 
and Boards (ISIC 2610) supplied by Plastics Packaging Materials and 
Unlamented Film and Sheet Manufacturing (ISIC 2220) are as inter-industry 
vertical FDI. Figure 2 shows the parent-affiliate industry combinations for both 
inter- and inter-industry vertical FDI in the manufacturing sector (ISIC, 1010-
3290). We can observe that intra-industry affiliates are, by construction, close to 
the diagonal line, whereas inter-industry FDI is more widely spread.  
        Industry characteristics differ among horizontal, inter-industry and intra-
industry FDI. Table 4 shows that horizontal FDI affiliates are in industries with 
higher contract intensity than vertical ones, whereas there is no significant 
difference in unit value intensity between horizontal and vertical FDI. Host 
country characteristics of horizontal and vertical FDI also differ. Horizontal FDI, 
on average, are more likely to be found in distant locations. In Table 5, the 
average distance is still significantly different between inter-and intra-industry 
vertical FDI affiliates, while there is no significant difference in the factor costs 
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motive (wages) and market access motive. It suggests that trade costs might still 
be a dominant determinate of vertical FDI locations. Figure 3-1 and 3-2 
demonstrate that the bilateral distance has general negative effect on FDI 
locations.  
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5. Empirical Strategies and Results 
 
5.1 Baseline Estimates 
Following the empirical literature on FDI location (Egger 2008, Alfaro and 
Charlton, 2009, Mayer et al., 2010, etc.), I assess the importance of trade costs in 
the determination of horizontal and vertical patterns by running the following 
equation (1):  
 
 
 
where the subscript s indexes the industry of foreign affiliate, the subscript p 
indexes the industry of the parent firm, the subscript j indexes the Chinese 
province, and the subscript t indexes the time periods, which are from 2002 to 
2011. The outcome of interest, FDIspjt, is the measure of the multinational 
activities either classified as the logarithm of the number of new horizontal 
affiliates or vertical FDI affiliates in an affiliate-parent industry pair, s-p, in 
province j at year t. To examine the first hypothesis based on the vertical and 
horizontal FDI models, trade costs, market access motive and provincial factor 
prices are included. First, Distancej, used as a proxy for the trade costs, is the 
logarithm of bilateral distance between Taipei (Taiwan) and the capital city of 
Chinese province j. Wagejt-1 is the logarithm of average salaries of workers and 
staff in province j at year t-1. This is used to approximate the factor price 
differentials between Taiwan and Chinese provinces.  MarketAccessjt-1 is the 
logarithm of measure of local market size in province j at year t-1, defined in the 
previous section.  
          In addition, empirical evidence suggests that agglomeration externalities 
have significant impact on FDI location in Chinese provinces (e.g., Amiti and 
Javorcik, 2008, Debaere et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2011). Two agglomeration 
variables are included in order to control for these time varying provincial 
FDIspjt = β0 +β1Distancej                                                            (1)
 +β2D_VFDIsp +β3Distancej ×D_VFDIsp   
 +β4Wagejt−1 +β5MarketAccessjt−1      
  + β6IndAgglomerationjt−1 +β7TaiAgglomerationjt−1
 +ΘX jt-1D_VFDIsp +εspjt
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characteristics. IndustryAgglomerationjt-1 is the logarithm of total gross industry 
outputs in province j at year t-1. This accounts for the positive externalities that 
an affiliate can benefit from locating in the province where it has larger supplier 
access. TaiAgglomerationjt-1 is the logarithm of total cumulated FDI projects in 
province j at year t-1. Taiwanese agglomeration is likely to be a favorable factor 
in Taiwanese firms’ location choices. The findings in Chapter 1 suggest that for a 
newly entering firm, the agglomeration of Taiwanese affiliates in the host 
province demonstrates that the investment environment is favorable because of 
local information spillovers and lower investment risk.  
         D_VFDIsp is the vertical FDI indicator, which equals one for the 
observations that are aggregated from vertical FDI affiliates, and zero for 
horizontal FDI. The interaction term, Distancej×D_VFDIsp, is the interaction of 
distance and an indicator variable. Xjt-1 is the vector of provincial control 
variables in equation (1): Wagejt-1, MarketAccessjt-1, IndustryAgglomerationjt-1, 
and TaiAgglomerationjt-1. Xjt-1×D_VFDIsp, which is the vector of interactions 
between control variables and the vertical FDI indicator, is included to control for 
all the additional effects of control variables on the patterns of vertical FDI. 
         The theoretical predictions suggest that in the vertical FDI sub-sample, a 
negative coefficient of the distance variable is expected. As provinces are closer 
to Taiwan, they will attract more vertical FDI projects because of lower trade 
costs given the similar provincial comparative advantage. On the other hand, in 
the horizontal FDI sub-sample, a positive coefficient is expected. As provinces 
are further away from Taiwan, they will attract more horizontal FDI projects 
because of higher trade costs given the similar size of market access. 
          Table 6 presents the main results of equation (1) using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator. In columns (1) and (2), I present the results using data 
at the four-digit level of aggregation (58 four-digit manufacturing industries) and 
information on the number of new horizontal FDI affiliates only. Columns (3) 
and (4), present the results for aggregated vertical FDI affiliates (63 four-digit 
manufacturing industries). Two specifications for each outcomes of interest are 
reported. The first specification regress the distance variable only, reported in 
columns (1) and (3). Columns (2) and (4) report the estimates from equation (1) 
including all controls. Overall, the coefficients of the variable of interest, 
Distancej, show that trade costs have no expected impacts on horizontal and 
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vertical FDI in both specifications. Since the distance variable is likely to be 
correlated with other unobserved provincial characteristics, such as cultures or 
institutions, the coefficient of distance variable might be biased. Also, the 
unobserved time and industrial characteristics are not controlled for. For example, 
some industries with highly fragmented production processes or higher share of 
intermediate inputs for producing final goods, such as computer, electronic and 
optical products or motor vehicles, may incline to agglomerate to benefit from 
better market or supply access than other industries in which raw materials are 
major inputs. 
         Columns (5) and (6) report the results for total FDI affiliates. To estimate 
the relative effect in trade costs on horizontal and vertical FDI affiliates’ location 
decisions in the full FDI sample, vertical indicator and all its interaction terms 
with other repressors are included. The estimated coefficient of the distance 
interaction term, Distancej×D_VFDIsp, reveals the average change in the 
outcomes of interest arising from the types of FDI. With or without control 
variables, the estimates are positive but not significant, which is not in line with 
the theoretical predictions. This can be resulted from the same omitted variable 
bias faced in columns (1) to (4).   
     
5.2 Horizontal vs. Vertical FDI 
To reduce omitted variable as well as selection biases, I estimate equation (2) 
with industry and province-industry fixed effect estimators. The industry here is 
referred to affiliate’s industry. There are two main unobserved affiliate’s industry 
characteristics to control for. First, the cross-industry agglomerations effects have 
been considered as major determinants of FDI locations in China (see Chapter 1; 
Amiti & Javorcik, 2008; Debaere et al., 2010). However, due to the data 
limitation, these agglomeration variables in 4-digit ISIC industry level are not 
available. In order to uncover their impacts on affiliate’s locations, the 4-didgt 
ISIC industry fixed effects are at play. 
        Second, the unobserved specific industry-province characteristics, such as 
comparative advantages, might bias the estimation on vertical FDI location 
choices. For example, the interactions between the relative difference in skilled-
labour intensity or knowledge capital across affiliate’s industry and provincial 
factor endowments might affect the patterns of vertical FDI locations. Yeaple’s 
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(2003) and Alfaro and Charlton’s (2009) results show that a skilled-labour 
intensive affiliate industry tends to be located more in the destinations with a 
relative abundant skilled labour force. Because of the data constraints on factor 
endowments in provincial level, the industry-province fixed effects estimator is 
used to reduce the omitted variables bias.   
 
 
 
            Columns (1) and (2) in Table 7 report the results estimated by using 
industry fixed effects estimator. Province and time dummies are also included. 
The estimate of interest in column (1) is not significant and with the positive sign. 
In column (2), after including additional time-varying provincial control 
variables, the estimate of interest is significant with the expected negative sign.  
             Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 report respectively the results of 
estimated coefficients from equation (2) by running industry-province fixed 
effects estimator. The coefficient of distance interaction term in column (3) is 
negative but not significant. In column (4), the result shows that trade costs have 
an addition negative impact on vertical FDI locations in comparison to Horizontal 
FDI. Quantitatively, according to the estimates in column (4), if the distance 
between Taiwan and Chinese provinces increase by 10 percentage, the number of 
new vertical FDI decreases by 2.48 percentage comparing to horizontal FDI. This 
result supports the first hypothesis that vertical FDI affiliates locate in the 
destinations that are closer to the parent firm to save trade costs.  
 
5.3 Transaction and Transport costs and Patterns of FDI locations 
In this section, I further examine the impact of transaction and transport costs on 
locations of new FDI affiliates. According to the findings in Chapter 2, in the 
transaction costs channel, as bilateral distances increase, the contract intensive 
industries will invest less than less intensive ones. On the other hand, in the 
transport costs channel, industries with higher unit value intensity will tend to 
invest in locations relatively further away than less intensive ones. In equation (3), 
FDIspjt = β0 +β1D_VFDIsp +β2Distancej ×D_VFDIsp           (2)
 +ΦX jt-1 +ΘX jt-1D_VFDIsp
 + vsj ×D_VFDIsp + vt ×D_VFDIsp + vsj + vt +εspjt
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the estimated coefficients of the distance interaction terms, Ln 
Distancej×Contract intensitys and Ln Distancej×Unit value intensitys, reveal the 
relative effects of distance on the location choices through transaction and 
transport cost channels across industries. 
 
FDIspjt = β0 +β1D_VFDIsp                                                        (3)
 +β2Distancej ×CIs ×D_VFDIsp
 +β3Distancej ×UVIs ×D_VFDIsp    
 +ΦX jt-1 +ΘX jt-1D_VFDIsp
 + vsj ×D_VFDIsp + vt ×D_VFDIsp + vsj + vt +µsjt
 
      
        In Table 8, I use the Taiwanese FDI affiliates’ data aggregated to three-digit 
ISIC Rev. 4 level. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for horizontal FDI 
affiliates and vertical FDI respectively. As for vertical FDI, although the 
estimated coefficient of transaction costs channel has the expected negative sign 
and the estimate of the transport costs channel has the positive sign, there is no 
clear significant impact of transaction and transport costs on vertical FDI 
locations. In the horizontal sub-sample, the estimated coefficients of transaction 
costs channel is significant with a negative sign, and the coefficient of transport 
costs channel is with a positive sign but insignificant. The results are in contrast 
to the theoretical predictions that horizontal FDI affiliates in relative high contract 
intensity industry will tend to be located more in the further away destination to 
save trade costs. Similarly, the locations of horizontal affiliates being in the 
relative low unit value industry will tend to be further away from the parent frim. 
In general, we cannot distinguish the relative effects of trade costs on the patterns 
of FDI.  
      Next, I examine the relative impact of trade costs through these two channels 
on horizontal and vertical FDI affiliates. In equation (3), the estimated 
coefficients of the interaction terms with vertical FDI, Distancej×CIs×D_VFDIsp 
and Distancej×UVIs×D_VFDIsp, reveal the average additional effects of being 
vertical FDI affiliates through each specific channel. Column (3) in Table 8 
shows that, if vertical affiliates are in the contract intensive industries, the parent 
firms tend to choose the locations relatively closer in comparison to horizontal 
FDI affiliates with the same intensity. If horizontal and vertical FDI affiliate are 
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in the same contract intensive industry, a 10 percent increase in the distance 
reduces the number of vertical FDI affiliates by an additional 4.43 percent than 
horizontal FDI. The result in column (3) also indicates that, through the transport 
costs channel, if vertical affiliates are in the unit value intensive industries, parent 
firms choose locations that are relatively further away in comparison to horizontal 
FDI locations with the same intensity. If a horizontal and a vertical FDI affiliates 
are in the same unit value intensive industry, a 10 percent increase in the distance 
will result in an additional 0.15 percent increase in the number of the vertical FDI 
affiliate. In column (4), with all control variables, the coefficient of transaction 
costs is still significant with similar magnitude, while the significance of transport 
costs drops with the expected positive sign. In short, the empirical findings 
suggest that vertical FDI locations are much more sensitive to trade costs through 
both transaction and transport costs channels.  
 
5.4 Patterns of Inter- and Intra-industry FDI 
In this section, I further investigate the relative importance of trade costs on inter- 
and intra-industry vertical FDI by estimating the following equation: 
 
 
 
where the outcome of interest is VFDIspjt,, the logarithm of new vertical FDI 
affiliates in affiliate-parent industry pair, sp, in province j at year t. 
Distancej×D_intraVsp is the variable of interest, which is the interaction between 
the distance and the intra-industry vertical FDI indicator. D_intraVsp equals one if 
the observation is intra-industry vertical FDI, and zero for inter-industry vertical 
FDI.  
          Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and Ramondo et al. (2012) show that 
multinational firms are more likely to own the stages of production closest to the 
final good they supply. To control for the industrial proximity impact on the 
patterns of vertical FDI, I introduce a variable, Closenesssp, which measures the 
VFDIspjt = β0 +β1D_ IntraVsp                                                  (4)
 +β2Distancej ×D_ IntraVsp
 +β3Closenesssp +β4Closenesssp ×D_ IntraVsp    
 +ΦX jt-1 +ΘX jt-1D_IntraVsp
 + vsj ×D_ IntraVsp + vt ×D_ IntraVsp + vsj + vt +εspjt
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proximity of two industries in a vertical production chain established by Alfaro 
and Charlton (2009). Closenesssp is simply the logarithm of absolute difference 
between the four-digit ISIC Rev. 4 codes of two industries, where subscript s 
indexes the industry of foreign affiliate and subscript p indexes the industry of 
parent firm. For example, Manufacturing of Computers and Peripheral Equipment 
(ISIC 2620) have a closeness of 10 to Manufacturing of Computer Components 
and Boards (ISIC 2610) and a closeness of 400 to Plastics Packaging Materials 
and Unlamented Film and Sheet Manufacturing (ISIC 2220). This closeness 
variable takes advantage of the fact that the ISIC Rev.4 categorizes similar 
industries together.  
         Table 9 presents the results of equation (4). The estimates of distance 
interaction in columns (1) and (2) are not significant, but in column (2), the 
estimate of distance interaction term is with positive sign. In columns (3) and (4), 
I further control for the production proximity effect. The estimated coefficient of 
distance interaction is with positive sign but not significant in column (4). In 
short, the results suggest that trade costs might affect less negatively on intra-
industry vertical FDI than inter-industry vertical FDI, but this difference is not 
significant.  
        The estimated coefficients of the proximity variable are with the expected 
negative sign as the literature suggests (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009). The results 
imply that the farther apart two ISIC codes, the less vertical multinational activity 
is observed between them. Hence, the parent firms tend to invest in the stages of 
production proximate to their final production, giving rise to a class of similar 
factor inputs, intra-industry vertical FDI.  Columns (3) and (4) also report the 
results of the estimates of interaction terms of the intra-industry indicator and the 
proximate variable. The negative and statistically significant coefficients indicate 
that parent firms tend to own more intra-industry affiliates which are in the 
similar production stages in comparison to inter-industry vertical FDI.  The 
rationales for why firms choose to own these proximate stages of production 
might result from information advantages associated with co-ownership of the 
similar production stage, intellectual property concern or product quality 
control37.   
                                                
37 Alfaro and Charlton (2009) provide detail discussion based on the existing trade literature.  
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5.5 Robustness Check 
According to Hummels (2007), air and sea transportation costs have declined 
since 1970s. Although the distance is still a major part of the costs, it may not 
catch the change in trade costs over time. Alternatively, it has been suggested that 
transportation time can be taken as a type of trade costs (Hummels and Schaur, 
2013). To provide a more practical measure to catch the time variation for the 
trade costs in this paper, I construct the estimated passenger air traveling time 
between Taiwan and each Chinese provincial capital. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the passenger air travelling time has two components: actual flight time and 
estimated transfer time. These are calculated through the flight booking systems 
of both airlines and flight search engines38. This measure takes into account the 
change in travelling time costs over the period 2001 to 2011. For example, the 
open of direct flights between Taiwan and Chinese provinces dramatically change 
the travelling time after 2008.  
        Following previous specifications, Distancej is replaced with the passenger’s 
flight time, Flight timejt, which is a time varying measure of trade costs. Columns 
(1) and (2) in Table 10 report the results of the relative importance of trade costs 
on horizontal and vertical FDI. In column (1), without including provincial 
control variables, the estimate of flight time interaction term is positive. It reflects 
the similar omitted variables bias discussed in section 5.1. In column (2), once 
control variables are included, the coefficient of flight time interaction term has 
expected negative sign but not significant. Columns (3) and (4) report the results 
of transaction and transport costs channels. The results show that both transaction 
and transport cost channels are significant with the expected signs. Overall, the 
travelling time variable gives better results on the two trade costs channels but 
weaker in the baseline specification. For the transaction and transport costs 
channels, the robustness check further supports the findings in the previous 
sections that trade costs have heterogeneous impacts on the patterns of horizontal 
and vertical FDI across industries and provinces. 
 
                                                
38 For example, I use booking websites such as Skyscanner (www.skyscanner.net) and airline companies’ website, such as 
China Airline and Eva Airways. 
  143 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I aim at investigating the relative impact of trade costs on horizontal 
and vertical FDI across industries. Since trade costs are recognized as one of the 
determinants in both horizontal and vertical FDI theoretical models, the 
understanding of their impact on different type of FDI is empirical relevant. 
Although there are abundant empirical studies on the impacts of other 
determinants, such as market access or factor cost differentials, on the patterns of 
FDI since 1990s, there are fewer studies on the relative impact of trade costs on 
the distribution of horizontal and vertical FDI activities. This might be due to 
limitations on data availability and methods to classify horizontal and vertical 
FDI. By exploiting unique firm-level data on Taiwanese public listed firms’ 
affiliates in China during the period 2001 to 2011, I aim at providing solid 
empirical evidence to identify the causal effect of trade costs on the distribution 
of horizontal and vertical FDI across space. 
           Based on horizontal and vertical FDI theoretical models, I test three 
hypotheses: 1) trade costs – approximated by bilateral distance - have a negative 
impact on the formation of new vertical FDI affiliates in comparison to the 
horizontal FDI; 2) with the same transaction or transport costs intensities, vertical 
FDI affiliates will be affected relatively more than horizontal FDI as the trade 
costs increase; and 3) the negative impact of trade costs on intra-industry vertical 
FDI formation is smaller than inter-industry vertical FDI.  
           The paper exploits a novel source of data, a panel dataset of Taiwanese 
public-listed firms‘ affiliates in Chinese provinces with detail information on 
location, ownership, and four-digit ISIC Rev.4 between 2001 and 2011. As 
Alfaro and Charlton (2009), I identify each affiliates as a horizontal or vertical 
FDI on the basis of the input-output linkage of each parent-affiliate industry pair.  
I estimate the impact of trade costs on the number of new vertical and horizontal 
FDI affiliates by using the fixed effects estimator. This controls for unobserved 
industrial and provincial characteristics in order to eliminate omitted variables 
problems or selection issues that might cause biased estimates. 
           My findings indicate that the increase in distance between Taiwan and 
province j of 10 percent reduces the number of new vertical FDI affiliates by 2.48 
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percent in comparison to horizontal FDI. In addition, if both vertical and 
horizontal FDI affiliates are in the same industry, as the distance increases by 10 
percent, the number of the vertical FDI affiliates reduces average additional 4.43 
percent than horizontal FDI through the transaction costs channel, while the 
number increases by 0.15 percent through the transport costs channel. Finally, 
trade costs have no significantly relative impact on inter-and intra-industry 
vertical FDI.  
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Figure 1-1  
Comparison of Cross-year and province Taiwanese FDI in China:  
TEJ vs. MOEA, 2001-2011 
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Figure 1-2 
Comparison of Cross-year, province and industry Taiwanese FDI in China: TEJ 
vs. MOEA, 2001-2011 
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Figure 2  
Taiwanese Inter- and Intra-industry Vertical FDI, 2001-2011  
100
0
150
0
200
0
250
0
300
0
350
0
Pa
re
nt 
Fi
rm
s, 
4-d
igi
t I
SIC
4
1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Foreign Affiliates, 4-digit ISIC4
Source: TEJ, 2012
Inter-industry Vertical FDI
100
0
150
0
200
0
250
0
300
0
Pa
re
nt 
Fi
rm
s, 
4-d
igi
t I
SIC
4
1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Foreign Affiliates, 4-digit ISIC4
Source: TEJ, 2012
Intra-industry Vertical FDI
  151 
 
 
Figure 3-1  
Taiwanese Total, Horizontal and Vertical FDI in China, four-digit ISIC4, 2001-
2011 
 
 
Figure 3-2  
Taiwanese Horizontal, Inter-and Intra-Industry Vertical FDI in China, four-digit 
ISIC4, 2001-2011  
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Table 1 
Patterns of Taiwanese FDI Affiliates in China 
 
 Four-digit Three-digit Two-digit 
Total 2960 2960 2960 
Horizontal 1599 1723 2180 
Vertical 1361 1237 780 
Vertical inter 780 780 780 
Vertical intra 581 457  
    
Percentage    
Horizontal 54% 58% 74% 
Vertical 46% 42% 26% 
Vertical inter 26% 26% 26% 
Vertical intra 20% 15%  
Source: Authors’ calculation using TEJ data. 
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Table 2 
Most Frequent Parent-Affiliate Horizontal Industry Pairs 
 
Parent Industry Parent ISIC 
code 
No. of 
Affiliates 
Electronic components and boards 2610 820 
Computers and peripheral equipment 2620 181 
Electric motors, generators, transformers, and electricity 
distribution and control apparatus 
2710 75 
Communications equipment 2630 60 
Footwear 1520 37 
Plastics products 2220 31 
Optical instruments and photographic equipment 2670 27 
Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 2930 25 
Wearing apparel, except fur apparel 1410 22 
Plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms 2013 22 
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products 2100 22 
Other special-purpose machinery 2829 21 
Prepared animal feeds 1080 16 
Pulp, paper and paperboard 1701 14 
Glass and glass products 2310 14 
Other fabricated metal products 2599 14 
Batteries and accumulators 2720 13 
Soft drinks; production of mineral waters and other bottled waters 1104 12 
Rubber tyres and tubes; retreading and rebuilding of rubber tyres 2211 12 
Medical and dental instruments and supplies 3250 12 
Consumer electronics 2640 11 
Basic iron and steel 2410 10 
Bicycles and invalid carriages 3092 10 
Magnetic and optical media 2680 8 
Other chemical products  2029 7 
Irradiation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic equipment 2660 7 
Sports goods 3230 7 
Made-up textile articles, except apparel 1392 6 
Corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers of paper and 
paperboard 
1702 6 
Articles of concrete, cement and plaster 2395 6 
Source: TEJ, 2012  
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Table 3 
Most Frequent Parent-Affiliate Upstream Vertical Industry Pairs 
 
Parent Industry Affiliate Industry Parent 
ISIC 
code 
Affiliate 
ISIC 
code 
No. of 
firms 
Computers and peripheral equipment Electronic components and boards 2620 2610 127 
Electronic components and boards Computers and peripheral equipment 2610 2620 58 
Electronic components and boards Plastics products 2610 2220 54 
Cement, lime and plaster Articles of concrete, cement and plaster 2394 2395 45 
Electronic components and boards Optical instruments and photographic 
equipment 
2610 2670 30 
Computers and peripheral equipment Communications equipment 2620 2630 28 
Computers and peripheral equipment Plastics products 2620 2220 27 
Electronic components and boards Other fabricated metal products 2610 2599 26 
Electronic components and boards Cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 2610 2593 25 
Electronic components and boards Other electronic and electric wires and 
cables 
2610 2732 23 
Communications equipment Electronic components and boards 2630 2610 22 
Communications equipment Computers and peripheral equipment 2630 2620 21 
Pulp, paper and paperboard Corrugated paper and paperboard and of 
containers of paper and paperboard 
1701 1702 18 
Other special-purpose machinery Electronic components and boards 2829 2610 18 
Electronic components and boards Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-
forming or metal; powder metallurgy 
2610 2591 17 
Electronic components and boards Electric lighting equipment 2610 2740 17 
Computers and peripheral equipment Electric motors, generators, transformers, 
and electricity distribution and control 
apparatus 
2620 2710 17 
Basic iron and steel Treatment and coating of metals; 
machining 
2410 2592 16 
Electric motors, generators, 
transformers, and electricity 
distribution and control apparatus 
Electronic components and boards 2710 2610 16 
Plastics and synthetic rubber in 
primary forms 
Plastics products 2013 2220 15 
Electronic components and boards Communications equipment 2610 2630 15 
Electronic components and boards Treatment and coating of metals; 
machining 
2610 2592 14 
Electronic components and boards Electric motors, generators, transformers, 
and electricity distribution and control 
apparatus 
2610 2710 14 
Electronic components and boards Wiring devices 2610 2733 12 
Electronic components and boards Wiring devices 2620 2733 12 
Other electronic and electric wires 
and cables 
Electronic components and boards 2732 2610 12 
Parts and accessories for motor 
vehicles 
Electric lighting equipment 2930 2740 12 
Electronic components and boards Other special-purpose machinery 2610 2829 11 
Computers and peripheral equipment Basic precious and other non-ferrous 
metals 
2620 2420 11 
Other special-purpose machinery Treatment and coating of metals; 
machining 
2829 2592 11 
Source: TEJ, 2012  
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Table 4 
Characteristics of Horizontal and Vertical FDI 
 
 Horizontal FDI Vertical FDI Difference  
Average log distance between Taiwan 
and Chinese provinces 
6.84 
(6.80-6.88) 
6.78 
(6.76-6.80) 
0.06*** 
Average industry-contract intensity of 
subsidiary 
0.64 
(0.63-0.65) 
0.56 
(0.55-0.57) 
0.08*** 
Average industry-unit value intensity 
of subsidiary 
0.98 
(0.91-1.05) 
0.96 
(0.89-1.02) 
0.02 
Average log wage of subsidiary 
province 
9.95 
(9.92-9.99) 
10.02 
(9.99-10.04) 
-0.07*** 
Average log market access of 
subsidiary province 
4.70 
(4.66-4.74) 
4.75 
(4.72-4.78) 
-0.05** 
Average log gross industry output of 
subsidiary province 
9.51 
(9.43-9.59) 
9.88 
(9.83-9.94) 
-0.37*** 
Average log Taiwanese FDI stock of 
subsidiary province 
11.90 
(11.69-12.12) 
12.97 
(12.85-13.09) 
-1.07*** 
Note: 95% confidence interval in brackets.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, and * Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Table 5  
Characteristics of Inter- and Intra-industry Vertical FDI 
 
 Inter-industry 
FDI 
Intra-industry 
FDI 
Difference 
Average log distance between Taiwan and 
Chinese provinces 
6.76 
(6.74-6.79) 
6.81 
(6.76-6.85) 
-0.05* 
Average log wage of subsidiary province 10.03 
(9.99-10.06) 
10.02 
(9.97-10.06) 
0.01 
Average log market access of subsidiary 
province 
4.76 
(4.72-4.80) 
4.73 
(4.68-4.78) 
0.03 
Average log gross industry output of 
subsidiary province 
9.97 
(9.91-10.04) 
9.74 
(9.65-9.83) 
0.23*** 
Average log Taiwanese FDI stock of 
subsidiary province 
12.87 
(12.72-13.02) 
13.13 
(12.93-13.33) 
-0.26** 
Note: 95% confidence interval in brackets.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, and * Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Table 6  
Baseline Estimates: Horizontal and Vertical FDI 
 
 Dependent Variable: Ln New Taiwanese Vertical FDI Affiliatesspjt, 4-digit ISIC4 
 Horizontal FDI  Vertical FDI  Total FDI 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Ln Distancej -0.127* 0.0234  -0.0222 0.0520**  -0.127* 0.0234 
 (0.0765) (0.0826)  (0.0232) (0.0221)  (0.0764) (0.0825) 
Ln Distancej× D_VFDIsp       0.104 0.0286 
       (0.0805) (0.0864) 
D_VFDIsp       -0.960* 2.228* 
       (0.577) (1.246) 
Control variables         
Ln Wagejt-1  0.169   -0.108**   0.169 
  (0.238)   (0.0520)   (0.238) 
Ln Market Access jt-1  -0.133   0.00781   -0.133 
  (0.260)   (0.0519)   (0.259) 
Ln Industrial   0.0176   0.0262   0.0176 
 Agglomeration jt-1  (0.0759)   (0.0179)   (0.0757) 
Ln TAI FDI   0.0933***   0.0356***   0.0933*** 
 Agglomeration jt-1  (0.0291)   (0.00958)   (0.0291) 
Ln Wagejt-1 ×D_VFDIsp        -0.278 
        (0.213) 
Ln Market Accessjt-1        0.141 
×D_VFDIsp        (0.233) 
Ln Industrial         0.00861 
Agglomerationjt-1×D_VFDIsp        (0.0772) 
Ln TAI Agglomerationjt-1        -0.0577** 
×D_VFDIsp        (0.0248) 
         
Observations 651 651  1,059 1,059  1710 1710 
Within R-squared 0.007 0.142  0.001 0.042  0.05 0.153 
Note: Observations are at industry-province-year level. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
natural log of Taiwanese new FDI affiliates. Ln Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese 
provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and transport costs. The vertical FDI dummy variable, 
D_VFDI, equals one for the industrial pairs with direct input requirements greater than zero in the IO table, and zero 
otherwise. Control variables are one year lagged. OLS estimator is used for 4 specifications and standard errors are in 
parentheses. Industry-province cluster Standard errors are reported. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level 
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Table 7 
The Relative Impact of Trade Costs on Horizontal and Vertical FDI 
 
Dependent variable: Ln New Taiwanese FDI Affiliatesspjt, 4-digit ISIC4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln Distancej× D_VFDIsp 0.0697 -0.125* -0.028 -0.248*** 
 (0.0615) (0.0645) (0.0887) (0.0917) 
D_VFDIsp -2.376 -19.33 6.099 41.84 
 (16.91) (41.83) (20.16) (54.52) 
Control variables     
Ln Wagejt-1  -0.0719  0.0134 
  (0.246)  (0.314) 
Ln Market Accessjt-1  -1.098  -1.265 
  (0.772)  (0.939) 
Ln Industrial Agglomerationjt-1  -0.0373  0.0434 
  (0.145)  (0.194) 
Ln TAI Agglomeration jt-1  0.151***  0.137** 
  (0.0204)  (0.0542) 
Ln Wagejt-1×D_VFDIsp   -0.125  0.211 
  (0.119)  (0.176) 
Ln Market Accessjt-1×D_VFDIsp  0.0385  -0.0166 
  (0.122)  (0.144) 
Ln Industrial Agglomerationjt-1 0.111**  0.247*** 
×D_VFDIsp  (0.0480)  (0.0726) 
Ln TAI Agglomerationjt-1  -0.173***  -0.338*** 
    ×D_VFDIsp  (0.0208)  (0.0324) 
     
Time Dummy Y Y Y Y 
Province Dummy Y Y N N 
Fixed Effects Industry 
 
Industry 
 
Industry-
Province 
Industry-
Province 
Observations 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 
Within R-squared 0.158 0.235 0.159 0.254 
Note: Observations are at industry-province-year level. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
natural log of Taiwanese new FDI affiliates. Ln Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese 
provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and transport costs. The vertical FDI dummy variable, 
D_VFDI, equals one for the industrial pairs with direct input requirements greater than zero in the IO table, and zero 
otherwise. Control variables are one year lagged. Coefficients are reported from the fixed effect estimators and standard 
errors are in parentheses.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level 
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Table 8  
Transaction and Transport Costs Channels 
 
Dependent variable: Ln New Taiwanese FDI Affiliatesspjt, 3-digit ISIC4 
 
Horizontal 
FDI  
Vertical 
FDI  
 Total FDI   
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Ln Distancej×Contract Intensity -0.609**  -0.0258    
 (0.250)  (0.190)    
Ln Distancej×Unit Value Intensity 0.00728  0.00489    
 (0.0435)  (0.0408)    
Ln Distancej×CIs×D_VFDIsp     -0.399*** -0.443*** 
     (0.0457) (0.0448) 
Ln Distancej×UVIs×D_VFDIsp     0.0144** 0.0148** 
 
    (0.00585) (0.00603) 
       
Control variables Y  Y  N Y 
Time Dummy Y  Y  Y Y 
Province Dummy Y  Y  N N 
Fixed Effects Industry  Industry  Industry-
Province 
Industry-
Province 
Observations 723  952  1,691 1,691 
Within R-squared 0.33  0.068  0.173 0.239 
Note: Observations are at industry-province-year level. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
natural log of Taiwanese new FDI affiliates. Ln Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese 
provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and transport costs. The vertical FDI dummy variable, 
D_VFDI, equals one for the industrial pairs with direct input requirements greater than zero in the IO table, and zero 
otherwise. Control variables are one year lagged. Coefficients are reported from the fixed effect estimators and standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
Control variables include: Ln Wage, Ln Market access, Ln Industrial agglomeration, and Ln Taiwanese agglomeration in 
the 2-digit ISIC4 level. Controls*D_VFDI are included as well. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level
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Table 9  
Trade Costs on Inter-and Intra-industry Vertical FDI  
 
Dependent variable: Ln New Taiwanese Vertical FDI Affiliatesspjt, 4-digit ISIC4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln Distancej×D_IntraVsp -0.0148 0.197 -0.0121 0.208 
 (0.138) (0.158) (0.137) (0.157) 
Ln Closenesssp   -0.0258 -0.0215 
   (0.0187) (0.0186) 
Ln Closenesssp×D_IntraVsp   -0.0756* -0.101** 
   (0.0388) (0.0390) 
Control variables N Y N Y 
     
Time Dummy Y Y Y Y 
Fixed Effects Industry-
Province 
Industry-
Province 
Industry-
Province 
Industry-
Province 
Observations 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059 
Within R-squared 0.031 0.059 0.046 0.077 
Note: Observations are at industry-province-year level. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
natural log of Taiwanese new FDI affiliates. Ln Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese 
provincial capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and transport costs. The intra-industry vertical FDI 
dummy variable, D_IntraV, equals one for the industrial pairs in the same 2-digit ISIC4 code and zero otherwise. Control 
variables are one year lagged. Coefficients are reported from the fixed effect estimators and standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
Control variables include: Ln Wage, Ln Market access, Ln Industrial agglomeration, and Ln Taiwanese agglomeration in 
the 2-digit ISIC4 level. Controls*D_IntraV are included as well. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level
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Table 10 
Alternative Measure of Trade Costs: Air Travelling Time 
 
 DV: Ln New Taiwanese 
FDI Affiliatesspjt, 4-digit 
ISIC4 
 DV: Ln New Taiwanese 
FDI Affiliatesspjt, 3_digit 
ISIC4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Ln Flight timejt -0.0842 0.0637  0.265** 0.275*** 
 (0.118) (0.125)  (0.109) (0.101) 
Ln Flight timejt×D_VFDIsp 0.233*** -0.0262    
 (0.0877) (0.100)    
Ln Flight timejt    -0.447*** -0.456*** 
×CIs×D_VFDIsp    (0.0562) (0.0541) 
Ln Flight timejt    0.0157** 0.0167** 
×UVIs×D_VFDIsp    (0.00723) (0.00749) 
      
Control variables N Y  N Y 
Time Dummy Y Y  Y Y 
Fixed Effects Industry-
Province 
Industry-
Province 
 Industry-
Province 
Industry-
Province 
Observations 1,710 1,710  1,675 1,675 
Within R-squared 0.15 0.25  0.169 0.235 
Note: Observations are at industry-province-year level. The periods are from 2002 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
Taiwanese new FDI affiliates. Ln Distance is the natural log of the distance between Taiwan and Chinese provincial 
capital that is defined as a proxy for transaction costs and transport costs. The vertical FDI dummy variable, D_VFDI, 
equals one for the industrial pairs with direct input requirements greater than zero in the IO table, and zero otherwise. 
Control variables are one year lagged. Coefficients are reported from the fixed effect estimators and standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
Control variables include: Ln Wage, Ln Market access, Ln Industrial agglomeration, and Ln Taiwanese agglomeration in 
the 2-digit ISIC4 level. Controls*D_VFDI are included as well. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level 
 
